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Abstract
Cognitive science is currently the scene of a number of exciting debates. 
The so-called ‘classical’ approach, which has dominated the field since the 
1950s, is increasingly being challenged on various fronts. Evolutionary 
psychologists and researchers in artificial life accuse classical cognitive 
scientists of ignoring the fact that natural cognition is not designed to solve 
abstract problems and prove theorems but to solve particular adaptive 
problems. Those working with a ‘situated’ view of the mind are 
challenging the classical commitment to internalism. Finally, proponents 
of dynamical approaches claim that the discrete models favoured by the 
classical approach are too coarse-grained and impute too much internal 
structure to the mind.
In this thesis I argue that the ‘non-classical’ approaches are compatible 
with classical cognitive science, with the important proviso that 
compatibility comes in different kinds. In the final chapter I outline a vision 
of a comprehensive 'integrated non-classical cognitive science1 that 
combines the three non-classical approaches into a single conceptual 
bundle.
I illustrate these claims about cognitive science in general with reference 
to a particular field of research: the emotions. Emotions were ignored by 
most classical cognitive scientists, though some models of emotion were 
developed within the classical framework. These models, however, 
provided no way of distinguishing emotion from cognition. I argue that the 
non-classical approaches remedy this problem, and together provide a 
new way of thinking about the emotions which I dub ‘the interruption 
theory’. Since the interruption theory borrows insights from all three of the 
non-classical forms of cognitive science, it serves as a good example of 
the integrated non-classical approach that I recommend for cognitive 
science in general.
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Introduction:
Varieties of cognitive science
Cognitive science is currently the scene of a number of exciting debates. 
The so-called ‘classical’ approach, which has dominated cognitive science 
since the 1950s, is increasingly being challenged on various fronts. 
Evolutionary psychologists and researchers in artificial life accuse classical 
cognitive scientists of ignoring the fact that natural cognition is not 
designed to solve abstract problems and prove theorems but to solve 
particular adaptive problems. Those working with a ‘situated’ view of the 
mind are challenging the classical commitment to internalism. Finally, 
proponents of dynamical approaches claim that the discrete models 
favoured by the classical approach are too coarse-grained and impute too 
much internal structure to the mind.
Because of the challenges they pose to the classical approach, the 
evolutionary, situated and dynamical approaches may all be referred to as 
‘non-classical’. One of the main questions I address in this thesis is 
whether or not these non-classical approaches are compatible with 
classical cognitive science. I argue that they are, in fact, compatible with 
the classical approach, with the important proviso that compatibility comes 
in different kinds. In the final chapter I outline a vision of a comprehensive 
'integrated non-classical cognitive science1 that combines the three non- 
classical approaches into a single conceptual bundle.
It is hard to assess these sweeping claims about cognitive science in 
general without reference to a particular field of research. The emotions 
constitute one such field, and, moreover, one that is eminently suited to 
assessing the compatibility of the classical and non-classical approaches. 
Emotions were ignored by most classical cognitive scientists, and some of
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the main proponents of the classical approach even went so far as to 
claim that they were strictly beyond the purview of cognitive science 
altogether. Later, some models of emotion were developed within the 
classical framework, but these models provided no way of distinguishing 
emotion from cognition. I argue that the non-classical approaches 
remedy this problem, and together provide a new way of thinking about 
the emotions which I dub ‘the interruption theory’. Since the interruption 
theory borrows insights from all three of the non-classical forms of 
cognitive science, it serves as a good example of the integrated non- 
classical approach that I recommend.
What is cognitive science?
Cognitive science is a massive field, grouping together many formerly 
distinct disciplines, such as artificial intelligence, linguistics and the 
neurosciences, with branches of philosophy, psychology, and 
anthropology. Indeed, it may be more appropriate to speak of ‘the 
cognitive sciences’ rather than of ‘cognitive science’ in the singular, since 
the diversity of theoretical approaches and methodologies that now refer 
to themselves as ‘cognitive’ may preclude any view of them as a single 
discipline. This is not my view. I think that the cognitive sciences have 
enough in common to warrant speaking of a single entity, 'cognitive 
science1 in the singular, that has a ‘classical’ form and various ‘non- 
classical’ variants.
The two key features that are shared by all forms of cognitive science are:
(i) the computational theory of mind (CTM): the idea that the mind is a 
computer; and
(ii) a design-based approach: the methodological maxim that a good 
way to understand any natural mind is by designing artificial ones.
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I think it is the second clause -  the commitment to a design-based 
methodology -  that most clearly distinguishes cognitive science from 
previous approaches to the study of the mind. The computational theory 
of mind is certainly important, but the idea of computation is such a loose 
notion that to define cognitive science on this basis alone would be to risk 
vacuity. It is not enough to say that the mind is a computer; one must 
then set out to think how such a computer might be built. When we 
succeed in building a thinking machine, we will know a lot more about 
thought. Similarly, when we are able to build machines that can feel 
happy or sad, we will know a lot more about emotion. This is what I mean 
by the cognitive approach to understanding emotions.
Varieties of cognitive science
The two core features of cognitive science are shared by all the 
approaches that I discuss in this thesis. It is only this that allows such 
different kinds of approach to the study of the mind to be regarded as 
forms of cognitive science in particular rather than merely forms of 
psychology (which I take to be a much more general term). These two 
core features provide the unity underlying the different approaches.
Within cognitive science, thus defined, I distinguish different approaches 
based on the stance one takes on particular issues. The evolutionary 
approach is defined by its emphasis on functional questions; what is the 
mind, and its various components, fori? In other words, why did the mind 
evolve? The situated approach is defined by its rejection of internalism. 
And the dynamical approach is defined by its preference for continuous 
models over discrete-state machines. The classical approach is defined, 
by default, by its obliviousness to evolutionary-functional questions, its 
commitment to internalism, and its preference for discrete-state machines.
During the first three decades of cognitive science, from about 1950 to 
about 1980, the characteristics that I take to define the classical approach 
went largely unchallenged. During that period, few cognitive scientists
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paid much attention to evolutionary questions, and most were committed 
to internalism and to modelling the mind with discrete-state machines. 
Nobody referred to this set of features as embodying a particular form of 
cognitive science. Many assumed that these features were just as 
essential to cognitive science as the commitment to CTM and to a design- 
based methodology. It was only when certain sections of the cognitive 
science community began to question these assumptions that it became 
clear that cognitive science was not, in fact, essentially committed to 
ignoring evolutionary questions, to internalism, and to discrete-state 
machines. Only then were these three features seen as defining a 
particular form of cognitive science, rather than defining cognitive science 
perse. The particular form of cognitive science that was marked by these 
three features came to be called the ‘classical’ approach in retrospect, 
when various dissident groups within the cognitive science community 
wished to question one of the features without thereby excluding 
themselves from cognitive science itself.
Pluralism
The identification of particular forms of cognitive science had the merit of 
making clear that the bracketing of evolutionary questions, the 
commitment to internalism, and the preference for discrete-state machines 
were all logically independent from the basic idea of CTM and from the 
choice of a design-based methodology. However, it also had a downside; 
it fractured cognitive science into a set of warring schools, each of which 
had a tendency to exaggerate its disagreements with the others. A vision 
of the underlying unity of cognitive science was lost, and cognitive 
scientists used the new labels to pigeon-hole one another. To the 
proponents of the non-classical approaches, it became an easy rhetorical 
ploy to refer to everyone before 1980 as classical. A typology of 
approaches became a way of classifying scientists.
Scientists are people, however, and people are much more complex than 
schools of thought. The latter can be defined in conceptual terms, as I
7
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have done with the various forms of cognitive science, but people are not 
so consistent. It is rare to find a scientist who pursues one kind of 
approach with single-minded dedication throughout his whole life. 
Thankfully, most people are more flexible than that. There probably never 
was a pure classical cognitive scientist, in the sense of one who never 
said anything about evolution, nor ever doubted internalism, nor ever 
wondered about the possibility of modelling the mind in continuous terms.
Nevertheless, flexibility comes in degrees. Even though there may never 
have been a pure classical cognitive scientist in the sense just described, 
there have been, and still are, cognitive scientists who are more closely 
identified with one approach rather than another. One of the aims of this 
thesis is to persuade cognitive scientists to be more flexible. The 
integrated non-classical approach I recommend is all about such flexibility.
Alan Turing: the pioneer of integrated cognitive science
In the minds of many cognitive scientists, the name of Alan Turing is 
associated exclusively with the classical form of cognitive science. 
Turing’s work does not brim with references to evolution; his emphasis on 
internal memory seems to make him a strong internalist; and the 
‘universal machine’ to which he gave his name was a discrete-state 
machine. All these features figure strongly in his great paper of 1950, 
'Computing machinery and intelligence' (Turing, 1950), which can 
therefore be taken as inaugurating the discipline of cognitive science in 
general and its classical form in particular.
Turing's legacy, however, turns out to be much broader than this. When 
one looks more closely at the 1950 paper, for example, one finds there not 
just the seeds of the classical approach, but the germs of all the so-called 
non-classical approaches too. In the section on ‘learning machines’, for 
example, Turing proposes a method of designing machines based on an 
analogy with natural selection, thus anticipating the techniques of artificial 
life by almost forty years (Turing, 1950: 52). The distinction between
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memory and processing may be far closer to the situated approach to 
cognition, with its emphasis on exploiting external resources to ease the 
burden of computation, than is usually realised (Wells, 1998: 275). 
Turing’s remarks, in section about the importance of giving a computer a 
body in order for it to have the same experiences as a normal child 
anticipate current research in robotics (Turing, 1950: 53). And although 
Turing put his money on digital computers having sufficient resources to 
pass his test for machine intelligence, he did not argue that non-digital 
computers did not have such resources. Indeed, he clearly states that the 
human nervous system is 'certainly not a discrete state machine' (Turing, 
1950: 47), and argues that digital machines could pass his test only 
because they are capable of mimicking the behaviour of non-digital 
systems sufficiently closely. It turns out that Turing anticipated many of 
the supposedly novel challenges to the classical approach that are 
generating so much debate in cognitive science today.
Turing's legacy is, then, far richer and more eclectic than is generally 
believed. It may be more accurate to regard him, not as the founding 
father of the classical approach, but as the first pioneer of the truly 
integrated cognitive science that I propose in my final chapter. Turing did 
not merely leave us with a fascinating thought-experiment about how to 
test machines for intelligence and a detailed set of proposals about one 
way (the classical way) to build such intelligent machines; he also left us 
with a number of provocative complementary suggestions, suggestions 
that have recently been developed independently by various cognitive 
scientists who object to the classical approach in one way or another.
The question of how Turing's rich legacy came to be reduced, in the minds 
of most commentators, to a mere fraction of what it really is, would make 
an interesting case study in the history of science. Whatever the reasons 
for this impoverished interpretation, one notes its subtle influence in even 
the most rigorous scholarship. When Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel 
Dennett, for example, published Turing's great paper in an anthology of 
philosophical works about the self, they chose to excise many of the
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passages I have just referred to as evidence of the richness of Turing's 
legacy (Hofstadter and Dennett, 1981).
J. A. Scott Kelso notes the same pattern of systematic misrepresentation 
in an interesting little aside in chapter one of his book, Dynamic Patterns. 
He tells a story about a famous scientist who was always arguing that the 
brain is not a Turing machine. When Kelso pointed out to the scientist that 
there was another Turing, the response was adamant: 'No, no, there's 
only one Turing. You know, the Turing of the Turing machine!' After Kelso 
wrote some equations on the board describing chemical patterns, the 
scientist paused and stared at him. 'Ah, I see what you mean,' he said. 
The equations that Kelso had written on the board were the very ones 
Turing had used to describe 'the chemical basis of morphogenesis' in 
another paper that has since become a classic in developmental biology 
(Turing, 1952; Kelso, 1995).
The anonymous scientist in this revealing anecdote had clearly heard of 
Turing's other work, for he recognised the reference when Kelso wrote up 
the diffusion equations that Turing had published in 1952. Yet, until he 
was reminded of this, the scientist insisted that there was 'only one Turing' 
-  the father of the programmable digital computer. The 'other Turing' -  the 
Turing who showed how patterns in nature can emerge without any 
programmer at all simply by means of a set of dynamic equations -  had 
been eclipsed by the monolithic image of Turing the classical cognitive 
scientist.
Even Kelso is somewhat restrictive, however, when he captions his box, 
'The two sides of Turing'. In addition to the two Turings that Kelso 
mentions, there are all the other facets that I have just mentioned, such as 
the Turing who anticipated recent ideas about the value of giving 
computers humanlike bodies, and the Turing who foresaw the field of 
artificial life. And it is not necessary to go to Turing's other papers to find 
these men. They are all there in the great paper of 1950.
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Turing even seems to have anticipated recent ideas about the mind 
emerging from complexity theory. I do not examine complexity theory in 
this thesis, so I will conclude this introduction by a brief discussion of its 
relevance to cognitive science. Complexity theory takes ideas from 
dynamical systems theory and applies them to systems composed of a 
wide range of components or of a large number of similar components.1 
One of the key ideas in complexity theory is the idea of supercriticality. 
Complex systems usually exhibit one or more phase-transitions in which 
the addition of just a few extra components can produce an abrupt shift in 
the system's behaviour.
Turing's paper pre-dates the development of complexity theory by at least 
three decades, yet it contains a thought-provoking idea about the role of 
supercriticality in mental development. After discussing the phase 
transition in atomic piles that occurs when they reach critical mass, Turing 
asks if there is a corresponding phenomenon for minds. He answers in 
the affirmative:
The majority of (human minds) seem to be ‘subcritical’, that is, to 
correspond in this analogy to piles of subcritical size. An idea 
presented to such a mind will on average give rise to less than one 
idea in reply. A smallish proportion are supercritical. An idea 
presented to such a mind may give rise to a whole 'theory' consisting 
of secondary, tertiary and more remote ideas. Animals' minds seem 
to be very definitely subcritical. Adhering to this analogy we ask, 
‘Can a machine be made to be supercritical?’
(Turing, 1950: 51)
1 There is no widely accepted definition of complexity theory. Some authors seem to treat 
it as a synonym of dynamical systems theory, or nonlinear dynamics, while others state 
explicitly that 'chaos is not complexity' (Bak, 1996). The central plank of the theory, in my 
view, is the idea that special mathematical tools are required for understanding systems 
in which the high number of components precludes any attempt to derive systemic 
properties directly from component properties. Care must also be taken to distinguish 
this theory from the branch of computational theory that is concerned with the complexity 
of certain mathematical functions, for this too goes by the name of complexity theory 
(Andy Wells, personal communication).
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Another central idea in complexity theory is that complex adaptive systems 
tend to hover around the critical points, rather than living deep in the 
subcritical or the supercritical regions of their phase-spaces. In Stuart 
Kauffman's evocative terminology, complex adaptive systems tend to be 
poised 'at the edge of chaos’, where behaviour is neither entirely ordered 
nor completely chaotic (Kauffman, 1995: 86-92). Kelso is somewhat more 
prosaic and prefers to speak of 'the intermittency mechanism', though his 
meaning is essentially the same (Kelso, 1995: 99). The following 
passage, again taken from Turing's 1950 paper, seems to anticipate just 
this idea:
Intelligent behaviour presumably consists in a departure from the 
completely disciplined behaviour involved in computation, but a 
rather slight one, which does not give rise to random behaviour, or to 
pointless repetitive loops.
(Turing, 1950: 55)
With hindsight and close-reading, then, Turing’s prescience can be seen 
to extend even into the most recent thinking in cognitive science. Yet this 
does not match the common idea of Turing today as the founding father of 
the classical approach.
The impoverishment of Turing's legacy reflects a general narrowing of 
perspective that has marred cognitive science for much of its history. In 
this history, something has occurred akin to what Steven Jay Gould has 
called 'the hardening of the modern synthesis' in evolutionary biology 
(Gould, 1983). Varela, Thompson and Rosch argue that the cybernetics 
movement, which directly preceded the emergence of cognitive science 
proper, was characterised by a much more pluralistic approach to 
cognition -  one that, for example, still regarded the digital nature of 
computation as an open question rather than an accepted dogma (Varela, 
Thompson et al., 1991: 37-39). If Varela e t al. are correct in their 
historical account, my arguments in chapter six about the need for a 
similar pluralism in cognitive science can be seen as a plea for cognitive
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science to return to its eclectic roots in what we might call the ‘pre- 
classicar era of cognitive science in the 1940s, when the design-based 
approach was initiated by disciplines with other names such as ‘control 
theory’, ‘information theory’ and ‘cybernetics’. The various species of 
cognitive science I discuss in this thesis -  both classical and non-classical 
-  can then be seen, not as antagonists, but as pieces in a complex jigsaw, 
all of which are necessary if we are to get the whole picture about mental 
phenomena. In the second part of chapter six, I go on to argue that this 
eclecticism is especially vital when it comes to getting the whole picture 
about emotion -  although Turing, it must be said, was silent about this 
important part of our mental life.
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Chapter One: 
Cognitive science and emotion
The question is not whether inteiiigent machines can have any 
emotions, but whether machines can be inteiiigent without emotions.
Marvin Minsky, The Society o f Mind
In this chapter I discuss the two ideas which underlie all the different forms 
of cognitive science: the computational theory of mind, and the design- 
based approach. I then go on to show how these ideas also mark out the 
cognitive science of emotion as a distinctive way of understanding 
emotional phenomena.
1.1. Cognitive science
Many commentators assume that the heart of cognitive science is the 
computational theory of mind (henceforth CTM) (e.g. Gardner, 1987). At 
first this idea seems quite appealing. Yet, as I argue in this section, CTM 
reduces to the old-fashioned representational theory of mind plus a 
commitment to materialism. Thus, if CTM were all there were to cognitive 
science, we would have to count almost all twentieth-century 
psychologists and neuroscientists as cognitive scientists. This would be 
stretching the term rather too far. Cognitive science is a distinctive 
approach to the study of the mind, and not all psychologists regard 
themselves as taking this approach. I conclude that, although cognitive 
science is indeed committed to CTM, this is not its most distinctive feature. 
The thing that really sets cognitive science apart from other ways of 
studying of the mind is the fact that it takes a design-based approach.
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The computational theory o f mind
The term ‘computer’ originally referred to people who computed the 
answers to mathematical problems -  that is, people who did sums. This, 
indeed, is how Alan Turing was using the term as late as 1950, by which 
time there were already a variety of electronic machines that could perform 
complex calculations automatically. These machines came to be known 
as electronic computers to distinguish them from their human 
counterparts. The etymology makes it clear that computers are defined in 
functional terms. So long as a thing can calculate the answers to certain 
mathematical questions, it is a computer, no matter what it is made of.
In claiming that minds are no more than ‘things that compute’, CTM makes 
a bold reductive move. CTM claims not merely that some minds are 
capable of performing mathematical calculations, but that all are, and that 
all the other things that minds do are reducible to such calculations.
This claim might have seemed rash in the early days of cognitive science, 
but as technology has progressed it has become more plausible. The 
range of things that electronic computers can do now is quite staggering, 
and yet all these capacities are achieved by means of reducing each step 
of each task to a set of mathematical operations. For a wide range of 
problems that were previously solvable only by agents with minds, we now 
have a transparent account of how they can be solved by machines that 
perform computations. Prima facie, this lends strong support to the idea 
that all other problems which are currently believed to require mental 
powers for their solution will eventually be solvable by computing 
machines.
Even if this is true, and all technical objections to CTM are removed, there 
may remain theoretical objections. Principal among these is the charge of 
vagueness that threatens the notion of computation. The basic idea of 
taking input and generating output in accordance with some mathematical 
function is so general that, if this were all that computation consisted of,
15
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practically anything could be construed as a computer. The position of all 
the bodies in the universe at time T2, for example, is a function of their 
position at time T1. If computation is just a question of systematically 
transforming input into output, we could regard the whole universe as a 
computer that takes the position of bodies at T1 as input and generates, 
as output, their position at T2. Yet it seems perverse to regard the 
universe as single gigantic mind. So, unless we can find some extra 
condition to constrain our notion of computation, this example would be 
enough to refute CTM.
Cognitive scientists generally argue that just such a constraint is provided 
by the notion of representation. According to this view, for x to be a 
computer, it is not enough that x systematically transforms input into 
output; the input-output relation must be representational. That is, the 
process that transforms input into output must be ‘about’, or designate, 
some process other than itself. Only when this is the case does it make 
sense to judge the output as being ‘correct’ or not. When the input-output 
transformation in x correlates well with another transformation elsewhere, 
the output of x can said to be correct. When the input-output 
transformation in x does not correlate well with another transformation 
elsewhere, the output x is incorrect. On this view, nothing is a computer 
in itself, but only with respect to some other system.
Once this constraint is imposed on the notion of computation, it no longer 
becomes possible to view the entire universe as one big computer. By 
definition, there can be no external system with which the changing 
positions of all material entities in the universe can be compared. One 
counter-example to CTM, at least, can be dispensed with. However, 
astronomers frequently run simulations of parts of the universe, such as 
the solar system. The machines running such simulations count as 
computers because there is a correlation between the way they transform 
input into output on the one hand, and the changing positions of the 
bodies in the part of the universe they represent on the other. However, 
since correlation is a symmetrical relation, it would be just as legitimate to
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regard the relevant part of the universe as a computer with respect to the 
simulation.1 Yet it seems just as perverse to regard the solar system as a 
mind as to view the whole universe as one.
To defeat this counter-example to CTM, we need some way of introducing 
asymmetry into our notion of representation so that, whenever we have 
two systems, x and y, which transform input into output in accordance with 
similar functions, one system alone can be non-arbitrarily designated as 
the computer. We may be able to find a way of introducing such 
asymmetry by appealing to the idea of approximation. Astronomical 
models of the solar system are only ever approximate; that is why we call 
them simulations and regard the solar system as the real thing. The 
relation of approximation is non-symmetrical because the correlation 
between x and y can be increased by adding degrees of freedom to x 
and/or subtracting degrees of freedom from y, but not vice-versa.
Let us now pause to summarise the argument so far. According to CTM, 
having a mind just means being a computer, and anything that computes 
can be said to have a mind. Computers can be defined as systems that 
systematically transform input into output in a way that closely 
approximates the behaviour of some other external system. On this 
definition, the machines on which astronomers run simulations of the solar 
system count as computers. Hence, if CTM is right, such machines can 
be said to have minds.
This position has been dubbed 'strong Al' by the philosopher John Searle, 
to distinguish it from what he calls 'weak Al'. Weak Al is merely the idea 
that computers are powerful tools in psychology that enable us 'to 
formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than 
before' (Searle, 1980: 183). Strong Al goes a lot further than this, claiming
1 More generally, so long as computation is constrained only by the notion of 
representation, and representation is defined purely in terms of correlation, whenever 
there are two systems, x and y, which transform input into output in accordance with 
similar functions, both systems can be regarded as computers whose internal states 
represent those of the other.
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that computers are not merely tools, but (when appropriately programmed) 
really have minds, and 'can literally be said to understand and have other 
cognitive states' (Searle, 1980: 183, emphasis in original). In strong Al, 
the programs do not merely help us to test psychological explanations; 
rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. That is, they are 
supposed to explain behaviour by providing precise models of the mental 
processes that generate it. Searle's term 'strong Al' is thus simply 
equivalent to the term 'cognitive science' as I use it in this thesis.
The representational theory of mind
Constraining the notion of computation by appealing to the idea of 
representation strengthens CTM by excluding such obviously non-mental 
entities as the universe from the class of computers. It also ties CTM to an 
earlier tradition in the philosophy of mind. Representations are intentional 
-  they are 'about' other things -  and ever since Franz Brentano declared 
that intentionality is the distinguishing mark of the mental, there has been 
a thriving school of philosophical thought that identifies the mind with a set 
of representations (Brentano, 1874).2 This is the so-called 
‘representational theory of mind’ (RTM). Thus, by defining computers as 
representational systems, CTM seems to amount to no more than a re­
statement of RTM.
CTM does, however, add something to RTM. By combining Brentano’s 
thesis with the idea that the data in computing machines are mental 
representations, CTM was able to solve a problem that had beset earlier 
forms of RTM. Brentano and others in his wake had been accused of 
begging the question, since they offered no account of how mental
2 More needs to be said, of course, about the way in which mental representations differ 
from, say, the linguistic representations on a page of print, or the pictorial representations 
in a painting, but CTM deals with this by appealing to the idea of process: minds are not 
just static sets of representations, but processes in which in representations are 
systematically transformed. To say that minds are processes does not imply, of course, 
that minds are not also metaphysically robust ‘things’.
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processes could be semantically coherent. That is, identifying thoughts 
with representations did not in itself explain how thoughts could follow 
each other in a way appropriate to their meanings. It seemed to some 
critics that Brentano's thesis merely pushed back the explanatory burden 
to some 'little man in the head1, an inner homunculus who understood the 
meanings of the representations. It did not offer a clear account of how 
minds could be material entities.
By treating the mind as a computer, however, the first cognitive scientists 
argued that they could explain how thought processes are semantically 
coherent without positing such a homunculus. If all the rules for 
manipulating data are purely formal, based wholly on syntactic properties, 
and if these rules license all and only those inferences that are permissible 
on semantic grounds, then a commitment to mental representations can 
be compatible with a genuinely causal and materialistic account of the 
mind. There is no doubt about the purely physical make-up of computing 
machines, and such machines can be programmed to carry out the formal 
rules that respect the semantics of the symbols without recourse to a 
homunculus. I conclude that CTM is reducible to RTM plus a strongly 
argued case for materialism.
To sum up: according to CTM, minds are computers that process internal 
representations by means of purely formal rules. Mental processes, in 
other words, are determined by a program, which specifies how various 
symbolic representations are to be manipulated and transformed. The 
rules in the program, whether in a man-made computer or a human mind, 
are supposed to be precise, completely explicit, and exceptionless, so that 
an ability to perform elementary logical and mathematical operations is all 
that is needed to execute them. The individual components of the 
machine, therefore, can be quite 'dumb'; they need not 'understand' the 
content of the representations that the machine is manipulating, since they 
can treat the data and the rules as purely formal structures. The rules, 
then, apply to the representations purely on the basis of their formal 
syntactic structure, but because the syntax 'hangs together' with the
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semantics, the rules generate output that is properly interpretable as being 
about objects and facts in the external world.
Criticisms of CTM
Searle is famous for his criticisms of CTM. In his classic paper, 'Minds, 
brains, and programs', he argued that even the most appropriately 
programmed computer could never properly be said to have a mind 
because it could never understand anything (Searle, 1980). Searle 
claimed that computers were like a person who didn't understand Chinese, 
but who had a rulebook that enabled him to respond appropriately to 
whichever Chinese ideograms he was presented with. The Chinese room 
argument was intended to undermine the claim of classical cognitive 
science that computing machines are capable of having minds, but it only 
goes through if one accepts a number of assumptions. For example, the 
argument assumes that the computer is equivalent to the person in the 
room. This assumption has been challenged by various critics. The 
'systems reply', which Searle discusses in his paper, argues that the 
computer is equivalent not to the person in the Chinese room, but to the 
whole system which comprises the room, the person, the rulebook, and 
everything else in the room. The person and the rulebook are analogous 
to the components of the computer. Just as 'understanding' is not 
ascribed to the individual components of the computer, but to the 
computer itself, so it is ascribed not to the person in the room but to the 
whole system. But the system is still representational because its answers 
may be judged as correct or incorrect by the external system constituted 
by the person outside the room.
I will not go into the various criticisms of the Chinese room argument and 
the various replies, which already constitute an ample literature by 
themselves. Suffice it to say here that there are still philosophers like 
Searle who do not find the claims of CTM convincing. Fodor may claim 
that CTM is 'the only game in town', but not all are persuaded. My own 
focus in this thesis, however, is not with the criticisms from outside
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cognitive science. Rather, I am concerned with the arguments of those 
who broadly accept CTM, but who wish to divorce it from other 
assumptions with which it is commonly linked. In the following chapters, I 
discuss various species of 'non-classical' cognitive science. While they 
may differ somewhat on how they define computation, and in their 
approach to hardware and software design, all of these species accept the 
basic idea that the appropriately programmed computer can be truly said 
to have a mind, and that the programs for these machines can themselves 
constitute bona fide psychological explanations.
Understanding by designing
I have argued that CTM is reducible to RTM plus a well-argued case for a 
materialist view of mind. By appealing to the existence-proof of modern 
computing machines, CTM makes a good case for resolving important 
philosophical questions about how a commitment to mental 
representations can be compatible with a commitment to materialism. 
This, however, can hardly be used to pick out cognitive science as a 
distinctive research program in psychology. The vast majority of 
psychologists have, for over a century, adopted both RTM and a 
materialist view of mind. If CTM were all there were to cognitive science, 
the term would be rather vacuous.
If cognitive science is a distinctive research program, it must have some 
other feature peculiar to itself. I think that it does have such a 
distinguishing mark. In line with various other commentators, I take this to 
be its emphasis on taking a design-based approach (c.f. Haugeland, 1996) 
In other words, cognitive science is to be defined not simply by a 
theoretical commitment to the idea that the mind is a computer, but also by 
a methodological commitment to the idea that a good way to understand 
natural minds is by designing artificial ones.
This methodological maxim is intuitively very appealing. If you want to 
understand how a car works, one way might be to try and design a vehicle
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that exhibits similar properties. Likewise, argue cognitive scientists, if you 
want to know how the human mind works, one way to do this is to design 
an artificial mind that mimics the human mind at some acceptable level of 
similarity. As John Haugeland points out, this approach to understanding 
minds is rather different from traditional empirical psychology, which is 
often purely descriptive. Unlike traditional psychology, which works 
backwards from observable behaviour to hypothetical mental causes, 
cognitive science starts with a proposed mental design and then works 
forwards by constructing a machine along these lines and observing how 
its performance compares to that of a natural cognitive agent. If the 
performance is similar to some acceptable degree, then this is good 
grounds for thinking that the mind of the natural cognitive agent has a 
similar internal design to that of the machine. Haugeland coins the term 
‘mind design’ to refer to this forward-facing methodology (Haugeland, 
1996). The term nicely underlines the crucial role played by artificial 
intelligence and software engineering in the research program of cognitive 
science. The claim is not that learning to design a mind is the only way of 
doing psychology. Rather, the claim is that designing an artificial mind is a 
very good way of doing psychology that would, at the very least, 
complement other, more descriptive approaches.
Defining cognitive science by its commitment to a design-based approach 
places artificial intelligence at the core of cognitive science. This may 
annoy those cognitive scientists who are not actively engaged in building 
artificial minds, as it may seem to imply that their research is not as 
important as work in Al, or even that they are not ‘true’ cognitive scientists. 
This is not, however, the intended meaning of the second clause. The 
clause does not specify that all cognitive scientists must take an active 
part in building artificial minds. It simply states that cognitive scientists are 
those who adopt as a methodological maxim the idea that designing an 
artificial mind is a good way to understand natural ones. This condition is 
fulfilled, I claim, whenever researchers propose models of the mind that 
are computational enough to permit a computer program to be readily 
designed on the basis of the model. If a model of mental structure
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proposed by a psychologist, for example, is written in the form of a 
decision-tree or flowchart, this could easily be taken by a programmer and 
implemented on a computing machine.3
Machines and men
The term 'machine' is often used by cognitive scientists as a convenient 
label for the hardware that is supposed to implement the artificial minds 
they design. However, as Turing pointed out, if the cognitive research 
program is not to become vacuous, we must be careful about how we 
understand this label. Machines are, by definition, artificial, yet it can be 
hard to draw a firm line between the artificial and the natural. Turing 
attempted to avoid getting bogged down in such tough metaphysical 
questions by simply stipulating that human beings born in the usual 
manner could not be regarded as true machines (Turing, 1950: 31). 
However, this stipulation is clearly not very stringent. Current advances in 
biotechnology make it conceivable that, in a few year’s time, we may be 
able to clone a human being from a single adult cell and incubate the 
foetus in an artificial womb. The result would be a human being, but not 
one ‘born in the usual manner’. It would, therefore, satisfy Turing’s 
definition of the term ‘machine’. Yet to claim that the resulting cognitive 
agent was a triumph for cognitive science would clearly violate the spirit of 
Turing’s definition, if not the letter. Turing himself noted this possibility:
... it is probably possible to rear a complete individual from a single
cell of the skin (say) of a man. To do so would be a feat of biological
3 This is what happened with some of the work in appraisal theory that is mentioned in 
chapter one; some of these models were not written as computer programs, but they 
were written as decision trees, with more than just an eye to their potential 
implementation in a computer program. These models would, therefore, count as 
'cognitive' on my definition. Likewise, many of the accounts of mental structure offered by 
evolutionary psychologists, and the accounts of neural structure provided by most 
neuroscientists, while not written as programs, are sufficiently computational in nature as 
to qualify as proper cognitive models. Most psychoanalytic models of the mind, on the 
other hand, would clearly be ruled out by the second clause.
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technique deserving of the very highest praise, but we would not be 
inclined to regard it as a case of ‘constructing a thinking machine’.
(Turing, 1950: 32)
Transparent engineering
To see why such things as a human being reared from a single somatic 
cell would not count as the realisation of the cognitive research program, 
we need not waste our time searching for more stringent definitions of the 
term ‘machine’. Rather, we need to remember that the reason why 
cognitive science is interested in constructing machines with minds is in 
order to better understand the natural minds we observe around us. 
Software engineers may be content to build intelligent machines for 
practical purposes. So long as the machines can solve the problems they 
are built to solve, it will not worry the engineers if the machines seem to 
operate in ways that bear very little relation to the way natural minds work, 
or if the machines work in ways that are not fully understood. Cognitive 
scientists, however would not be content with such machines. Cognitive 
scientists require not only that their machines solve the kinds of problem 
that natural minds solve, but also that they do it in similar ways to those 
used by natural minds, and, furthermore, that the precise details of how 
the machines work are well understood. If we succeeded in constructing 
an artificial mind simply by mimicking the natural processes by which our 
brains develop, without understanding how the resultant construction 
operated, this would indeed be a stunning technical achievement, but it 
would not count as the culmination of the cognitive research program.
Thus it seems that cognitive science would only achieve its aim if it could 
build an artificial mind by means of a technique that is, to some extent, 
self-explanatory or transparent By the phrase 'transparent engineering', I 
mean any method of construction whose principles are widely agreed by 
scientists to be well understood. Basic mechanical engineering is 
transparent in this sense, since we need only see the various pulleys, 
cogs and levers in a simple machine to understand how it works. 
‘Biological engineering’, which is how we might describe the technique of
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growing a neural network in a petri dish, is not self-explanatory, since we 
still want further explanations of how neurons actually work in terms of 
simple mechanics. The reason why constructing silicon-based minds may 
be more informative, at the current moment, than constructing neuron- 
based minds is that the former are well understood in terms of their 
physical properties, whereas the latter are much more complex. One of 
the most puzzling things about minds is how properties such as 
intelligence and intentionality can arise from arrangements of mere matter. 
If we are seeking to understand how this occurs, it is surely better to work 
with materials whose physical properties are well understood. Otherwise, 
we risk begging the question.
Functionalism and multiple readability
The requirement that cognitive scientists build their machines out of 
components whose physical properties are well understood highlights an 
important feature of cognitive science -  namely, the extent to which it is 
predicated on the assumption that ‘mind’ is a substrate neutral concept. If 
minds were tied to the neural tissue in which they are instantiated in 
humans and other vertebrates so intimately that they simply could not be 
instantiated in any other material, the whole edifice of classical cognitive 
science would come tumbling down. The idea that minds can be 
instantiated in many different media is known as the ‘multiple readability 
thesis’, and this thesis is one of the cornerstones of the whole cognitive 
research program.
In its strongest form, the multiple realisability thesis implies that there are 
only the very weakest material constraints on the instantiation of any kind 
of functional organisation. It was this intuition that allowed Hilary Putnam 
and others to challenge the (type-type) identity theory of mind in the 
1960s. Since minds, they claimed, are defined entirely in functional terms, 
and since we can imagine the same functions being performed by very 
different kinds of physical structure, it seems chauvinistic to deny that alien
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life forms and robots could have minds just because they do not have 
human-like brains (Putnam, 1960).
It is important to recognise, however, that the multiple realisability thesis is, 
at the moment, not proven. At present we have some evidence from 
artificial intelligence that minds like ours can be implemented by very 
different material structures, but this is not conclusive. It may well be the 
case, as some now argue, that human-like minds are much more 
dependent on the particular physical and biochemical properties of 
vertebrate neurons than previously thought. The multiple realisability 
thesis should be treated as empirical matter requiring further investigation, 
and not assumed on the basis of stories of robots and aliens that are, at 
present, mere science fiction. Indeed, testing the multiple realisability 
thesis can be seen as one of the subsidiary goals of artificial intelligence.
The multiple realisability thesis has led many classical cognitive scientists 
to take a very dismissive attitude towards neuroscience. The study of the 
brain becomes of very little interest once the mind is regarded as software 
which can, in principle at least, be run on almost any kind of hardware. 
The cognitive psychologist can then elaborate hypotheses about the 
programs instantiated in the human brain without worrying at all about how 
these programs are instantiated. True, it might also be interesting to know 
about the details of instantiation, but this information could not provide any 
constraints on the development of hypotheses about the purely functional 
mechanisms studied by the cognitive psychologist, since these are 
substrate neutral. This has led some critics to accuse cognitive science, 
and the functionalist doctrine on which it is based, of a hidden 
Cartesianism (Edelman, 1992).
Daniel Dennett argues that these criticisms are misplaced because they 
fail to distinguish between two claims. The first is the broad idea of 
functionalism; the second is a specific set of minimalist empirical wagers 
(neuroanatomy doesn't matter, neurochemistry doesn't matter, etc.). It 
was the second claim, not the first, that provided an excuse for many early
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cognitive scientists to remain in blissful ignorance of neuroscience. In the 
past few decades, as it has become increasingly clear that the 
neurobiological details do matter, cognitive scientists have had to give up 
on their minimalist wagers and get to grips with nueronanatomy, 
neurochemistry and the rest of neuroscience. This has left the mistaken 
impression in some places that the underlying idea of functionalism is 
flawed. In fact, however, the correct inference to draw from these recent 
discoveries is precisely the opposite; the reasons why the new claims 
matter is precisely because we accept the broad idea of functionalism. As 
Dennett remarks, 'neurochemistry matters because -  and only because -  
we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other 
chemical messengers that diffuse through the brain have functional roles 
that make important differences' (Dennett, 1999, author's manuscript, 
emphasis in original). What recent discoveries about the importance of 
neurobiology show is simply that functionalism has to be expanded 
downwards to include the details of the brain. Human minds may well be 
computers, but not the relatively simple computers that the first cognitive 
scientists hoped they would be. Their computational resources reach 
down into the sub-cellular level, and artificial minds that have humanlike 
intelligence will have to employ virtual neuromodulators and other such 
software that mimics these molecular resources.
Exactly how far downwards the computational resources of the human 
mind reach is a moot point. Roger Penrose has suggested that they reach 
as far down as the subatomic level. He argues that consciousness, in 
particular, depends crucially on the quantum mechanical properties of 
microtubules that are found in vertebrate neurons (Penrose, 1989). This is 
an extremely speculative claim, with no real evidence to back it up, and is 
regarded by many cognitive scientists with a considerable degree of 
scepticism. Nevertheless, if Penrose were correct in supposing that some 
subset of cognitive processes could only be realised by structures with 
particular quantum mechanical properties, the multiple realisability 
hypothesis would be severely weakened. Unless all physical materials 
had the relevant quantum-mechanical properties, there would be strong
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constraints, of a purely physical nature, on the kind of materials from 
which conscious minds could be constructed. Silicon, for example, might 
have inherent limitations which rule it out as a substrate for complex 
minds. This is, of course, an empirical matter that will only be resolved 
with further research in artificial intelligence.
Functional decomposition
The way that functional hypotheses about the structure of the mind are 
extended downwards into the neurobiological and physical details is 
usually by means of an explanatory strategy known as 'functional 
decomposition'. This strategy works well for understanding how complex 
man-made machines like cars and computers work. It consists of picking 
out the various components from which the machine is made, described in 
terms of the functional role they play. For example, in a car we can 
identify various systems such as the ignition system and the combustion 
system. We can then proceed in the same way with each of these 
systems, identifying the various functional subsystems which compose 
them.
This strategy of breaking complex systems down into their components 
and subcomponents is often applied to natural biological systems as well 
as to man-made artefacts. In describing the physiology of an animal, for 
example, it is common to proceed by identifying various systems such as 
the endocrine system and the nervous system. These systems can then 
be further analysed. For example, we can take the nervous system and 
break it down into the sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous 
systems. This strategy has worked well in biology despite the occasional 
objection to the apparent literalness with which it takes the analogy 
between organisms and artefacts. Largely because of its success, it has 
been taken as providing a model for psychological explanation by many 
cognitive scientists.
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When applied to the mind, the strategy of functional decomposition is 
sometimes known as ‘homuncular functionalism’. The idea here is that the 
mind can be broken down into various functional units, each of which can 
be imagined as a ‘little man in the head’ or homunculus. Each of the 
functional units can then be further analysed into subunits, which can be 
compared to even smaller mini-homunculi in the heads of the first 
homunculi. Unlike the traditional form of homunculism, according to which 
the man in the head was just as clever as the man in whose head he sat, 
homuncular functionalism is supposed to block infinite regress, and thus 
avoid vacuity, by requiring that the homunculi posited at each stage of the 
analysis are dumber than the homunculi posited at the previous stage 
(Fodor, 1968). Eventually, it is supposed, we will reach a stage at which 
the homunculi are so dumb as to be virtually mindless. That is, our 
psychological explanation ends when it is able to analyse a mini-mini-mini 
homunculus into components that can be understood in transparently 
mechanical (or neural) terms, without the need for any mentalistic or 
intentional vocabulary.
Of course, the talk of ‘little men in the head’ is merely a way of making the 
explanatory strategy more vivid. The strategy can be described in 
equivalent but less anthropomorphic terms by reference to the idea of a 
computer flowchart. Instead of being compared to little men, the functional 
units of the mind may be compared to the boxes in a computer flow chart. 
In such a flow chart, every box name is the name of a problem. ‘If the 
computer is to simulate behaviour, every box name will be the name of a 
psychological problem’ (Fodor, 1968: 48). Each box in the flowchart can 
then be analysed as a flowchart in its own right, and so on, until the boxes 
in the last flowcharts are clearly realisable by transparent engineering.
This completes our brief survey of cognitive science. In the following 
section, I show how the basic principles of cognitive science can be 
applied to the study of emotion.
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1.2. The cognitive science of emotion
Insofar as the study of emotion is concerned, the choice of the word 
‘cognitive’ to denote a research tradition in psychology was a recipe for 
misunderstanding. Many psychologists use the term ‘cognitive’ to refer to 
‘unemotional’ thought processes, such as the deductive reasoning one 
might engage in when in a calm frame of mind. Yet, as I argued in the last 
section, when used to refer to a distinctive approach to the study of the 
mind, the term ‘cognitive’ means something quite different. There are, in 
other words, at least two quite different meanings of the term:
(1) When used to describe a way of studying the mind, as in the phrase 
‘cognitive science’, the term denotes an approach that both (i) is 
committed to CTM and (ii) adopts a design-based methodology.
(2) When used to describe a mental faculty that contrasts with the 
emotions, the term denotes a set of mental processes whose 
paradigmatic forms are deductive reasoning, decision-making and 
problem-solving.
The fact that the word ‘cognitive’ can have both of these meanings has at 
times muddled the debate about emotion in cognitive science. For 
example, it can lead to the false impression that cognitive science must be 
concerned exclusively with understanding unemotional thought processes.
The first generation of cognitive scientists were largely of this view. In his 
classic textbook, Cognitive Psychology, Ulric Neisser stated unequivocally 
that dynamic and motivational factors such as emotions were not part of 
the field (Neisser, 1967). Jerry Fodor echoed this view in The Language 
of Thought (Fodor, 1975), and Howard Gardner has listed the de­
emphasis of affective or emotional factors among five defining features of 
cognitive science (Gardner, 1987).
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When one looks at the kind of programs written in the first decades of 
cognitive science, the exclusion of emotional processes is strikingly 
obvious. From the chess-playing programs to the theorem-provers, none 
seems to exhibit any feature that even remotely resembles an emotion. 
On the contrary, they all model our paradigmatic notions of unemotional 
thought processes. Computers running such programs behave like high- 
functioning autistics. Like these so-called idiots savants, machines 
running early classical programs are unusually gifted in certain areas, 
such as ‘rapid computation of large numbers, memorising phone listings, 
and precise memory of huge sets of facts and trivia, b u t... lack the forms 
of common sense and emotional intelligence that most people acquire 
effortlessly’ (Picard, 1997: 90).
However, while it is certainly true that the first models of the mind that 
were cognitive in sense (1) did, in fact, happen to deal exclusively with 
mental processes that were cognitive in sense (2), this need not have 
been the case. The two sense of the word cognitive are logically 
independent, so there is no contradiction involved in speaking of the 
cognitive science of emotion. To think that there is would be to confuse 
the two senses of the word cognitive.
There is nothing that rules out taking a design-based approach to emotion 
as well as to cognition. The cognitive approach to cognition is based on 
the idea that, by attempting to design machines that can think, we will 
come to know a lot more about thought. The cognitive approach to 
emotion is based on the idea that, by attempting to design machines that 
emote, we will come to know a lot more about emotion.
Reason and the passions
All this is to presuppose that cognition and emotion (or, in an older 
vocabulary, reason and the passions) are distinct types of mental process. 
This idea is an old one, going back at least as far as Plato, but precise 
nature of the distinction is hard to pin down. In the eighteenth century,
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David Hume attempted to specify exactly how reason differed from 
passion by appealing to the idea of representation. In A Treatise on 
Human Nature, he argued that reason was representational while the 
passions were not. On this view, thoughts can be judged as true or false, 
while emotions cannot:
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of 
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders 
it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I 
am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no 
more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, 
or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this 
passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth, or reason; 
since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, 
considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent ... 
nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a 
reference to it, and ... the judgements of our understanding only have 
this reference...
(Hume, 1734:415)
Hume’s thesis about the non-representational nature of emotion has been 
very influential, but it poses an obvious dilemma for cognitive science. As 
we saw in the previous section, cognitive science subscribes to CTM, 
which is a version of the representational theory of mind. So cogntive 
science must either reject Hume’s thesis or exclude emotions from the 
class of mental processes. In the next chapter, I outline the way in which 
some of the first cognitive scientists responded to this dilemma by 
constructing a representational account of emotion.
The substrate neutrality of emotion
Before concluding this chapter, however, it is worth noting that the multiple 
realisability thesis applies just as much to emotion as to other kinds of 
mental process. In other words, one we are committed to a view of
32
Chapter One Cognitive science and emotion
emotion as a computational process and to CTM, then we must conclude 
that emotions are to be defined in functional terms rather than in purely 
material ones. Emotions, that is, are substrate neutral.
This means that we cannot refuse to attribute true emotions to a machine 
simply on the grounds that it is not made out of flesh and blood. This, 
however, may be harder for many people to accept than the 
corresponding idea that machines could truly be said to think even if they 
are made of different materials. Cultural representations of intelligent 
machines abound, but such machines are generally devoid of emotion. In 
many people’s minds, emotions are precisely what distinguish us from 
machines (Turkle, 1984). The cognitive science of emotion rejects this 
view as too anthropomorphic. So long as machines have components that 
perform the same function as the neural mechanisms of emotion in 
humans, the machines could be said to have true emotions.
33
Chapter Two:
Classical cognitive science and emotion
Think how much stronger the self will be when it deliberately uses 
reason and judgement to form a decision. For the mind freed from 
passions is like a fortress, and there is nothing more secure in which 
to retreat and find unceasing sanctuary.
Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations
It may seem presumptuous that a discipline barely forty years old already 
prides itself on having a ‘classical’ form and various ‘non-classical’ 
variants. Yet this is exactly how cognitive scientists describe the 
theoretical diversity that currently characterises their field of study. In this 
chapter I outline the main features of classical cognitive science, and then 
discuss the classical approach to emotion.
2.1. Classical cognitive science
By ‘classical’ cognitive science, I intend to refer to the general style in 
which the cognitive research program was pursued in its first decades, 
from about 1950 to 1980. This style was marked by a number of 
assumptions that have since been challenged by various sections of the 
cognitive science community. These assumptions included:
(i) Domain generality
(ii) Intemaiism
(iii) Discreteness
In the rest of this section, I will briefly describe what is meant by each of 
these terms. First, however, I want to make a few general points.
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During the years 1950-1980, nobody spoke of ‘classical’ cognitive science. 
The assumptions of domain generality, internalism and digitality were so 
widely accepted by cognitive scientists that they seemed essential 
components of cognitive science itself. Only later, when various sections 
of the cognitive science community began to challenge these 
assumptions, did it become clear that that cognitive science was not, in 
fact, committed to them. At that point, it became useful to distinguish 
different species of cognitive science. Because the assumptions of 
domain generality, internalism and digitality had prevailed in the early days 
of cognitive science, it became common to refer to this set of views as 
marking the ‘classical’ form of the discipline. Those who challenged one 
or more of these assumptions could then refer their own approaches as 
‘non-classical’.
The classical assumptions of domain-generality, internalism and digitality 
were challenged, respectively, by those adopting evolutionary, situated, 
and analogue approaches to the study of the mind. These approaches 
therefore, are all ‘non-classical’ in one way or another. However, just 
because an approach is non-classical in one way does not mean that it 
has to be non-classical in every other way. Just because the evolutionary 
approach rejects domain-generality, for example, does not mean that it 
has to reject internalism and digitality. However, in the final chapter I 
argue that while the various non-classical approaches are logically 
independent of one another, there are good theoretical reasons of a non- 
logical kind that make the non-classical approaches natural allies. While 
they do not logically entail one another, the non-classical approaches can 
be combined to make up a single coherent species of cognitive science 
that we might refer to as ‘integrated non-classical cognitive science’.
This said, it is now time to look at what the assumptions of classical 
cognitive science actually say.
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(i) Domain generality
As I noted in the previous chapter, the principle explanatory strategy of 
cognitive science is functional decomposition. On this view, 
understanding the mind is like understanding the body in the sense that 
both involve ‘carving nature at its joints’. Cognitive science is supposed to 
proceed by producing an ‘anatomy’ (or a ‘map’) of the human mind, whose 
components are discovered by taking a componential approach to 
designing artificial minds. If the artificial minds thus designed behave just 
like human ones, this is good grounds for assuming that the human mind 
is composed of similar functional units.
In adopting this view, cognitive science assumes that the mind can be 
partitioned into distinct parts. This view, which is sometimes known as 
‘faculty psychology’ is an ancient view, going back at least as far as Plato.1 
There are various ways in which one could go about anatomising the 
mind, but cognitive scientists in the period 1950-1980 assumed that the 
best way of doing so was to divide the mind, first, into three parts: a 
perception system, a general reasoning system, and a motor-control 
system. This was not a new idea either; it figured in many previous 
models of the mind, including one proposed by Freud.
In the nineteenth century, however, Franz Joseph Gall had proposed a 
rather different way of doing mental anatomy. According to Gall, the mind 
is composed of a large number of subsystems, each of which operates 
solely in a particular domain. Gall did not spell out in any detail the criteria 
for individuating domains, but one gets a rough intuitive idea of what he 
meant when one reads the list of subsystems he identified; there were, for 
example, subsystems for musical ability, moral reasoning, and the 
appreciation of beauty (see Fodor, 1983).
1 Faculty psychology was challenged in the eighteenth century by Hume and other 
associationists, who argued that the mind is a homogeneous entity governed by a few 
general principles. If the associationists are right, then the viability of functional 
decomposition as an explanatory strategy in understanding the mind would be seriously 
in doubt
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Gall’s taxonomy of mental structures is clearly orthogonal to the taxonomy 
assumed by most early cognitive scientists. In that taxonomy, a single 
perceptual system took in all sensory stimuli, processed them, and passed 
them to a single reasoning system, which then decided, on the basis of all 
this information, what instructions to pass on to the motor control system. 
There is no specific sensory system dedicated purely to the analysis of 
music or beauty. The sensory system, like the reasoning system and the 
motor-control system, is domain-general.
In Gall’s view, things are quite different. Each subsystem works relatively 
autonomously with input of a certain class. The music subsystem only 
processes musical stimuli, for example. Each subsystem has its own 
relatively independent means for perceiving, reasoning and initiating 
motion. Another way of putting this is that perception, reason and motor- 
control are domain-specific.
The choice between the two taxonomies is not a black and white one. In 
1983, for example, Jerry Fodor proposed a hybrid taxonomy that 
combined elements of both. In The Modularity o f Mind, he argued that the 
sensory systems and motor-control systems were domain-specific, but that 
the central reasoning system was domain-general (Fodor, 1983). Fodor’s 
criteria for individuating domains, however, were rather different from 
those envisaged by Gall. In fact, they were just the same as those 
normally used to individuate the five senses (with the modification that 
language comprehension was regarded as a distinct perceptual system in 
its own right, a kind of ‘sixth sense’). According to Fodor, the distinct 
sensory systems worked relatively autonomously, but then passed all their 
information to a single, domain-general central system where all the data 
were integrated. Fodor’s mind is still, then, fundamentally domain-general 
in its centre and bulk. Despite the small gesture towards domain- 
specificity, Fodor retains the basic assumption of domain-generality that 
characterises the classical approach.
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Fodor’s suggestion opened the way for other cognitive scientists to argue 
for a view much more like Gall’s. In particular, a number of evolutionary 
psychologists began to argue, in the late 1980’s, that the human mind was 
composed entirely of domain-specific systems, each of which had evolved 
to solve a particular adaptive problem faced by our ancestors. This has 
since become known as the ‘massive modularity hypothesis’.2 I discuss 
this view in chapter three.
(ii) Internalism
CTM states that minds are computers, but (as we saw in chapter one) 
nothing is a computer except with regard to some other, external system. 
Whenever we are confronted with a claim that something has a mind, 
therefore, we can always ask where, exactly, the boundary lies between 
the internal and the external systems. Where, in other words, are we to 
locate the input-output boundary?
In the case of humans and other brainy creatures, most cognitive 
scientists in the period 1950-1980 tended to locate this boundary at the 
junction between the central nervous system and the rest of the body. 
The mind, in other words, was thought to supervene entirely on the brain. 
The only bona fide psychological states, therefore, are those that can be 
individuated without reference to the rest of the world outside the brain. 
This view is sometimes known as internalism or individualism, though, like 
most ‘isms’, these words cover a multitude of sins and mean different 
things to different people. The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive 
Sciences, for example, takes a slightly different view of internalism, 
defining it as the view that ‘psychology in particular and the cognitive 
sciences more generally are to be concerned with natural kinds whose 
instances end at the boundary of the individual’ (Wilson, 1999: 397). 
Equating the input-output boundary with that of the individual is clearly 
somewhat different to equating it with the brain-body boundary.
2 The term is due to Sperber (1994).
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Instead of trying to resolve this ambiguity by futile discussions about the 
where exactly internalists should locate the input-output boundary, we can 
simply identify the common assumption underlying all the different 
formulations of internalism. Although they may disagree about where the 
input-output boundary is located, all internalists assume that this boundary 
is to be identified with some physical feature of the organism. It is this 
assumption, therefore, that should be taken as the essence of internalism.
In the 1980s, a loose federation of cognitive scientists began to reject 
internalism in favour of a more ‘situated’ approach to the mind. They 
argued that the input-output boundary was a moveable feast. On their 
view, the question of where the input-output boundary is to be located will 
depend very much on the particular context of enquiry. The boundary of 
the mind is not to be simply identified with any physical boundary, whether 
that between the brain and the rest of the body or that between the body 
and the rest of the world. Some mental processes may well supervene 
entirely on the brain, or even on just one part of the brain. Others 
supervene on the brain plus part of the body. Others supervene on the 
brain, body, and parts of the world. In Andy Clark’s arresting metaphor, 
the mind often leaks out of the brain into the body and the rest of the world 
(Clark, 1997). I discuss this view in chapter four.
(iii) Discreteness
The machines designed by cognitive scientists in the period 1950-1980 
were almost all discrete-state machines. In such machines, the transitions 
from one state to another are like sudden jumps or clicks. The various 
states are sufficiently distinct and definite for the possibility of confusion 
between them to be ignored. There are no intermediate positions between 
one state and another.
Many of the first generation of cognitive scientists assumed that this was 
the only way to design intelligent machines. In 1976 Allen Newell and
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Herbert Simon consolidated this impression by arguing that all cognitive 
agents would turn out to be digital machines. This is the thrust of their 
‘physical symbol system’ hypothesis (Newell and Simon, 1976: 85). 
Strictly speaking, this claim has nothing to do with discreteness. A digital 
machine is not necessarily a discrete-state machine. A digital machine is 
simply one that can reidentify things it has made positively and reliably 
(Haugeland, 1996: 9).
Now, it might turn out to be the case that only discrete-state machines can 
succeed in being digital, but, if so, this would be an empirical discovery 
about discrete-state machines -  we cannot make any such inference on 
purely conceptual grounds. The concepts of being discrete and being 
digital are logically independent. Nevertheless, for some reason the two 
concepts have often been confused, with the result that Newell and 
Simon’s physical symbol system hypothesis seemed to confirm the view 
that cognitive science was exclusively concerned with discrete-state 
machines.
In the 1980s, this view was challenged by a growing band of cognitive 
scientists who were interested in using continuous machines to model the 
mind. They used components with continuously variable rates of 
activation, and linked them together in networks resembling groups of 
interconnected neurons. The connectionist movement was not the only 
section of the cognitive science community to call for analogue models of 
the mind. In the 1990s, they were joined by others of a more theoretical 
bent who proposed that cognitive science could benefit from using the 
tools of dynamical systems theory.
Dynamical systems are not all continuous. There are discrete dynamical 
systems as well. But most proponents of dynamical approaches to 
cognition have tended to concentrate on continuous systems. It is 
therefore plausible to regard the connectionist movement and the 
dynamical approach to cognitive science as fighting on a similar front. 
Both call into question the assumption that cognitive science is exclusively
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concerned with discrete-state machines. For this reason, I discuss them 
both together in chapter five, which is concerned with continuous 
approaches to cognitive science.
Other features of classical cognitive science
A number of other assumptions were shared by many of the first cognitive 
scientists apart from the three listed above. Many, for example, assumed 
that mental representations are stored in the brain in a rich language-like 
code (dubbed 'Mentalese' by Fodor) which is independent of any natural 
language like English or Japanese (Fodor, 1975). This is known as the 
'language of thought1 hypothesis', and is a particularly strong form of 
representationalism. It is possible to adopt weaker forms of 
representationalism, according to which thoughts are representations, but 
do not take a language-like, propositional form. Cognitive scientists 
working outside the classical tradition are generally more likely to espouse 
such a weaker form of representationalism, and a few even claim to reject 
the idea that thoughts are representations altogether (although it is not 
clear whether, in fact, they are really just objecting to the strong Fodorian 
version). One can then, with hindsight, see a commitment to the language 
of thought hypothesis as another of the distinguishing features of classical 
cognitive science.
I take it, however, that the language of thought hypothesis is less central 
to the classical approach than the three assumptions described above. 
Whole movements in cognitive science have arisen based on the desire to 
challenge these assumptions. I think, then, that there are good grounds 
for considering these assumptions to be the main diagnostic features of 
the classical approach. In the next section, I show how they inform the 
classical approach to emotion.
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2.2. The classical approach to emotion
Despite the general reluctance to address the emotions among most of 
the pioneers of cognitive science, there were, even in the early days, a few 
lonely voices calling for a more inclusive research program that would 
embrace emotional factors as well as classical cognitive processes. In 
1963, for example, Robert Abelson proposed that cognitive psychologists 
should move away from their focus on ‘cold’ logical processes and 
address ‘hot cognitions’ (Abelson, 1963). In 1967 Herbert Simon himself 
argued cognitive models should include emotions (Simon, 1967).
Such calls for a more inclusive research program forced cognitive 
scientists to face up to the dilemma posed by Hume’s distinction between 
reason and the passions. Since nobody was prepared to argue that 
emotions were not bona fide mental processes, cognitive scientists were 
forced to reject Hume’s thesis about the non-representational nature of 
emotion. Hence, those cognitive scientists interested in emotion 
attempted to reduce emotions to particular kinds of thought. The resulting 
research project came to be known as appraisal theory.
Appraisal theory
Appraisal theory assumes that emotions are evaluations of current 
situations. The first proponent of this approach was Magda Arnold, whose 
pioneering book, Emotion and Personality, practically inaugurated the 
cognitive science of emotion (Arnold, 1960). The research program that 
grew out of Arnold’s work attempted to discover the features of situations 
and events which cognitive agents use to arrive at an emotional 
evaluation. For example, some have suggested that a key aspect of the 
antecedent situation is whether it was self-caused or other-caused (Smith 
and Ellsworth, 1985). On the basis of this and other criteria, represented 
in terms of a simple decision-tree, a computer could analyse any situation 
(if presented appropriately) and decide which emotion it should respond 
with. That is, it could take a linguistic description of a situation as input,
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and generate the name of a particular emotion as output. Such a 
computer would clearly have explicit internal representations of emotions.
During the past decade, an increasing number of computer models of 
emotion have been designed along these lines. Most of them have been 
based on two appraisal-type theories of emotion: the Ortony Clore Collins 
model (henceforth OCC) and Ira Roseman’s model (Ortony, Clore et al., 
1988; Roseman, Antoniou et al., 1996). Both of these models were 
constructed with computers in mind, so both are relatively easy to 
implement in software. The process of designing such simulations can 
help to test the theories as well as stimulating new questions (Picard, 
1997: 195).
Both the OCC model and Roseman’s model categorise emotions on the 
basis of the cognitive appraisal that people make about eliciting 
conditions. In the OCC model, emotions arise from valenced reactions to 
situations consisting of the consequences of events (is it good or bad for 
me and for others?), the actions of agents (do I approve of my actions and 
those of others?), and the aspects of objects (do I like them or not?). A 
decision tree involving these questions leads to twenty-two different 
emotions, from joy and distress to gratitude and anger. Roseman’s model 
uses slightly different parameters to generate a total of seventeen 
emotions.
Both of these systems are framed in terms of rules and so are relatively 
easy to implement in classical digital computers (symbol systems). The 
OCC model has never been implemented in full in any Al system, but 
simplified versions of it have been used to synthesise emotions in various 
applications. Tomoko Koda used the OCC model to simulate a restricted 
set of ten emotional facial expressions on poker-playing software agents 
(Koda, 1996, cited in Picard, 1997). Clark Elliot augmented the OCC 
model to twenty-six emotion types and used these as the basis of his 
‘Affective Reasoner’ system (Elliot, 1994).
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The classical approach to emotion
Within the field of cognitive science, appraisal theory may rightly be called 
the ‘classical’ approach to emotion, both because it has dominated the 
cognitive psychology of emotion, and because it implicitly adopts all the 
main tenets of classical cognitive science. In line with classical cognitive 
science, appraisal theory takes an implicitly domain-general, internalist 
and discrete view of emotion.
(i) Domain-generality and emotion
In appraisal theory, there is no provision for distinct emotional subsystems. 
A single system analyses all the relevant features of the situation, and 
then computes a single emotion as output.
(ii) Internalism and emotion
Appraisal theorists assumed that emotional processes supervened entirely 
on the brain. The brain required sensory and proprioceptive inputs, of 
course, in order to generate an emotion, and then instructed the body to 
move in certain ways in accordance with the kind of emotion generated, 
but in their ‘essence’, emotional processes were neural, not physiological.
(iii) Discreteness and emotion
The decision-tree model of emotion employed by appraisal theory implies 
that emotions are discrete in a number of ways. Firstly, an emotion is 
either present or it is not; there are no intermediate levels of activation. 
Secondly, no attention is paid to the temporal features of emotion, such as 
how long it lasts, and how quickly it is triggered.
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Criticisms of the classical approach to emotion
The classical cognitive approach to emotion rejected Hume’s explication of 
the traditional distinction between reason and the passions, but failed to 
specify any other way of explicating this distinction. In so doing, the 
classical approach to emotion threatened to undermine the distinction 
altogether and thereby eliminate emotion from the taxonomy of mental 
processes. It was not long before critical voices were raised. One of the 
most prominent critics was the psychologist, Robert Zajonc, whose 
influential article ‘Feeling and thinking: preferences need no inferences’, 
argued that it was important to retain the ancient distinction between 
cognition and emotion (Zajonc, 1980).
Zajonc’s arguments, however, were weakened by a serious equivocation; 
his use of the word cognitive was decidedly ambiguous. At some points in 
his article, the term is used to designate a set of mental processes that 
differ in important ways from other mental processes of an ‘emotional’ 
nature. However, the experimental evidence that Zajonc cites in support 
of this distinction in fact supports a rather different claim; namely, that the 
appraisal process preceding the experience of emotion is largely 
inaccessible to conscious introspection (Zajonc, 1980). Thus the word 
‘cognitive’ is best construed, at other points in the article, as synonymous 
with the term ‘conscious’. This is misleading, to say the least. Unless we 
simply wish to identify conscious/unconscious distinction with the 
cognition/emotion distinction (which seems a very unattractive option), we 
must acknowledge that Zajonc’s experiment does not provide grounds for 
regarding cognition and emotion as distinct kinds of mental process.
Zajonc’s article was based, in part, on a clever experiment that he 
conducted himself, which was an extension of earlier work he had done on 
the 'mere exposure effect'. This term refers to the fact that, when subjects 
are exposed to novel visual patterns, and then asked to choose whether 
they prefer these or similar patterns to which they have not been exposed, 
they prefer the pre-exposed ones. Mere exposure, in other words, is
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enough to create preferences. In the experiment described in the 1980 
paper, Zajonc presented the visual patterns so quickly that subjects were 
unable to state accurately whether or not they had seen them before. All 
the same, the mere exposure effect was still there. Subjects gave all sorts 
of reasons for preferring the pre-exposed patterns, but nobody gave the 
correct reason (the pre-exposure).
This experiment dealt a severe blow to the method then used by appraisal 
theorists to investigate the emotions. This method consisted of asking 
people to introspect and figure out what had gone through their minds just 
before they had had some emotional experience. The appraisal theorists 
hoped thereby to find out the rules that relate antecedent situations to 
consequent emotions. Zajonc’s experiment showed that this method was 
flawed because people were often wrong about the mental processes that 
caused them to have emotions.
Zajonc could have concluded that the appraisal processes preceding the 
experience of emotion are often inaccessible to conscious introspection. 
However, he went much further than this, claiming that emotional 
preferences could be formed without the aid of any cognitive processes at 
all. This is clearly a non-sequitur. As Joseph LeDoux points out, most 
processes that are considered prototypical examples of cognition also 
occur without any conscious awareness, so the absence of conscious 
recognition cannot be used to infer anything about the cognitive or non- 
cognitive status of emotional appraisal (LeDoux, 1998).
By pointing to the powerful role of unconscious factors in preferences, 
Zajonc provided a useful reminder that introspection is of limited use when 
doing research in cognitive psychology. Unfortunately, this important 
reminder was somewhat obscured by the fact that Zajonc perpetuated the 
old mistake of equating cognition with consciousness.
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What Zajonc really meant
As Paul Griffiths notes, the debate between Zajonc and his opponents 
about the relationship between emotion and cognition can sometimes 
seem like a mere semantic squabble, as if all it were about was the correct 
use of the term ‘cognitive’ (Griffiths, 1997: 25). However, there are more 
substantive issues at stake. No one denies that some kind of information 
processing must go on before an emotion can emerge in response to a 
given stimulus. The real question is whether or not this processing is of a 
kind sufficiently like the paradigm cases of unemotional thought-processes 
(such as deductive reasoning) to justify treating emotions as kinds of 
thought. Most emotion research in classical cognitive science has 
assumed a positive answer to this question. This is the assumption that 
Zajonc opposes.
As I noted in the previous section, mental processes are understood in 
classical cognitive science as bare computations. There is no provision 
here for distinguishing among different kinds of mental process, such as 
cognition and emotion. Zajonc is best construed as pointing out that the 
classical models of emotion do not provide a way of distinguishing emotion 
from cognition. If emotions are representational, what distinguishes them 
from thoughts, which are also representational? What Zajonc really meant 
was that we need to supplement the classical approach with new 
theoretical resources if we wish to do justice to emotion as a separate 
category of mental process.
At the time Zajonc wrote his paper, in 1980, the non-classical forms of 
cognitive science described in this thesis barely existed. In the years 
since then, the emotions have received much more attention from those 
working with non-classical approaches than they received from the 
pioneers of the classical approach. This suggests an intriguing possibility. 
Perhaps the non-classical approaches provide just the new conceptual 
resources needed for understanding the emotions that Zajonc was calling 
for in 1980. By providing new criteria for distinguishing between different
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kinds of computation, the non-classical approaches can help cognitive 
science find a new, non-Humean way of explicating the difference 
between cognition and emotion.
The propositional attitude theory o f emotion
At the same time as cognitive scientists were developing appraisal theory, 
a group of analytic philosophers were working along similar lines. Like the 
appraisal theorists, these philosophers argued that emotions could be 
analysable purely as particular kinds of mental representation or thought. 
Specifically, it was proposed that emotions might simply be kinds of 
judgement A concise statement of this view has been put forward by 
Richard Solomon:
What is an emotion? An emotion is a judgement ...[For 
example,] my embarrassment is my judgement to the effect that I 
am in an exceedingly awkward situation... an emotion is an 
evaluative (or a normative) judgement.
(Solomon, 1977: 185, emphasis in original)
Now, most psychologists and philosophers accept that some emotions, at 
least, imply certain judgements. It is hard to imagine how someone could 
feel guilty, for example, unless they judge, perhaps unconsciously, that 
they have done wrong. Solomon's claim, however, is much stronger. He 
claims that an emotion is no more than its constituent judgements. 
Emotions, on this account, are entirely reducible to (kinds of) thought.
This approach to emotion became known, among analytic philosophers, 
as the 'cognitive' theory of emotion. This name is misleading, since it 
suggests a concern with the findings of cognitive psychology, when in fact 
there was, at that time, virtually no contact between the philosophical and 
psychological investigations into emotion. I will therefore follow Paul 
Griffiths in referring to this philosophical tradition as the 'propositional 
attitude theory of emotion' (Griffiths, 1997: 2).
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Although there was no real dialogue between the cognitive psychologists 
who developed appraisal theory and the philosophers who pioneered the 
prepositional attitude theory of emotion, the two theories are remarkably 
similar. Both reject Hume’s claim about the non-representational nature of 
emotion, and both attempt to reduce emotions to particular kinds of 
thought.
Criticisms of the propositional attitude theory
One of the most articulate philosophical critics of the propositional attitude 
theory of emotion is David Pugmire. In his book, Rediscovering Emotion, 
he argues persuasively that emotions cannot be reduced to judgements. 
His most powerful arguments turn on cases in which a person experiences 
an emotion of which the alleged constituent judgements are at odds with 
the person’s explicit beliefs. Pugmire dubs such emotions ‘irrational’, and 
provides a number of examples. One example concerns a man who does 
not believe in ghosts and yet is overtaken by fear as he enters a deserted 
house. Another is that of a bereaved widow who finds herself angry at her 
husband for having ‘left’ her, even though she knows full well that his 
death was an accident. Such emotions are not reducible to judgements, 
Pugmire claims, since the judgements they might be taken to consist of 
conflict with the person’s avowed beliefs.
Proponents of the propositional attitude theory of emotion have tried to 
deal with irrational emotions in a variety of ways. One is to say that the 
object of the emotion is represented less definitely in the person’s mind; 
the man entering the deserted house does not believe it is haunted, since 
he does not believe in ghosts, but he does think that there is a danger of 
some unspecified kind. Another is to say that the belief is not certain; the 
man does not believe firmly in ghosts, but nor is he certain that they do not 
exist, and he is better off safe than sorry. Pugmire argues that not all 
irrational emotions can be explained in these ways. Sometimes a 
person’s beliefs explicitly preclude the judgements alleged to be
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constitutive of the emotion, yet the emotion is still felt. The man explicitly 
states that he does not consider the house to be in the least dangerous, 
and yet he is still afraid when he enters it. So, Pugmire concludes, the 
propositional theory is in trouble.
Pugmire’s objections to the propositional attitude theory fail, however, and 
for the same reasons as Zajonc’s criticisms of appraisal theory: thoughts 
and judgements can be unconscious. Neither Zajonc’s experiment with 
the mere-exposure effect, nor the cases of irrational emotion cited by 
Pugmire, rule out the possibility that emotions are reducible to 
unconscious thoughts. Like the appraisal theorist, the proponent of the 
propositional attitude theory can answer these objections by appealing to 
deeper cognitive resources offered by unconscious beliefs. When the 
man who is afraid of the deserted house tells us that he believes it is safe, 
there is no obvious reason why we should take his statement at face 
value. Perhaps he is simply unaware of his true beliefs. Or, perhaps he is 
only aware of some of his beliefs. If we take a domain-specific view of the 
mind, there could be various mutually inconsistent beliefs held by different 
mental parts, and it may be senseless to ask which of these beliefs is 
more truly his.
Pugmire is aware of the first of these responses, but not the second. 
When he points out that there are problems with tracing unconscious 
beliefs, then, he fails to see that this might be because we are assuming 
that the agent must have a single set of mutually consistent beliefs. 
Pugmire himself makes this dubious assumption in speaking of irrational 
emotions in the first place. He also assumes that, in cases of conflict 
between reported belief and a hypothetical unconscious belief, we must 
decide which of the two is the agent’s real belief.
According to Pugmire, the claim that unconscious judgements must 
always have been at work in irrational emotions ‘would rank as dogmatic, 
as an ad hoc hypothesis on the part of a psychoanalytically minded 
cognitivism’ (Pugmire, 1998: 27). But this goes too far. Beliefs, or at least
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representations, are the fundamental explanatory tool of classical 
cognitive science. But cognitive scientists are not simply being dogmatic 
when they claim that that mental processes are thoroughly 
representational. There are good reasons that can be adduced to support 
this claim, some of which were outlined in the previous section. Among 
these reasons is the fact that we already have a good theoretical account 
of how representations can be processed by such obviously material 
entities as electronic computers, and thus a possible solution to the mind- 
body problem. In rejecting the representational theory of mind, Pugmire 
puts the mind-body problem back in the realm of mystery and thus leaves 
open the door to dualism.
Pugmire’s main motivation for rejecting the representational theory of mind 
is his desire to save the Humean distinction between reason and the 
passions. He seems to think that, unless we can save this Humean 
thesis, we will have to give up the ancient distinction between cognition 
and emotion altogether. This, however, is clearly a non-sequitur. Just 
because we reject Hume’s account of the distinction between reason and 
emotion does not mean that we have to give up the distinction altogether. 
There may be other ways of explicating this distinction, ways that do not 
appeal to a non-representational view of emotion. In the following 
chapters, I argue that the non-classical variants of cognitive science 
provide the resources that allow us to explicate the cognition-emotion 
distinction without giving up the representational theory of mind (and thus 
without giving up CTM).
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Evolutionary cognitive science and emotion
The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing.
Blaise Pascal, The Pensees
All the natural minds we observe in the world around us have something 
in common that the classical approach completely ignores; they are all 
organisms, descended from a single common ancestor that lived on Earth 
some four billion years ago. This fact has prompted some cognitive 
scientists to urge their classical colleagues to pay more attention to 
phylogenetic questions. The recommend, in other words, that we 
supplement the classical focus on computation with considerations drawn 
from evolutionary theory. In this chapter, I examine some of these 
proposals for an evolutionary approach to the mind. I also argue that this 
evolutionary approach can help solve the problems with the classical view 
of emotion.
g. 1. Evolutionary cognitive science
Classical cognitive science made little reference to evolutionary theory. 
The fact that all natural minds are the product of evolution was treated as 
purely historical matter, of little relevance to the task of understanding how 
minds work. In the 1980s, however, a growing band of evolutionary 
psychologists began to argue that the neglect of evolutionary theory had 
led classical cognitive science to make some important mistakes.
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What are minds for?
The most serious of these mistakes, according to those working in the 
nascent discipline of evolutionary psychology, consisted in forgetting what 
minds are for. In their enthusiasm for designing machines that could 
prove-theorems and play chess, classical cognitive scientists had 
overlooked the fact that these capacities are mere by-products of the 
human mind. These capacities may be interesting in their own right, and 
designing machines with such capacities may pose fascinating technical 
challenges, but if our aim is to understand the fundamental properties of 
natural minds, theorem-proving and chess-playing are surely distractions. 
Human minds may be capable of such things, but they were not designed 
to have such capacities. Theorem and chess-playing are not the proper 
functions of the human mind nor of any part of it.
The difficulty of designing machines capable of solving even simple 
problems was enough to convince classical cognitive scientists at a very 
early stage that minds are very complex things. Now, according to 
evolutionary theory, complex designs can only evolve by natural selection. 
Natural selection is not the only force driving evolutionary change, but the 
other forces such as random drift are not capable of generating complex 
functional design. Thus all natural minds must have evolved by natural 
selection. That is, they must have evolved because they helped 
organisms in certain lineages to survive and reproduce better than those 
in the same lineages who lacked minds. The ultimate function of all 
natural minds, as with any other adaptation, must therefore be to promote 
survival and reproduction. I will refer to this as the evolutionary theory of 
mind (ETM). For the sake of precision, we may sum up ETM as follows: 
ETM is the theory that all natural minds evolved by natural selection, and 
therefore that their ultimate function is to promote the survival and 
replication of cognitive agents.
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Compatibility
It is true that classical cognitive science tended to ignore evolutionary 
questions about the ultimate biological function of minds, but neither did it 
rule them out. Classical cognitive science was simply interested in the 
question of how minds work -  what is their design. Evolutionary 
psychologists, on the other hand, were interested in historical questions 
about how, why and when minds evolved. Unless these two questions 
are tied together in some way, there is no real argument to be had 
between evolutionary psychology and classical cognitive science. The 
two disciplines are asking different kinds of question. There can be no 
room for conflict between these research programs. They must, rather, be 
seen as complementary projects.
Some evolutionary psychologists do not accept this view. They argue that 
there is, in fact, a way of linking the synchronic question about mental 
structure with the diachronic question about mental evolution in such a 
way as to generate potential conflict between evolutionary psychology and 
classical cognitive science. The most famous proponents of this view are 
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. In an influential paper published in 
1992, these two pioneers of the evolutionary psychology movement 
argued that cognitive scientists could draw on evolutionary considerations 
to predict certain design features of the human mind and rule out others. 
Certain hypotheses about mental structure could be ruled out a priori, 
because they would be unlikely to evolve. Cosmides and Tooby referred 
to this principle as the ‘evolvability criterion’ (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992).
To demonstrate the heuristic value of the evolvability criterion, Tooby and 
Cosmides focused on one particular aspect of cognitive design: the
question of domain-specificity. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
classical cognitive scientists tended to assume that the mind was a single, 
domain-general mechanism. In other words, it applied the same
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computational procedures to any and every kind of problem it 
encountered. Tooby and Cosmides argued that this kind of design was 
ruled out by the evolvability criterion; such a domain-general mechanism 
could not evolve, or was at least highly implausible from an evolutionary 
point of view. Natural selection would, they claimed, always (or almost 
always) lead to the evolution of minds composed of a variety of domain- 
specific mechanisms.
The notion of domain-specificity needs to be spelt out in more detail, but 
before I do this I want to highlight the theoretical significance of the 
argument put forward by Cosmides and Tooby. If they are right, and the 
evolvability criterion does rule out domain-general mechanisms, then they 
will have succeeded in linking synchronic questions about mental 
structure with diachronic questions about mental evolution. The 
compatibility claim I made above about the relationship between classial 
cognitive science and the evolutionary approach to cognition would be 
refuted, and there could be genuine conflict between the two approaches. 
In this section, then, am not interested in the question of domain- 
specificity as a purely empirical matter; I am interested here only in how 
the evolutionary arguments for domain-specificity bear on the relationship 
between evolutionary psychology and classical cognitive science. In 
short, do the arguments about domain-specificity put forward by Cosmides 
and Tooby show that ETM has implications that constrain the 
methodology of the classical approach?
Domain specificity
Let us now return to the notion of domain-specificity. A domain-specific 
mechanism is one that operates only on input that meets certain 
conditions. Domain-specific mechanisms cannot manipulate all the 
representations stored in the cognitive system to which they belong. A 
module for vision, for example, cannot process auditory representations,
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and a module for face-recognition cannot process representations of 
plants. Modules are thus opposed to domain-general mechanisms, which 
can operate on any representation in the cognitive system to which they 
belong. Modules are 'special purpose' mechanisms, while domain-general 
mechanisms are 'general purpose' mechanisms
Let us call a mind composed entirely of domain-specific mechanisms 
‘massively domain-specific’. Cosmides and Tooby argue that natural 
selection will always favour massively domain-specific minds over other 
kinds of mind. What other kinds of mind might there be? The obvious 
alternative to a massively domain-specific mind is a mind composed of a 
single, domain-general mechanism. As we saw in section 2.2, Jerry Fodor 
has proposed a third kind of mind that includes several domain-specific 
mechanisms and a single domain-general one (Fodor, 1983). In Fodor’s 
model, the central executive is a domain-general mechanism that can 
process input from all the domain-specific mechanisms, but the latter can 
only process input from a single sensory source, or a single type of output 
from the central executive.
Evolutionary arguments for domain-specificity
Now that the terms of the debate have been clarified, let us return to the 
claim that natural selection tends to favour massively domain-specific 
minds over other kinds of mind. I will here focus on two of the main 
arguments that have been advanced in support of this claim:1
1 A third argument for massive domain-specificity is also prominent in the evolutionary 
psychological literature. This is the argument, not that domain-general mechanisms will 
be out-performed by domain-specific ones, but that domain-general mechanisms would 
simply not have been capable of solving the adaptive problems faced by early humans in 
their environment of evolutionary adaptedness. Cosmides and Tooby build a persuasive 
argument of this type by linking it with discussions of the frame-problem. They argue that 
the multiplicity and variety of adaptive problems faced by our ancestors would threaten a 
domain-general mind with 'analysis paralysis’ (not their term) because of combinatorial 
explosion (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). I do not discuss this argument here since it 
appeals not to the evolvability criterion but to what Cosmides and Tooby call the 
'solvability criterion’. That is, this argument does not turn on a putative selective
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(1) Specific problems are solved more quickly by domain-specific 
mechanisms (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). I will refer to this as 'the 
argument from specialisation1.
(2) Domain-specific theories of mind provide the only plausible account of 
the evolution of the mind by showing how there could be an 
incremental path from very simple systems to complex minds (Marr, 
1982; Brooks, 1991). I will call this 'the incremental argument'.
I will now discuss each of these arguments in more detail.
The argument from specialisation assumes that specific problems are 
solved more quickly by special-purpose mechanisms. This may be true, 
although there is not much empirical evidence for it. Even supposing it is 
true, however, does not licence the inference that natural selection will 
generally favour domain-specificity. Other things being equal, natural 
selection will favour a faster system over a slow one, but other things are 
rarely equal. Unless the environment is perfectly stable, flexibility is 
important too. Yet the same features that make domain-specific 
mechanisms fast also render them highly inflexible. Without detailed 
mathematical models in which the various advantages and disadvantages 
of domain-specificity are specified as opposing selection-pressures, we 
are left trading intuitions about whether or not specialisation would have 
been favoured during the course of human evolution. Appeals to the 
greater speed of domain-specific mechanisms are not convincing if they 
do not also take into account their decreased flexibility.
The incremental argument relies on another intuition that turns out, upon 
closer inspection, not be so solid. The intuition is that tightly integrated
advantage that favours one viable design over another, but on the putative inviability of 
one kind of design.
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systems cannot evolve because evolution always proceeds by a series of 
small steps. This seems to rule out a domain-general mind, since this 
kind of design is so much more integrated than a massively domain- 
specific architecture. It seems much easier to imagine how a massively 
domain-specific mind could have evolved incrementally, because we can 
imagine evolution proceeding by adding one domain-specific mechanism 
at a time. Rodney Brooks cited this advantage for domain-specific 
systems in connection with his own approach to robotics:
The advantage of this approach is that it gives an incremental path 
from very simple systems to complex autonomous intelligent 
systems. At each step of the way, it is only necessary to build one 
small piece, and interface it to an existing, working, complete 
intelligence.
(Brooks, 1991: 403)
David Marr also argued that a domain-specific design was more 
evolutionary plausible, because domain-specific mechanisms could be 
‘de-bugged’ individually, without rewiring the whole system (Marr, 1982). 
While there are important differences between the concept of domain- 
specificity as employed in evolutionary psychology on the one hand, and 
as used in robotics and Al on the other, they share the basic properties of 
relative computational autonomy on which the evolutionary arguments 
here depend.
It is not hard to see that, from the point of view of a human engineer 
building a robot or a digital computer, a massively domain-specific 
architecture is a sensible way to proceed. This is clearly what motivates 
the fondness for domain-specificity shown by Rodney Brooks and David 
Marr. But to extend this practical preference to a theoretical account of 
natural evolution is to make a massive leap. In particular, the incremental 
nature of natural selection does not bear directly on gross phenotypic
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features but on the individual genes, many of which are required to build a 
single gross phenotypic feature.
A parallel with the evolution of the body may serve to make clearer the 
flaw in the incremental argument. The analogy is particularly apt, since 
domain-specific mechanisms are often compared to physiological 
structures; Fodor explicitly describes them as the psychological analogue 
of bodily organs (Fodor, 1983). Now, nobody supposes that the 
incremental nature of evolution means that the human body must have 
evolved by adding individual organs one after the other. It would be 
ludicrous to suppose that an early ancestor possessed, say, just a heart 
and a stomach, and that this primitive species evolved by, say, acquiring 
first a liver, then a pancreas, and finally a brain. The steps by which 
evolution proceeds are much smaller, and the organism must be fully- 
functional at each stage of the process. Furthermore, the organs evolve 
in tandem with each other; it is not the case that only one organ can be 
modified at a time.
Just as the organ-by-organ hypothesis is implausible as an account of 
physiological evolution, so also the mechanism-by-mechanism hypothesis 
is implausible as account of mental evolution. Paul Griffiths is surely right 
when he states that it is 'implausible that our brains evolved by adding 
separate mechanisms subserving new functions' (Griffiths, 1999: 51). The 
mind may be massively domain-specific, but if it is, the various 
mechanisms surely evolved in parallel, just like the organs of the body. 
Conversely, there is no reason why a domain-general mind could not have 
evolved incrementally by a process of gradual expansion. Thus the 
incremental nature of natural selection does not predict a massively 
domain-specific mind.
I have argued that the two evolutionary arguments for domain-specificity 
do not work. The claim that natural selection tends to favour domain-
59
Chapter Three Evolutionary cognitive science and emotion
specific minds, therefore is not proven. I conclude that Cosmides and 
Tooby have not succeeded in linking the structural question of how natural 
minds are designed to the evolutionary question of how they evolved in 
such a way as to generate potential conflict between the evolutionary and 
the classical approaches to cognition. The two research programs are 
perfectly compatible.
Evolutionary psychology and artificial intelligence
Evolutionary psychology is something of an odd-man-out among the 
various non-classical approaches that I discuss in this thesis. In line with 
the design-based approach of classical cognitive science, situated 
cognitive science and dynamical cognitive science both involve intimate 
links between theory (theory of mental structure) and practice (the practice 
of building artificial minds). Most evolutionary psychologists, on the other 
hand, have been exclusively concerned with theories of human mental 
structure, and few have attempted to translate their models into working 
machines.2
This might seem to exclude evolutionary psychology from cognitive 
science, at least if we go by the definition of cognitive science that I 
proposed in chapter one. There, I defined cognitive science as any 
approach to the study of the mind that (1) accepts the computational 
theory of mind, and (2) adopts a design-based approach. Evolutionary 
psychology certainly satisfies the first of these conditions; the discipline 
owes its very name to the desire for a label that would both mark the 
rejection of the rather behaviouristic approach typical of much 
sociobiology, and signal the adoption of an explicitly computational 
approach (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987; Caporael, 1989). However, it is 
not clear whether evolutionary psychology meets the second condition. 
With a few notable exceptions, most of those who call themselves
2 Notable exceptions include Geoffrey Miller, Gerd Gigerenzer and Douglas Kenrick.
60
Chapter Three Evolutionary cognitive science and emotion
evolutionary psychologists have not, as yet, been involved in designing 
artificial minds. They would therefore seem to lie outside the field of 
cognitive science, at least as I have defined it.
However, this conclusion is too quick. My definition of cognitive science, it 
will be recalled, does not specify that all cognitive scientists must take an 
active part in building artificial minds. It simply states that cognitive 
scientists must adopt a design-based approach. As I noted in the 
introduction, this condition is fulfilled whenever researchers propose 
models of the mind that are computational enough to permit computer 
programs to be readily designed on the basis of the models. Many of the 
domain-specific mechanisms proposed by evolutionary psychologists take 
such a form; they are not specified in terms of any programming 
language, but they are often spelled out in a form that would be relatively 
easy to convert into a computer program. The models proposed by 
evolutionary psychologists thus count, on my definition, as fully cognitive, 
and evolutionary psychology is firmly within the fold of cognitive science.
Even so, it seems a shame that evolutionary psychologists have not taken 
more interest in translating their models into real machines. The tools of 
artificial intelligence and computational modelling might well offer them 
ways of testing their hypotheses and thus enable them to answer the 
common charge of telling ‘just-so stories’. Critics of evolutionary 
psychology frequently dismiss it on the grounds that it promulgates 
untestable theories. Evolutionary psychologists acknowledge that there 
are methodological difficulties posed by investigating the history of the 
mind, but point out that most of these difficulties are not particular to their 
discipline. Most of them are common problems faced by all those who do 
wish to investigate evolutionary hypotheses, so to be consistent the critics 
should also dismiss the whole of evolutionary biology. Such general 
defences, however, would be strengthened if evolutionary psychologists 
could point to experimental ways of testing their hypotheses. Artificial
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intelligence could supply evolutionary psychology with just such 
experimental techniques. There are, in particular, some relatively new 
techniques that would be particularly relevant, because they explicitly 
address evolutionary questions.
Artificial life and evolutionary robotics
One of these new techniques is known as artificial life (or simply as ‘A- 
Life’), a name coined by Christopher Langton in 1986 (Langton, 1986). 
Instead of trying to build complex machines in the normal way, by forward 
planning, researchers in A-Life attempt to model the process of natural 
selection. They remove the human engineer from the process as much as 
possible by using a random process to generate various alternative 
designs, and then allow the better designs to replicate. Errors are 
deliberately built into the replication process to mimic the mutations that 
occur naturally when biological systems reproduce. Repeated rounds of 
differential replication lead to increasingly refined designs, just like natural 
selection.
The advantage of this method is that it can lead to extremely novel 
designs. The random nature of the ‘mutations’ means that A-life is 
unhindered by the assumptions and prejudices that human engineers 
bring to any task, and so can explore regions of design space that 
humans might never find on their own. Some even argue that the 
complexity of some design problems is such that foresight is practically 
impossible, so that selection is in fact the optimal search strategy for 
exploring the hyperspace of all possible designs.
An example of this evolutionary approach to engineering was recently 
provided by Pablo Funes and Jordan Pollack of Brandeis University. 
Funes and Pollack constructed a program which generated random LEGO 
designs for various structures such as a two-metre bridge and a table
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capable of supporting a one-kilogram weight. The program also analysed 
these designs by using various algorithms for measuring torque, stress, 
leverage, etc. The bad designs were then eliminated, and the remaining 
ones fed back into the process, where they were modified by further 
random ‘mutations’, analysed again, and so on. Using this completely 
unsupervised process, the program was able to produce a sophisticated 
bridge with a cantilevered design in a day and a half. Funes and Pollack 
tested the various structures designed by their program with actual LEGO 
bricks, and found that they were all structurally sound.
A-Life is an umbrella term that embraces many other projects besides 
designing structures like bridges. A-Life methods have been used, for 
example, to model RNA replication and population dynamics, and even to 
produce works of art. Here, however, I shall concentrate on just one 
branch of A-Life research -  namely, that which is concerned with the 
design of artificial autonomous agents, or ‘animats’. The class of animats 
includes both mobile robots that inhabit the real world and simulated 
agents embedded in virtual environments.
One strategy for designing animats is to use the same kind of evolutionary 
approach as that used by Funes and Pollack. In one classic example of 
this approach, Thomas Ray designed a virtual world called Tierra and 
populated it with a simple digital organism. This was a simple self- 
replicating program (or ‘genetic algorithm’) which occasionally made 
mistakes in the copying process. These ‘mutations’ led to an increasingly 
diverse population of digital organisms. Competition for limited memory 
space ensured that there was differential survival. The conditions for 
natural selection were therefore all in place, and Ray was able to observe 
numerous cases of digital evolution complete with virtual viruses, parasite 
resistance and other surprisingly ‘natural’ features (Ray, 1992).
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Tierra is only a virtual world, and thus subject to the criticisms of 
roboticists like Rodney Brooks, who argue that it is all too easy in such 
simulations to make some crucial but unnoticed simplification that renders 
the simulation invalid (see chapter three). In order to avoid this potential 
danger, Brooks recommends that cognitive scientists work with artificial 
autonomous agents that inhabit the real world -  i.e., with robots. When 
this recommendation is combined with the A-Life approach to designing 
such agents, the result is a strategy known as ‘evolutionary robotics’ 
(Wheeler, 1996). In evolutionary robotics, genetic algorithms are usually 
used to develop robot control systems (‘robot minds’), but there is no 
reason why they should not also be used to design better robot bodies. 
This is, in fact, the way Funes and Pollack envisage their engineering 
program being used in the future. If a computer can design sound bridges 
and tables, then it is only a short step before it can design working 
computers and robots. It is another short step from this to the idea that 
robots will actually build the robots they design. Artificial autonomous 
agents that make copies of themselves need not be confined to virtual 
worlds. They could also come to exist in the real world, giving rise to a 
genuine lineage of robots evolving by natural selection.
Such a scenario is currently beyond our technical capabilities. However, 
the basic principle of using natural selection to design autonomous agents 
is sound, and has at least been tested in virtual environments such as 
Ray’s Tierra. The hope of researchers in Artificial Life and evolutionary 
robotics is that these methods may one day give rise to an artificial agent 
with humanlike intelligence. Perhaps these methods can provide a way, 
then, for evolutionary psychologists to test their hypotheses about mental 
evolution. They can simply watch it happen in silico and observe what 
kinds of mind tend to evolve.
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Evolution and contingency
One problem with using these evolutionary approaches to design artificial 
minds is that this might tell us nothing about the design of real minds. 
Evolution is a notoriously contingent process. The important role played 
by historical accident in evolution has led Stephen Jay Gould to remark 
that if we could rewind the tape of biological history and start it again, the 
outcome would probably be very different. Not only might there not be 
humans, Gould suggests; there might not even be anything like 
mammals. Even if we did succeed in creating an intelligent machine by 
means of some evolutionary design process, therefore, its mental 
structure might be very different from our own. If the point of building an 
artificial mind is to increase our understanding of real minds, using an 
evolutionary design-process to build one might be a dead end.
On the other hand, evolution may not be quite so contingent as Gould 
suggests. If we could rewind the tape of biological history and start it 
again, perhaps we would find similar kinds of outcomes. Since life on 
earth has only evolved once, it seems that there is no way of arbitrating 
between these different possibilities; we are left trading intuitions. 
However, researchers in A-Life dispute this. They claim that we can 
rewind the tape of biological history and re-run it thousands or even 
millions of times.
By running programs like Tierra over and over again, perhaps varying the 
initial parameters occasionally, we might just be able to discern various 
constants in evolution. Computer simulations of evolution might provide a 
way of testing Gould’s claim about the radical contingency of evolution. 
What counts as similarity and difference depends, of course, on your 
frame of reference. If we are concerned with details, such as the number 
of digits on a limb, then perhaps we will find a different outcome each time 
we run our computer simulation of evolution. However, if we use a less
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fine-grained taxonomy, we may find the same broad classes of organism 
turning up every time we let our virtual world evolve. This line of thought 
is what prompted Ray to note that he found virtual viruses evolving in 
Tierra. These viruses did not use RNA, and were not encased in a protein 
shell; they were simply strings of digits on the computer’s hard disk. 
However, they had certain important properties in common with natural 
viruses. They could not, for example, replicate in isolated culture, but only 
when cultured with normal (self-replicating) creatures. Like natural 
viruses, the artificial parasites executed some parts of the code of their 
hosts. As in the real world, some potential hosts in Tierra evolved 
immunity to the virtual viruses, and some of the viruses then evolved 
mechanisms to circumvent this immunity (Ray, 1992: 124).
Ray’s analysis of evolution in Tierra supports the idea that, while the 
details may change, the underlying patterns may be the same whenever 
evolution occurs. Given enough time, we may find that every evolutionary 
process tends to produce the same basic classes of organism, filling the 
same kinds of niche. If we make our taxonomy coarse enough, this 
statement will become trivially true. If we use very abstract ecological 
categories, such as parasite and host or predator and prey, for example, 
re-running the tape of evolution will almost certainly produce similar 
outcomes. Thus the claim that evolution always produces parasites may 
not be very interesting since the term parasite is so broadly defined. 
Conversely, if we find that evolution only rarely produces animals with five 
digits on each limb, this may not be very interesting either, because this 
kind of detail is of no particular consequence. The interesting questions 
focus on categories that are neither too general nor too specific.
I suggest that it is just these kind of interesting questions, at the right grain 
of analysis to make them worth investigating by computer simulations of 
evolution, that are posed by much of the work in evolutionary psychology. 
The claim that massively domain-specific minds tend to be favoured by
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natural selection has not been demonstrated on purely theoretical 
grounds, but it might be demonstrated on experimental ones. If we ran 
hundreds of simulations of human evolution, or animal evolution in 
general, now and again varying the initial parameters, and found that 
domain-specific minds were almost always the end product, this would 
provide strong evidence in support for the idea that natural selection tends 
to favour such minds. Such a finding would therefore provide 
encouragement for cognitive scientists to model the human mind by 
designing domain-specific machines. Conversely, if we found that 
domain-specific minds were only rarely produced by computer simulations 
of cognitive evolution, this would provide grounds for betting that the mind 
was better modelled by domain-general machines. Thus, while ETM is 
compatible with CTM, evolutionary approaches to cognition are not 
redundant; in particular, they can suggest interesting ways of narrowing 
the search space for the design that best approximates that of the human 
mind.
Evolutionary psychology or evolutionary cognitive science?
This suggestion would provide a way of bridging the gap that currently 
separates evolutionary psychology from artificial intelligence. I have 
already noted that evolutionary psychologists have not yet engaged in 
much explicit dialogue with researchers in artificial life and evolutionary 
robotics. This is a shame, because, as I have tried to show in this section, 
they are natural partners. Evolutionary psychology can be seen as 
investigating the evolution of natural minds, while A-Life (or at least some 
branches of A-Life) and evolutionary robotics can be seen as investigating 
the evolution of artificial minds. If we want to adopt the methodological 
maxim of cognitive science, according to which we build artificial minds in 
order to understand natural ones, evolutionary psychology and A-Life 
should be seen as two sides of the same coin. That is why I propose the 
umbrella term, ‘evolutionary cognitive science’, to cover the potentially
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fruitful intersection between evolutionary psychology, on the one hand, 
and A-Life and evolutionary robotics on the other. In the next section, I 
argue that evolutionary cognitive science would have many important 
things to say about the emotions.
3-2. Evolutionary approaches to emotion
In section 1.2 we saw that cognitive science faces a dilemma: it must 
either reject the cognition/emotion distinction, or find an alternative way of 
explicating this distinction to that proposed by Hume. The classical 
models of emotion developed by the appraisal theorists did not solve this 
dilemma. They did succeed in providing a representational account of 
emotion, by construing emotions as kinds of belief or judgement, but they 
did not specify any independent criterion for distinguishing emotional 
types of judgement from other non-emotional (cognitive) types.
As Zajonc said (or meant to say), if cognitive science is to solve the 
dilemma, it needs further conceptual resources. In this section, I argue 
that the evolutionary approach can provide these resources. Evolutionary 
theory can help cognitive science to deal with emotion in the same way 
that it helps cognitive science to deal with other mental processes: by 
bringing in the question of function. Before discussing the functions of the 
emotions, however, I will argue that the evolutionary approach can solve 
another problem posed by the classical account of emotion -  the problem 
of what emotions are about.
What are emotions about?
Hume, it will be recalled, argued that emotions are non-representational. 
Unlike thoughts or beliefs, they are not about anything; they just are. So, 
for Hume, it would make no sense to ask whether or not an emotion was 
‘correct’ or ‘true’.
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Classical cognitive scientists interested in emotion rejected this Humean 
view and replaced it with a representational account of emotion. 
Emotions, on this account, are particular kinds of judgement or belief. 
Psychologists working with appraisal theory and philosophers working with 
the propositional attitude theory both went about showing how particular . 
emotions could be construed in this way. If emotions are representational, 
however, it follows that there must be some way of assessing their truth 
value. And yet to many people this seems distinctly odd. Even if we 
disagree with Hume’s view of emotion, we can still feel the tug of his 
intuition when he writes that it is ‘impossible ... that this passion be 
oppos’d by, or be contradictory to truth, or reason’ (Hume, 1734: 415). 
Most people, after all, would feel rather puzzled, if not downright offended, 
if you asked them whether, say, their embarrasment was correct or not. If 
they bothered to reply, they would probably say that it must be correct, 
because they feel it. Such a reply implicitly endorses Hume’s view of 
emotion, and challenges the classical cognitive scientist to point to some 
external system by which the truth of an emotion can be judged.
The classical cognitive scientist would be at a loss here. If one adopts an 
explicitly evolutionary approach to the study of the mind, however, there is 
a possible solution; the environment can serve as the external system. In 
other words, a particular instance of an emotion in a particular organism 
can be judged ‘correct’ when it fulfils the proper function of that type of 
emotion. If the function of fear is to help the organism avoid danger, for 
example, then an organism is right to feel fear on this occasion if and only 
if there is an immediate danger. Otherwise, this instance of fear will be 
‘incorrect’.
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Functional accounts of emotion
Let us return now to the question of what functions are served by 
particular emotions. In order to understand this question, it is first 
necessary to be clear about how functional statements in biology should 
be should be understood. The meaning of functional ascriptions has 
generated substantial philosophical interest during the past few decades, 
and a rich literature has grown up around the topic. An extensive analysis 
of this literature would take me too far away from the subject of this thesis, 
so I will limit myself to summarising the main conclusions that have 
emerged from it.
There is now a good deal of consensus among philosophers of biology 
that functional statements in the biological sciences are usually to be 
understood as making a historical claim about causes.3 More specifically, 
a statement to the effect that ‘the function of trait x is y’ is to be 
understood as shorthand for the claim that ‘the reason this population has 
trait x is because x helped its ancestors to survive and/or reproduce by 
doing y \ For example, to say that ‘the function of the heart is to pump 
blood’ is to say that the reason we have hearts today is that hearts helped 
our ancestors to survive by pumping blood around their bodies. 
Functional statements thus imply that the trait in question conferred a 
selective advantage on those ancestral organisms who had the trait, and 
that this selective advantage played a causal role in the proliferation of the 
trait among the daughter population.
3 Functional statements in psychology may be treated quite differently. In particular, when 
functions are ascribed to mental processes, as in functional decomposition (see chapter 
one), this does not imply any historical or evolutionary claim. Rather, statements about 
cognitive functions are analysable in purely synchronic terms, as reducible to statements 
about the causal role that cognitive processes play in the overall mental economy. Some 
philosophers, such as Ruth Millikan, have attempted to ground these statements about 
cognitive functions in statements about biological functions, but this ‘teleo-semantic’ 
approach is an independent issue.
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In proposing functional accounts of human emotions, therefore, 
evolutionary psychologists are not claiming that emotions still help 
contemporary humans to survive and/or reproduce, but simply that they 
helped our recent ancestors to do so. Whether or not emotions are still 
selectively advantageous is left open by the functional hypotheses 
advanced by evolutionary psychologists.
There is a high degree of agreement between evolutionary psychologists 
about the functions of many emotions. I have based the following brief 
summary mainly on the work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (Tooby 
and Cosmides, 1990), but similar evolutionary accounts of emotion have 
been put forward by Paul Ekman, Robert Plutchik, R. S. Lazarus and 
Randolph Nesse (Plutchik, 1980; Nesse, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Ekman, 
1992). All these researchers argue, uncontroversially, that fear helps 
animals to survive by avoid predators by fleeing (to escape) or freezing (to 
avoid being spotted). Most agree that disgust is clearly of value in helping 
animals to avoid ingesting or touching substances that may be poisonous 
or infectious. There is similar agreement that surprise alerts animals to a 
change in the environment, while anger readies them for combat.
If we are to provide a functional definition of emotion, then we must 
abstract away from the functions of particular emotions and ask what they 
all have in common. The proposal I will argue for here is that all emotions 
are able to achieve their particular functions only because they fall under a 
more general functional category: they are all interruption mechanisms. 
Fear makes you stop what you are doing when you detect danger. Anger 
interrupts ongoing activity in order to deal with possible combat. Disgust 
stops you eating potentially dangerous food or going near sources of 
infection. And so on.
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Interruption mechanisms
The idea that emotions are interruption mechanisms can be traced back to 
Herbert Simon, who proposed a functional definition of emotion in a short 
but fascinating paper in the 1960s (Simon, 1967). Simon started from the 
simple observation that there is a limit to the amount of things that any 
agent can do at any one time, whether it be an animal or a robot. 
Therefore, if the agent has more than one goal, it must divide its time up 
wisely, allotting the right amount to each activity in pursuit of each of each 
goal. However, unless the environment is completely stable and benign, 
the agent must also remain alert to external changes that may require a 
rapid change of activity. Suppose, for example, that a robot has the 
following two goals: first to collect rock samples from an asteroid and 
analyse them in situ, and second, to bring these samples safely back to 
earth. Now imagine that such a robot is sitting happily on the asteroid, 
conducting some chemical test on the rock it has just picked up, when 
suddenly a piece of debris comes hurtling towards it. Unless the robot 
has some kind of 'interruption mechanism', it may succeed in its first goal, 
but fail dismally in the second.
Simon proposed that emotions were just such interruption mechanisms. 
He meant this as a definition. In other words, the word 'emotion' is the 
name we have given to these interruption mechanisms when we have 
observed them in ourselves and other animals. According to Simon's 
functional definition, emotions are those mental processes that generally 
work to interrupt activity in rapid response to a sudden environmental 
change. More recently, Keith Oatley has developed Simon's ideas into a 
theory of emotion according to which ‘an emotion is a psychological state 
or process that functions in the management of goals ... it is an urgency, 
or prioritization, of some goals and plans rather than others ... (that) can 
interrupt ongoing action (Oatley, 1999: 273; see also Oatley, 1996). 
Oatley’s theory drops Simon’s emphasis on reaction to sudden external
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changes, and thus allows that there might be interruption mechanisms 
that are triggered by less sudden changes and by internal events.
Objections to the interruption theory
Let us call the idea that emotions can be functionally defined as 
interruption mechanisms ‘the interruption theory’. It is now time to 
examine some possible objections:
(i) The interruption theory is to broad; it would class every mental 
process as emotional.
If any mental process can interrupt any other, then we will not have 
succeeded in finding an alternative, non-Humean way of distinguishing 
cognition and emotion. If we are to pick out emotions as a distinct class of 
mental processes on the basis of their capacity to interrupt other mental 
processes, then there must be some mental processes that are incapable 
of interrupting others (and, presumably, we will have to identify these with 
the class of ‘cognitive’ processes).
So, are there, in fact, any mental processes that never interrupt others? It 
is certainly possible to imagine how this might be the case. If mental 
processes could be organised in a simple hierarchy, such that a process 
at one level in the hierarchy could only interrupt those in the level above it, 
then those at the top of the hierarchy would clearly be incapable of 
interrupting any other. This is, in fact, the kind of mental architecture 
proposed by Simon in his paper on emotions. It is also the basis of many 
architectures in contemporary behaviour-based robotics, which often 
consist of many autonomous layers. In these systems, the robots’ 
behaviour is only controlled by one layer at any one time. The highest 
layer is the default control layer. In other words, so long as none of the 
lower layers is triggered into action, the highest layer directs the
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movement of the robot. However, while the robot is under the control of 
one layer, all the lower layers are still alert to possible stimuli. If the 
relevant stimulus triggers one of the lower layers into action, it 
automatically takes over.
Such hierarchical architectures are not restricted to robots, however. 
Jaap Swagerman has implemented such an architecture in a program he 
wrote for a desktop computer. The program is called ACRES (an acronym 
for ‘Artificial Concern REalisation System’) (Swagerman, 1987). ACRES 
is a database containing information about emotions and the situations 
that give rise to them, but these data are not the relevant point here. More 
important than the information contained in the database is the fact that 
ACRES is also a very sophisticated interface. ACRES has multiple 
concerns, and now and again it examines these concerns to see if any of 
them requires action. The concerns are, in decreasing order of 
importance: to stay ‘alive’ (switched on), to get fast input, to get accurate 
input, to get varied input, and so on, down to servicing database queries 
and turning on and off its debugging procedures. While the user is 
interacting with ACRES (asking it for data, inputting data, ending the 
session, etc.), the program scans its list of concerns, beginning with the 
most important, and takes appropriate action where necessary. For 
example, if it has not learned anything new for a while, its concern for 
getting varied input will trigger a request for the user to tell it something 
new. If the user does not comply with the system’s wishes, he is gradually 
given the cold shoulder, first being refused permission to change the 
database, and eventually being denied access to ACRES altogether.
Users interacting with ACRES report that the ‘emotional behaviour’ of the 
program feels quite realistic (Moffat, Frijda et al., 1994). On the 
interruption theory, this impression is understandable; the program really 
does have emotions. Each of the multiple concerns of ACRES can 
potentially interrupt ongoing activity. Each concern is assigned a fixed
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importance index, and these are ranked in a simple hierarchical fashion so 
that, although goals can conflict, there is always a simple algorithm for 
determining which takes precedence.
If emotions really are interruption mechanisms, then all the layers in this 
kind of architecture instantiate emotions, and only the highest layer could 
be said to be truly ‘cognitive’ (in the sense of being unemotional,). Prima 
facie, then, this ‘default view’ of cognition seems like a fairly good 
approximation of what we mean when we speak of pure thought, or pure 
reasoning, in humans. Only when we are not prey to a particular emotion 
do we usually attribute such purely ‘cognitive’ processes to ourselves.
Every layer must have some kind of goal, though. So, on the interrupt 
theory, emotions cannot simply be equated with goals or drives. The goal 
of the top layer must be something that never interrupts other goals. 
Curiosity or ‘interest’ meets this criterion. This is why Izard (1979) regards 
it as the default state of the organism. Izard calls interest an emotion, but 
on the interruption theory it would not be classed as such. It would, in 
fact, be the defining feature of unemotional (i.e. cognitive) processes!
(ii) The interruption theory is too broad; it may not class every mental 
process as an emotion, but it still allows us to call some things 
emotions when they are not.
What about things like hunger and pain? These are not usually described 
as emotions, but they can clearly interrupt other mental processes. This 
objection can be met in a number of ways. One way would be to refine 
the interruption theory by adding an extra clause to our definition of 
emotion, so they are defined not simply as interruption mechanisms, but 
as interruption mechanisms of a certain sort. We would then have to find 
a way of distinguishing between interruption mechanisms such as hunger 
and pain, on the one hand, and interruption mechanisms of a more
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obviously emotional kind on the other. I find this response unattractive, 
however, as I can think of no principled way to make such a distinction. I 
therefore prefer to adopt an alternative response to objection (ii).
The alternative response I prefer is to say that we were wrong to exclude 
things like pain and hunger from the class of emotions. It is not 
uncommon for us to revise our pretheoretic use of terms in the light of 
later scientific theories. If the range of things we refer to as ‘emotions’ in 
everyday, pretheoretic usage overlaps to a large extent with the class of 
interruption mechanisms, it is reasonable to see the pretheoretic term as 
an initial approximation to the scientific theory. We can than accept that 
the pretheoretic use of the term wrongly excluded (or include) a few things 
that we now think share the defining properties identified by our the 
scientific theory. In other words, so long as most of the things we 
designate as ‘emotions’ in our pretheoretic way are interruption 
mechanisms, then there are good grounds for arguing that our 
pretheoretic judgements about the unemotional nature of pain and hunger 
are just plain wrong.
The same response can be used to tackle cases of non-human emotion. 
Many people seem quite happy to attribute emotions to other primates, 
and indeed to many other mammals, but they become less happy to 
attribute emotions to other species less related to us. Most people would 
probably baulk at the idea that worms have emotions, for example. Yet 
worms clearly have interruption mechanisms, so, on the interruption 
theory, they can truly be said to have emotions. As with the case of 
hunger and pain in humans, we could deal with this objection by adding 
an extra clause to our definition of emotions as interruption mechanisms. 
For example, we could say that interruption mechanisms only deserve to 
be called emotions when they are found in creatures above a certain 
threshold of cognitive complexity. This is too arbitrary, however. The fact 
that such arbitrary post hoc modifications are required to bring the
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interruption theory into line with the common usage of the term emotion 
simply indicates that the pretheoretic use of the term is too 
anthropocentric, too obsessed with the local features of the various 
interruption mechanisms we find in ourselves. We should therefore not let 
the common reticence about attributing emotions to lowly creatures like 
worms stand in the way of a scientific account of emotion. So long as the 
interruption theory has hit on the element that we were groping towards in 
our pretheoretic use of the term, then we should not hesitate to ammend 
our usage when it conflicts with the interruption theory.
I think that it does hit on such an element. The interruption theory 
provides a precise way of explicating the notion that lies at the heart of our 
pretheoretic notion of emotion. This is the idea that emotions can take us 
over against our conscious volition. This idea is implicit in the older term 
‘passion’, which comes from the same root as ‘passive’. We are, in a very 
real sense, often passive ‘victims’ of our emotional reactions.
(iii) The interruption theory does not allow for top-down influences of 
cognition on emotion.
Humans are not entirely at the mercy of their emotions. Emotions often 
have an imperious, automatic quality to them, but no so much as to render 
them always impervious to voluntary control. Yet the interruption theory 
does not seem to allow for such top-down influences. This objection could 
be met by building some kind of variable threshold into our model. If lower 
levels could only interrupt higher levels when their signal exceeded some 
given threshold, and if higher levels could exert some influence on the 
level of this threshold, then, there would be some measure of top-down 
influence without thereby abolishing the distinction between mechanisms 
that are capable of interruption and those that are not.
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(iv) The interruption theory applies only to a subset of those things we 
call emotion.
All the emotions discussed so far in this chapter are among the so-called 
‘basic emotions’ identified by Paul Ekman. These include fear, anger, 
surprise, disgust, joy (or happiness), and distress (or sadness). According 
to Ekman, basic emotions are typically automatic, reflex-like responses of 
rapid onset and brief duration (Ekman, 1992). They thus seem well suited 
to being described as interruption mechanisms.
But not all emotions are ‘basic’ in this sense. Love, guilt, shame, jealousy 
and sympathy are certainly emotions, but they do not possess same suite 
of features that, according to Ekman, define basic emotions. For this 
reason, Paul Griffiths has argued that they deserve to be treated in a class 
of their own, which he refers to as ‘the higher cognitive emotions’ 
(Griffiths, 1997). Perhaps these emotions are not interruption 
mechanisms. If so, then we must either seek some other definition of 
emotion, or accept that emotion is not a natural kind. Griffiths prefers the 
latter option, but I think he gives up too quickly on the project of finding a 
good definition of emotion.
The first thing to note, in response to this objection, is that it may be 
misleading to lump all non-basic emotions together into a single class.4 
Just because an emotion does not possess all the characteristics that 
define basic emotions does not mean that it lacks them all. The properties 
that Griffiths attributes to higher cognitive emotions are the all contraries 
of those that Ekman attributes to basic emotions. Thus, according to 
Griffiths, all higher cognitive emotions take longer to build up and die away
4 Griffiths does not say quite this. He allows that there may be a third class of emotions 
that are culturally-specific. However, he still thinks that the pancultural emotions can be 
divided into two classes, basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions, and implies that, 
for every dimension on which basic emotions and higher cognitive emotions can be 
compared (other than the pancultural/culturally-specific dimension), they take opposite 
values.
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than basic emotions, all involve much more cortical processing than basic 
emotions, and all lack universally-recognisable distinctive facial 
expressions. There are reasons to doubt that these features correlate as 
highly as those that define basic emotions, but I will not go into them here. 
In order to avoid the dubious assumption that all non-basic emotions form 
a natural kind, as robust as the natural kind formed by basic emotions, I 
will not refer to them as ‘higher cognitive emotions’, but simply as ‘non- 
basic emotions’.
Secondly, it is worth remembering that Ekman proposed the distinction 
between basic and non-basic emotions, not because he thought that 
emotions could be divided into two robust natural kinds, but because he 
was trying to convince his fellow anthropologists that some emotions, at 
least, were universal and innate. By picking out a number of properties 
shared universally by some emotions, he was able to mount a persuasive 
argument against the cultural theory of emotion, which viewed all 
emotions as learned phenomena and thus culturally-specific. The 
historical context of the concept of basic emotions should warn us against 
granting too much metaphysical weight to the basic/non-basic distinction. 
In particular, we should not assume that, just because the interruption 
theory of emotion fits the basic emotions, it therefore does not apply to 
non-basic emotions. The question of whether non-basic emotions can 
also be treated as interruption mechanisms, and therefore the question of 
whether the interruption account amounts to a general theory of emotion, 
cannot be settled simply by appealing to the fact that a subset of emotions 
share the properties identified by Ekman.
To settle the question of whether or not emotions like love and guilt can be 
described as interruption mechanisms, we need to ask what their 
particular functions are, and then ask whether or not these functions are 
plausibly regarded as species of the more general functional category of 
interruption mechanisms. This is not so easy; functional accounts of the
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non-basic emotions have been much thinner on the ground than functional 
accounts of basic emotions. The only person to put forward an extensive 
theory of why (at least some of) the non-basic emotions evolved is the 
Cornell economist, Robert Frank. In his book, Passions within Reason, 
Frank argues that many non-basic emotions evolved to help our recent 
ancestors solve various kinds o f ‘commitment problem’ (Frank, 1988).
Commitment problems arise whenever an agent needs to make a credible 
threat or promise. Threats and promises are vital to successful co­
operation, but threats can be empty and promises defaulted upon, so the 
agent who wishes to co-operate must convince others that he is sincere. 
One way for him to do this, argues Frank, is to provide evidence that he is 
committed to carrying out the threat or promise willy-nilly, even if it 
becomes disadvantageous for him to do so. He needs, in other words, to 
show that he is ‘handcuffed’ to carrying out the promise or threat. This 
may be termed ‘the handcuff principle’. According to Frank, many non- 
basic emotions provide both the handcuff itself (in the form of an 
uncontrollable feeling) and the evidence that such a handcuff is in place 
(in the form of physiological signals, such as sweating or blushing).
Take guilt, for example. It might seem that feeling bad when you cheat is 
not very advantageous in a world governed by the iron law of the survival 
of the fittest. Yet if others know that you feel bad about cheating, they will 
be more likely to co-operate with you in joint-ventures that require trust. 
The fact that the feeling of guilt cannot be easily swayed by a calm, 
rational assessment of self-interest is vital. There are many occasions in 
life when it is possible to take a benefit without paying the corresponding 
price, and without being detected. In such a situation, the most rational 
thing to do (as defined by rational decision theory) is to cheat. However, 
when one takes a broader view, the calculation of costs and benefits 
changes somewhat. The feeling of guilt can force one to take this broader 
view, when reason might otherwise focus on the short-term.
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Frank illustrates his analysis of guilt with the following example. Consider 
two people, Smith and Jones, who wish to engage in a potentially 
profitable joint-venture, such as starting a restaurant. Their potential for 
gain arises from the advantages associated with the division of labour. If 
Smith is a talented cook, and Jones is a shrewd manager, they can use 
their respective skills to launch a successful joint venture that pays each 
of them more than they would gain from working alone. The problem is 
that each will have opportunities to cheat without being detected. Smith 
can take kickbacks from food suppliers, while Jones can fiddle the 
accounts. If only one of the partners cheats, he does very well, while the 
other does poorly. Thus self-interest dictates that cheating is the best 
policy, and, if both are rational agents, both end up cheating. With both 
parties cheating, however, each does worse than they would do if both 
were honest. This is simply a version of the famous ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 
so beloved by game theorists (Axelrod, 1984). If Smith and Jones could 
make a binding commitment not to cheat, both would profit by doing so. 
The problem thus reduces to that of how to make a credible commitment 
(Frank, 1988: 4-5).
Frank proposes that the emotion of guilt is one way of solving this 
commitment problem. If a person feels guilty whenever he cheats, this 
can cause him to behave honestly even when he knows that he could get 
away with cheating. And if others know that he is this type of person, they 
will seek him out as a partner in joint ventures that require trust. This 
depends, of course, on there being reliable cues that indicate the 
presence of guilt. Only if there is some signal that is good evidence for a 
conscience, such as blushing when one feels guilty, will people know that 
you are trustworthy. These signals must be hard to fake, otherwise they 
would not be reliable. Frank argues that natural selection has built such 
hard-to-fake signals into human physiology precisely to solve the 
commitment problem.
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The irony of the prisoner’s dilemma is that the failure to pursue self- 
interest actually leads to genuine advantages, at least when self-interest 
looks only to the short-term. On Frank’s account, emotions like guilt save 
us from the pitfalls of using reason alone. However, just because such 
emotions work against the dictates of human reasoning does not mean 
that they are ‘irrational’, in the technical sense of flouting the principles of 
rationality theory. When considered in the context of a one-shot game, 
they are clearly irrational, but when set in the context of a series of 
repeated interactions with the same players they exhibit a kind of ‘global 
rationality’ that saves human reasoning (not pure reason) from itself.
Frank’s analysis of guilt as a solution to a commitment problem can be 
extended to other non-basic emotions such as the ‘sense of fairness’, 
vengefulness, and romantic love. Forming a stable pair-bond for the 
purposes of rearing children is another example of the commitment 
problem. Jack and Jill may consider each other as a suitable mate, but 
forming a stable pair-bond requires a substantial investment of time and 
resources, and each fears that that this investment could be undercut if 
the other were to leave for an even more attractive partner in the future. 
Without reasonable assurance that this will not happen, neither will be 
willing to make the investments required for a successful pair-bond (Frank, 
1988: 49). The emotion of romantic love is a solution to this problem. If 
Jack commits himself to Jill because of an emotion he did not ‘decide’ to 
have (and so cannot decide not to have), an emotion that is reliably 
indicated by tachycardia and insomnia, then Jill will be more likely to 
believe he will not default on his commitment than if he had chosen her 
after coolly weighing up her good and bad points. ‘People who are 
sensible about love are incapable of it,’ wrote Douglas Yates (Pinker, 
1997:418).
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Emotions like guilt and romantic love are termed ‘higher cognitive 
emotions’ by Griffiths because they show much more sophisticated 
processing than basic emotions, and because they are much more 
integrated with other cognitive processes such as those leading to long­
term planned action -  not because of any susceptibility to conscious 
control. Lack of conscious control is, in fact, vital to these emotions, since 
an ability to control them by rational deliberation would defeat their 
purpose. If the function of these emotions is indeed to 'save rationality 
from its own pitfalls', as Frank argues, they must be fairly autonomous. 
Both the feeling and the signal must be hard to fake. In other words, 
these emotions too must be capable of interrupting thought when they 
detect some reason for doing so. There are good grounds, then, for 
thinking of higher cognitive emotions as interruption mechanisms too.
Emotions, domain-specificity, and modularity
I do not pretend to have dealt with all possible objections to the 
interruption theory, but I hope I have at least dealt with some of the most 
obvious ones. I now wish to return to the issue of domain specificity in 
order to clear up some terminological confusion that has at times side­
tracked those interested in this question.
The interruption theory implies that emotions must be subserved by 
domain-specific mechanisms. Only when a mind is composed of several 
distinct subsystems, each attending to a different kind of input -  only, that 
is, when a mind was massively domain-specific -  could it have interruption 
mechanisms. If the interruption theory is correct, then, a mind could not 
have emotions unless it was massively domain-specific (though the 
interruption theory does not rule out the possibility that such a mind could 
have a domain-general mechanism too, subserving cognitive processes). 
This argument is very similar that put forward by Cosmides and Tooby in 
their 1990 paper on emotions (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).
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In fact, there are good reasons for thinking that the mechanisms 
subserving emotions must not only be domain-specific, but that they must 
also have most, if not all, of the other properties that Fodor takes to define 
‘modules’. I hesitate to use this term, as it is used in such a variety ways 
by various sections of the cognitive science community that it tends to 
impede communication rather than to facilitate it. I will therefore spell out 
exactly what I mean by it before I go on.
However other people may use the term, I follow Fodor in thinking of a 
module as a computational mechanism (computational in the sense 
defined in chapter one, i.e. as something that performs transformations on 
representations) with the following nine properties (c.f. Fodor, 1983):5
(1) Domain specificity -  modules only perform transformations on 
representations that fall within a certain domain.
(2) Mandatory operation -  modules are automatic, like reflexes.
(3) Inaccessibility to conscious introspection -  the intermediate 
transformations performed by modules are not accessible to 
consciousness.
(4) High speed -  modular mechanisms are much faster than non-modular 
ones.
(5) Informational encapsulation -  the database and program of a module 
is not available for use by other mental mechanisms.
(6) Shallow outputs -  modules deliver output in the form of unanalysed 
representations.
(7) Specific neural architecture -  even though modules are mental rather 
than neural structures, they are often ‘hardwired’ in the brain; that is,
5 I will not analyse these properties here, nor discuss the kinds of evidence that would 
count in assessing them. Such a discussion would involve a protracted detour and would 
risk obscuring the main line of argument. Besides, Fodor himself has already discussed 
each of these properties in detail as well as the methodological problems of investigating 
them -  indeed, this discussion takes up most of his original book.
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they are implemented by the same neural structure in all normal 
brains.
(8) Characteristic breakdown patterns -  when modules are damaged or 
absent, this is manifested in a typical pattern of symptoms.
(9) Characteristic pace and sequencing in development -  modules are 
innately specified or genetically determined.
According to Fodor, a mental mechanism must have most or all of the 
nine properties listed above in order to qualify as a module.6 Indeed, it is 
the regular co-occurrence of these nine properties that is supposed to 
make modularity a robust natural kind.
I have two claims to make about the modularity of emotion:
(i) Firstly, an empirical claim: as a matter of fact, most of the things 
commonly identified as emotions in humans and other animals 
possess most of these nine properties. An overwhelming mass of 
psychological and neuroscientific research supports this claim, but 
to go into it in any detail would involve me in a protracted detour. 
Paul Griffiths sums up some of the evidence in his 1990 paper on 
psychoevolutionary theories of emotion (Griffiths, 1990). 
Empirically, then, emotions are properly described as modular.
(ii) Secondly, a theoretical claim: the interruption theory predicts that 
emotions should have many of these properties. I have already
6 Dominic Murphy and Stephen Stich point out, the term ‘module’ is used in a much 
broader and less demanding way by most evolutionary psychologists. This different 
usage can lead to confusion, so Murphy and Stich suggest that in cases of ambiguity, the 
two concepts should be distinguished by using the term 'Fodorian module’ to designate 
the stricter, original concept, and the term ‘Darwinian module’ to designate the broader 
notion employed by evolutionary psychologists (Murphy and Stich, 1998: 3). The 
Darwinian module is a broader concept than the Fodorian module because it does not 
insist that a mental mechanism possess all or even most of the nine properties listed 
above before calling it a ‘module’. Murphy and Stich go so far as to claim that a mental 
mechanism need only possess properties (1), (2) and (5) in order to count as a Darwinian 
module, and sometimes even (2) and (5) are not even necessary.
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argued that interruption mechanisms must have property (1): 
domain specificity. It should be pretty clear, without needing to 
spell out the argument, that interruption mechanisms must also 
have properties (2) and (4): they must be automatic and fast. In 
natural organisms, they should develop regularly in a wide range of 
environments -  property (9). Property (7) seems to follow from this, 
and to lead naturally to property (8).
This point is not new. Paul Griffiths pointed out the links between 
evolutionary theories of emotion and Fodor’s concept of modularity some 
years ago, first in a paper and then in a book, though he only thought it 
plausible that basic emotions were modular (Griffiths, 1990; 1997). More 
recently, however, Griffiths has disavowed his earlier views. He no longer 
thinks that it is useful to think of emotions a modular. In a recent article in 
Metascience, he proposes two reasons for this U-turn (Griffiths, 1999).
The first reason that Griffiths gives for rejecting modular accounts of 
emotion rests on the fact that modularity is supposed to be a whole cluster 
of properties, of which automaticity is only one. If these properties can 
dissociate relatively easily, as now seems to be the case, then it is wrong 
to call emotions ‘modular’ on the basis that they have one modular 
property, since this would prompt people to infer, falsely, that emotions 
must have all of the other modular properties too.
Griffiths’s second reason for rejecting modular theories of emotion is that 
the concept of modularity involves a strong commitment to a crude form of 
nativism. The ninth criterion in Fodor's list states that modular 
mechanisms are innately specified by some kind of genetic and neural 
program. Griffiths had previously endorsed the application of this idea to 
basic emotions, but he now rejects it because he thinks that the concept 
of innateness involves 'the idea of a literal neural program, containing a 
representation of the species-typical behaviour which ensues when the
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program is activated, and this, he claims, is 'entirely the wrong way' to 
think about basic emotions (Griffiths, 1999: 50, emphasis in original).
Both of the reasons put forward by Griffiths for rejecting a modular 
account of basic emotions are rather foolish. The first reason 
misunderstands the nature of the claim about the modularity of emotion. If 
the claim is an empirical one, we are simply saying that emotions do, in 
fact, have most or all of the properties listed by Fodor. We are not 
claiming that one can infer, simply on the basis that emotions have one 
modular property, that they have them all. If the claim about modularity is 
a theoretical one, of course, we are saying that we infer that emotions 
have several of the properties in Fodor’s list, but the inference is not from 
the possession of one modular property to the possession of the others. It 
is from a general theory about what emotions are -  they are interruption 
mechanisms -  to a set of empirical predictions about what properties we 
expect these mechanisms to have.
The second reason Griffiths gives for rejecting modular theories of 
emotion simply attacks a straw man. Just because we use terms like 
‘innately specified’ and ‘genetically determined’ does not mean that we are 
committed to a crude form of nativism. These terms may be perfectly 
acceptable shorthand for a sophisticated view of development. Andrew 
Ariew, for example, has argued for an account of innateness in terms of C. 
H. Waddington’s concept of canalisation (Ariew, 1996). On this account, 
to say that something is ‘innate’ is simply to say its development is 
buffered against a wide range of environmental and genetic variation.
Griffiths is wrong, then, to reject the modular accounts of emotion he 
previously endorsed. If anything, he should have extended his thesis and 
recognised that it is not just basic emotions that are modular.
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Chapter Four:
Situated cognitive science and emotion
In contemplating your true self, don't include the body which 
surrounds you and the limbs attached to it. They are like tools, the 
only difference being that they grow from the body.
Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations
A growing number of cognitive scientists today argue for the need to take 
a ‘situated’ approach to the study of the mind. In this chapter, I outline the 
main principles of this approach, and show how they can be applied to the 
interruption theory of emotion.
4.1. Situated cognitive science
When the term ‘evolutionary’ is used to describe an approach to the study 
of the mind, one immediately gets a pretty good idea what is involved. 
The same cannot be said of the term ‘situated’. The label is due to Lucy 
Suchman, whose 1987 book, Plans and Situated Action, has been one of 
the most influential works in shaping this approach (Suchman, 1987). The 
core idea in Suchman’s book, as I see it, is that minds are ‘leaky’, although 
this way of putting things is due to Andy Clark rather than Suchman 
herself (Clark, 1997).
The leaky mind
In section 2.1, I identified internalism as one of the assumptions of 
classical cognitive science. I also argued that the best way to construe 
this term was as the view that the boundary of the mind is to be identified 
with some physical feature of the organism. This is the assumption that 
the proponents of the situated approach dispute. The input-output
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boundary is, according to them, a moveable feast. In other words, the 
question of where the input-output boundary is to be physically located will 
depend very much on the particular context of enquiry. The boundary of 
the mind is not to be simply identified with any physical boundary, whether 
that between the brain and the rest of the body or that between the body 
and the rest of the world. Some mental processes may well supervene 
entirely on the brain, or even on just one part of the brain. Others 
supervene on the brain plus part of the body. Others supervene on the 
brain, body, and parts of the world. This is what I mean by saying that 
minds are ‘leaky’.
Why should we take the idea of the leaky mind seriously? Without 
attempting an exhaustive survey, I will summarise some of the arguments 
here. Since the most ‘watertight’ view of the mind locates it entirely in the 
brain, I begin by looking at cases in which the mind leaks out into other 
parts of the body. I then go on to examine cases in which the mind leaks 
even further afield, spilling out of the body into the world around it. If we 
wish to distinguish between these two cases of leakage, we could refer to 
the first as examples of the ‘embodied’ mind, and the second as cases of 
the ‘embedded’ mind.
The embodied mind
The idea that the mind can be embodied is more than just the claim that 
natural minds are always found in creatures with bodies. The latter claim 
is just STM. To say that minds can be embodied is to say that mental 
processes do not always supervene simply on the brain; sometimes, they 
supervene on the brain plus some other part of the body.
One kind of argument for the idea that minds can be embodied in this 
sense appeals to cases in which changes to the body cause changes to 
the mind. For some of those afflicted by Mobius syndrome, for example, 
the inability to move any of the muscles of facial expression leads the 
person to experience significantly less affect than others (Cole, 1998). In
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such cases, it is not plausible to think of the body as simply a medium 
through which the mind expresses itself; the body affects the mind so 
powerfully that it seems more than just a figure of speech to say that it is 
part of the mind. Daniel Dennett makes a similar point in his book, Kinds 
of Minds, where he argues that the mind is ‘distributed’ throughout the 
body. In Dennett's words, 'my body contains as much of me, the values 
and talents and memories and dispositions that make me who I am, as my 
nervous system does' (Dennett, 1996: 77, emphasis in original)
Those who are tempted to dismiss such cases on the grounds that they do 
not deal with properly cognitive phenomena can be presented with other 
cases. People often use their fingers to keep a tally of something instead 
of storing the number in their heads. Less consciously, there is no need 
for the brain to calculate the force needed to sit up straight too exactly, 
since a certain amount of leeway is catered for by the purely physical 
properties of the body. Andy Clark takes these kinds of example to show 
that other organs besides the brain are integral to the processing loops 
that result in intelligent action. In other words, the brain can ease its 
computational burden by ‘offloading’ some information processing onto 
other parts of the body (Clark, 1997).
More generally, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson claim, in Philosophy in 
the Flesh, that the very structure of our thoughts depends on the particular 
kind of body we have. For example, ‘the fact that we have muscles and 
use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our 
system of causal concepts’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 19). According to 
Lakoff and Johnson, if we had different kinds of bodies, we would have 
different kinds of concepts. This thesis could be tested empirically. We 
might, for example, be able to design an experiment to test whether 
people with only one arm could conceive of 'weighing' and 'balancing' as 
easily as those with two.
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The embedded mind
According to the leaky mind hypothesis, the mind is not only capable of 
spilling out of the brain into the rest of the body, but also of flowing out of 
the body into the rest of the world. In addition to being embodied, minds 
can be embedded.
One set of examples to support this view involve ‘cognitive artefacts’ -  
objects made for the purpose of aiding cognition, such as maps, notepads 
and computers. Such objects not only lighten the processing load of the 
thinker (by allowing, for example, external memory storage), but also make 
possible certain tasks that would otherwise be practically impossible. 
Nicholas Humphrey puts the point well when he writes that a man with a 
pair of scissors 'is not just handier, he is in effect brainier -  because he 
can now exploit his brain power in new ways' (Humphrey, 1997: 100).
Daniel Dennett and Andy Clark have both argued that the most important 
among the various mind tools at our disposal is language. The idea that 
external linguistic tools might alter and inform an individual's intrinsic mode 
of information-processing goes back at least to the Soviet psychologist, 
Lev Vygotsky, but for many years this possibility was largely ignored by 
many Western cognitive scientists, who followed Chomsky in adopting a 
thoroughly internalist approach to the study of language. Dennett and 
Clark have helped to redress this imbalance by showing how 'language is 
not just a medium in which we think', but in fact 'actually does some of the 
thinking with us and for us' (Humphrey, 1997: 101, emphasis in original). 
In Clark's terms, language is the 'ultimate (cognitive) artefact'; it provides 
the human brain with its most extensive and powerful 'external scaffolding'. 
Much of what humans take to be their own mental capacities, argues 
Clark, rely crucially on the external scaffolding provided by language 
(Clark, 1997).
The mind can leak out even further into the rest of the world, to include 
other people as well as cognitive artefacts. Edwin Hutchins proposes that
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the cockpit of an aeroplane be regarded as a cognitive system in which 
cognition is distributed over the pilot, co-pilot, and navigator, as well as 
over the various objects they use (Hutchins, 1995). There are, he claims, 
certain cognitive processes which simply cannot be located in one 
particular part of this system. Some of the complex capacities that we 
identify as mind and intellect may be much more like the systemic 
properties of the cockpit of an aircraft than intrinsic capacities of the bare 
biological brain.
The intemaiist reply
The internalist can respond to all the supposed cases of embodied and 
embedded minds with a single, simple move; he can simply stick to his 
guns, and insist that what is going on in such cases is simply a case of a 
brain interacting with its environment. If we want to tell a richer story about 
how this two-way interaction goes on, all well and good, but the mind still 
supervenes exclusively on the brain.
The proponent of the situated approach cannot deny this move on purely 
logical grounds. He must concede that, for all the cases of leakage 
described above, it is always logically possible to redescribe them in such 
a way as to shift the input-output boundary back onto the skin of the 
organism, or further back still, onto the brain-body boundary. His reasons 
for rejecting such a move must, therefore, be of a less abstract kind than 
pure logic. This, however, is nothing new. Pierre Duhem and W. V. O. 
Quine showed long ago that scientific questions can never be decided on 
logic alone, nor on facts alone. Most philosophers of science today accept 
that our choice of alternative theories must be guided by other more 
pragmatic grounds too.
Two such pragmatic criteria present themselves as relevant to resolving 
the debate between internalism and the leaky mind hypothesis. The first 
is explanatory flexibility, and the second is empirical fruitfulness.
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By explanatory flexibility, I mean that our explanatory tools must be able to 
accommodate themselves to different kinds of situation, rather than forcing 
the facts to accommodate to the theory. I recognise that this is a 
hopelessly sloppy way of putting things, but I take it that the reader has 
some idea of what I mean. The metaphors of the shoe-horn and the 
Procrustean bed are often used to describe inflexible explanatory 
frameworks. Of course, we don’t want our framework to be too flexible, so 
that it can accommodate itself to any fact at all, for otherwise it will become 
vacuous. But nor do we want it to be so inflexible that every single 
situation receives the same pat response. That seems like dogmatism 
rather than science.
The internalist response seems to have all the hallmarks of dogmatism. No 
example of embodied or embedded minds, it seems, will be sufficient to 
persuade him that the input-output boundary is flexible. Yet he can give 
no principled reason for taking the skin or any other purely physical thing 
to be so crucial to the concept of mind. In fact, this seems to fly in the face 
of the key idea of substrate neutrality, which is so central to cognitive 
science. The brain is only one element in the processing loops that result 
in intelligent action, and to single it out as somehow 'more vital1 to these 
action loops than any other seems somewhat arbitrary (Clark, 1997). 
Richard Dawkins has levelled the same charge of arbitrariness at 
biologists who identify the phenotype with the physical organism (Dawkins, 
1982). Indeed, Dawkins’ concept of the 'extended phenotype' can be seen 
as the biological analogue of the idea of embeddedness.
Parsimony
The second pragmatic criterion that is relevant to resolving the debate 
between internalism and the leaky mind hypothesis is empirical 
fruitfulness. By empirical fruitfulness I mean that we should prefer one 
theory over another when it leads, as a matter of fact, to more interesting 
technical achievements. In the context of the debate between internalism 
and the leaky mind hypothesis, these technical achievements are to be
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found in the domain of artificial intelligence. Thus, if we find that cognitive 
scientists who adopt the leaky mind hypothesis tend to design better 
computing machines than those of a more internalist bent, this will 
constitute good grounds for preferring the leaky mind hypothesis. By their 
works shall ye know them.
The relevant sense of ‘better’ in this case is not merely one of 
performance, but one of accuracy in modelling natural minds. This 
assumes that we have some independent criterion, other than 
performance, for judging which of two machines is a more accurate model 
of the human mind. I think we do have such a criterion; it is the criterion 
of parsimony.
In this context, the criterion of parsimony states that whenever two 
machines are capable of mimicking some aspect of human behaviour 
equally well, we should assume that the simpler machine is a better model 
of the human mind. The justification for using this criterion is not just that 
simpler models are easier to work with. Nor is it just that the criterion 
accords with Occam’s razor. It is also that, other things being equal, 
natural selection will favour simpler minds over more complex ones. To 
get this extra justification for the criterion of parsimony, of course, we need 
ETM.
When we compare the machines designed by proponents of the situated 
approach with internalist-type machines, the criterion of parsimony often 
favours the former. For example, how might we construct a robot that can 
pick up disused cans from the office floor? If we took a typical internalist 
approach we might assume that it was necessary to give the robot a 
sophisticated internal map of the office, and a complex camera system to 
register its position. The camera could search for tin cans at long range, 
in which case we would also need some complex image-analysis 
software. Alternatively, we could give the computer a short-range can 
detector and then make it traverse the whole office according to some pre­
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arranged systematic route. Either way, the program is going to be quite 
complex. Let’s call this the internalist robot.
Connell, however, took a rather different approach. Inspired by the idea of 
offloading as much computation as possible on the environment, Connell 
simply allowed his robot to take a random route and gave it a host of 
infrared proximity sensors to help it navigate along walls and through 
doorways. Whenever it happened to detect a can with its short-range 
metal detector, it stopped to pick it up. This robot performed its task 
perfectly well without the need for any internal map of the room, nor for 
any pre-arranged route to be stored in its memory. As Rodney Brooks 
argues, it is natural to construe the robot built by Connell as being far 
simpler than the internalist robot (Brooks, 1991). This is only one 
example, but in many other cases too, the machines designed by those 
adopting a situated approach have managed to achieve comparable 
results to more internalist-style machines despite being much simpler. 
Overall, then, when judged by the criterion of parsimony, the situated 
approach has led to the design of better artificial minds than the internalist 
approach.
Heuristics
There is nothing about CTM that forces one to adopt an internalist 
approach. CTM is perfectly compatible with the leaky mind hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that most classical cognitive did adopt an 
internalist approach. It seems that, unless people are forced to think 
otherwise by adopting an explicitly situated approach, they tend to operate 
on internalist assumptions.
Likewise, there is nothing about the internalist approach that forces one to 
design robots in one way rather than another. There is nothing about 
adopting the internalist stance that obliges the roboticist to design what I 
have dubbed ‘internalist-robots’. Still, those who have adopted an 
internalist approach have tended to ignore the possibility that
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computational burdens can be eased by simple mechanical solutions. 
Even though there is nothing about the internalist position that logically 
excludes this possibility, it is the case that, as a purely empirical matter, 
cognitive scientists of an internalist bent have regularly ignored it. The 
situated approach recommends itself to us then, along practical grounds 
too. It is a heuristic that can guide those working in artificial intelligence to 
design their machines in simpler and more elegant ways.
I have argued that the situated approach can shed new light on the nature 
of mind. In the next section, I argue that the same is true when it comes to 
understanding that particular subset of the mental we refer to as emotions.
4.2. Situated approaches to emotion
In section 3.2, I argued that new light could be thrown on the emotions by 
defining them as interruption mechanisms. In this section, I argue that we 
can advance our understanding of the emotions still further by applying a 
situated approach to the interruption theory.
The key idea of the situated approach is that mental processes are leaky. 
They do not always supervene on the brain alone. Sometimes they are 
‘embodied’, in the sense of supervening on the brain plus some other 
part(s) of the body. And sometimes they are ‘embedded’, in the sense of 
supervening on the extra somatic environment too. In this section I argue 
that this is particularly true of those mental processes we call emotions. In 
other words, interruption mechanisms are very often embodied and 
embedded.
The internalist view of emotion
The most obvious roles for bodily organs other than the brain in emotion is 
to serve as sensors for gathering emotionally relevant data and to serve 
as media for communicating emotions to other cognitive agents. These 
roles were clearly recognised by the proponents of the classical approach
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to emotion, but they tended to focus exclusively on linguistic inputs and 
outputs. The paradigmatic model of such a purely linguistic system is, of 
course, the Turing test, which (in its classical form) limits all 
communication to text messages sent via a keyboard to an alphanumeric 
display. In such a set-up, emotions can only be expressed by linguistic 
means. However, most emotion researchers today accept that the 
‘affective bandwidth’ of linguistic media is very narrow, notwithstanding the 
expressive power of written dialogue that we find in great scripts and 
screenplays. Emotions are primarily communicated not by words but by a 
whole host of nonlinguistic bodily signals, from facial expression and vocal 
intonation to gestures and posture. To make our computer models of 
emotion more realistic, therefore, we should give them the ability to use 
the visual, auditory and physiological signals of emotion. To this end, 
roboticists and others working in the field of affective computing are 
increasingly supplying their machines with a wide variety of peripherals in 
addition to the standard keyboard and monitor. Peripherals that could be 
such as cameras and microphones are used to help computers get better 
at recognising emotions in humans, while animated agent faces and 
affective voice synthesisers are used to model nonlinguistic forms of 
emotional expression (Picard, 1997).
All this, however, is perfectly compatible with an internalist approach to 
emotion. Giving computers more peripherals than a keyboard and a 
monitor can certainly improve their ability to recognise and express 
emotions, but such technical advances do not seem to pose a serious 
theoretical challenge to the internalist view of emotion. The internalist can 
simply treat all the extra peripherals as providing richer input to, and more 
expressive output from, the central cognitive system where the 'real' 
emotional processes go on. All discussions of the ‘recognition’ and 
‘expression’ of emotion are perfectly consistent, and perhaps even 
reinforce, a view of emotions as essentially brain-processes. The body 
just supplies input to the brain or serves as a vehicle for output, but the 
interruption mechanisms themselves are implemented exclusively in the
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brain. The input-output boundary is thus firmly maintained between the 
brain and the rest of the body.
Embodied emotions
Classical cognitive science is not necessarily committed to the internalist 
view of emotion, and the internalist view of emotion does not logically 
entail that bodily inputs are non-specific (i.e. that bodily inputs do not 
determine which emotional response is produced). However, in practice 
most classical cognitive scientists did, in fact, take an internalist view of 
emotion, and assumed that bodily inputs were non-specific. The most 
famous proponents of this view were Stanley Schachter and Jerome 
Singer. On the basis of a well-known experiment on the emotional effects 
of adrenaline (Schachter and Singer, 1962), Schachter argued that 
emotions arise from cognitive attributions about one's state of 
physiological arousal (Schachter, 1964). In other words, all the body does 
is to tell the brain that some kind of emotional response is called for, 
without specifying which kind. The bodily input is merely a quantitative 
signal which, when it exceeds some threshold, triggers a cognitive process 
of appraisal such as those described in section 1.2. According to 
Schachter, it is this cognitive process that determines which emotional 
process will be set in motion.
This view of the role of the body in emotion goes back to Walter Cannon, 
who proposed it as an alternative to an earlier view put forward by William 
James (Cannon, 1927). James had argued, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, that all conscious feelings associated with emotions are merely 
the perception of physiological changes (James, 1888). This implies that 
bodily inputs are specific to each type of emotion. On the basis of some 
experimental work, Cannon argued that James was wrong, and that bodily 
inputs did not differentiate the various emotions from each other. 
Cannon's arguments won the day, and held sway for the rest of the 
twentieth century, seemingly confirmed by the famous 1962 study by 
Schachter and Singer. More recent experimental work, however, has led
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some researchers to call for a return to a more Jamesian view of emotion. 
Paul Ekman, for example, has published a study purporting to show that 
there are, in fact, distinctive ANS signatures for some of the so-called 
'basic emotions', such as fear and anger (Ekman, Levenson et al., 1983). 
There are empirical grounds, then, for reviving the debate about the role of 
bodily inputs in emotional processing. It can no longer be assumed, as it 
was for much of the twentieth century, that bodily inputs are not specific to 
certain emotions. If Ekman's data can be replicated, we must broaden our 
view of where emotional computation takes place; it may not be the brain 
alone that instantiates this computation, but the brain plus other bits of the 
body.
The idea here is that the brain may offload some of its computational 
burden in emotional processes by storing some information about its 
current or recent emotional states in the body rather than storing it all in 
the brain itself. In that case, the emotional system consists not just of 
some neural structure but of the relevant brain structure plus some extra- 
neural bodily state. Once again, it would be open to the internalist to 
redescribe this in terms of an emotional brain mechanism monitoring input 
from the body as well as from the rest of the world. However, but since 
the interaction between brain and body is two-way, it allows for complex 
feedback loops that cross the boundaries between brain and body, so the 
emotional system is better seen as spread out over the whole agent. 
Andy Clark and Michael Wheeler have dubbed this effect ‘causal spread'.
Thinking along these lines, Dolores Canamero has written a computer 
program that simulates some of the physiological aspects of human 
emotions. The program runs in a two-dimensional virtual world inhabited 
by virtual creatures called ‘Abbots’ and ‘Enemies'. Enemies do not have 
emotions, but Abbots have six basic emotions, each of which can be 
triggered by both external events and by internal physiological changes. 
The Abbots’ virtual physiology includes synthetic hormones such as 
endorphins which, as in humans, can trigger a state of happiness or 
reduce the perception of pain (Canamero, 1997).
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Embedded emotions
Perhaps the claim that emotions are embodied is not that surprising. After 
all, the idea that emotions involve the body as well as the brain is probably 
more intuitive than similar claims about thoughts. The idea that emotions 
are embedded, however, is certainly not so intuitive. The claim that 
emotional processes supervene on bits of the external world as well as 
bits of the organism is so much of a challenge to the traditional internalist 
view of emotion that it needs to be argued for in more detail.
To illustrate what is meant by the claim that emotions are embedded, I will 
discuss a number of external devices that humans use to interrupt ongoing 
activity. Specifically, I will discuss two kinds of such external device: 
emotional artefacts, and emotional institutions. This is not meant to be an 
exhaustive taxonomy.
Emotional artefacts.
In the previous section, I mentioned a number of ‘cognitive artefacts’ such 
as maps and calculators. People use these devices to ease the burden of 
cognitive activity by partially offloading it onto the environment. In this 
section, I want to argue that humans also use a number of ‘emotional 
artefacts’. These are devices that ease the burden of emotional 
(interruptive) activity by offloading it in a similar way.
(i) Clocks
Clocks may not appear to have much to do with emotion according to our 
pretheoretic understanding of the term, but if we accept the definition of 
emotion given in the previous chapter, we may decide we have to revise 
this initial impression. Clocks clearly function as interruption mechanisms. 
They may have other functions too, but it can scarcely be doubted that 
one of the main purposes for which clocks are constructed is to enable us
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to set time limits for various activities. Alarm clocks are designed to 
interrupt sleep. Timers are used to interrupt cooking, teaching, and many 
other activities. True, we may ignore them, but then we may sometimes 
decide to override our internal interruption mechanisms too, such as when 
a soldier persists in marching towards the enemy despite the feeling of 
fear that urges him to run away. If we combine the interruption theory of 
emotion with the leaky mind hypothesis, clocks may be regarded 
emotional artefacts.
It should hardly be necessary to repeat here that the normal internalist 
response is always possible. The internalist can simply argue that clocks 
provide external input into the real emotional system, which supervenes 
entirely on the brain or some part of it. It should be clear by now how the 
proponent of the situated approach to emotion can deal with such a 
response. The behaviour-generating system of interest here comprises 
the brain, the body and the clock. It is spread out over the agent and his 
environment. To insist that we must divide this system up along traditional 
lines by identifying the input-output boundary with the skin of the organism 
is to give up on the richer explanatory perspective offered by the situated 
approach. The purely logical possibility of re-analysing the system in 
internalist terms is not really all that exciting.
(ii) Fire alarms and burglar alarms
Fire alarms and burglar alarms are also clear examples of interruption 
mechanisms. In particular, they partially offload the computational burden 
of the fear mechanism onto the outside world. It might be the case that, 
other things being equal, those who have such alarms installed in their 
houses tend to show fewer neural or physiological effects of fear in the 
relevant contexts than those without such alarms. I know of no evidence 
to support this hypothesis, but if it were true, it would constitute strong 
empirical support for the situated approach to emotion, for then we would 
have demonstrated very tight feedback effects between the 
neural/physiological aspects of the fear system and the
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external/mechanical aspects. Alternatively, if it could be shown that those 
with fire or burglar alarms show more neural or physiological correlates of 
fear in the relevant contexts than those without such alarms, we would 
also have evidence for the kind of feedback effects that favour a situated 
approach to emotion. The absence of feedback effects of either kind 
would not demolish the situated approach to emotion, but it would raise 
questions about its explanatory power.
(iii) Cruise-control
Some cars are fitted with cruise-control. This device allows the driver to 
set a maximum speed beyond which the vehicle cannot accelerate. If the 
driver then tries to drive faster than the pre-set speed limit, the mechanism 
cuts in and temporarily disables the throttle. This device is clearly an 
interruption mechanism. Like the fire alarm and the burglar alarm, it eases 
the computational burden of fear by partially offloading it onto the car. 
The driver no longer has to worry about going too fast.
Emotional institutions
The emotional artefacts described so far all offload fairly simple emotions 
like fear. What about other, more social emotions, of the kind discussed 
by Robert Frank? Can these too be partially offloaded onto the external 
environment?
As I have already noted in the previous chapter, Frank argues that many 
social emotions such as love and guilt function as commitment devices. I 
have already argued that commitment devices are just a special case of 
interruption mechanism, so I will not repeat the argument now. The 
important point to note here is that commitment devices can just as easily 
be offloaded onto the external world as other kinds of interruption 
mechanism. However, as befits their more social nature, these kinds of 
emotion are more typically offloaded onto the social environment than onto 
the physical one. They are offloaded, in other words, not onto physical
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artefacts, but onto social institutions. Such institutions therefore deserve 
to be called ‘emotional’.
(i) Marriage
Marriage is the emotional institution par excellence. Its function is to 
offload some of the computation involve in romantic love onto the social 
environment. According to Frank’s evolutionary analysis, the function of 
romantic love is to ensure that you can form a stable pair-bond for long 
enough to raise at least one child. Since this function cannot be fulfilled 
without a multitude of conditions, romantic love may in fact designate a 
whole suite of emotions, rather than just one. For example, we might 
distinguish romantic fidelity from romantic generosity. These are not 
usually regarded as distinct emotions, but there are many reasons why 
common sense views of love might be more misleading than many other 
aspects of folk psychology, so we should not worry too much if the 
cognitive science of love leads to counter-intuitive findings.
If this view of love is correct, we need not be surprised if we find that 
marriage is a way of offloading some aspects of romantic love but not all. 
We can take each aspect of romantic love separately, and ask, for each 
one, whether or not it is plausible to see marriage as a way of offloading it.
As far as romantic fidelity goes, marriage seems to fit the bill as a means 
for offloading. Once two people have declared their vows in public, they 
do not always need to interrupt themselves when faced with an offer of 
extra-marital sex. If there are friends and relatives around, they will 
probably exert social pressure to make sure the vows are kept.
Marriage is also a way of offloading romantic generosity. The common 
practice of exchanging gifts at wedding anniversaries means that there is, 
in effect, an external timing mechanism that repeatedly interrupts the day- 
to-day routine of married life and prompts the giving of gifts. Here again,
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the scrutiny of friends and relatives can help to enforce this interruption 
mechanism.
(ii) Confession
By means of the institution of confession, many Catholics partly offload 
guilt. The rule forbidding one to take communion while in a state of sin, 
coupled with the expectation that one will take communion fairly regularly, 
means that there is in effect a kind of external alarm clock that repeatedly 
forces one to examine one’s conscience. It is easy to see how this 
institution is a way of offloading the computational load of constantly 
checking to see if you have kept your promises. When you have not, you 
must tell a priest, who then exerts social pressure on you to make 
ammends.
Emotional groups
From what has been said so far, one might easily gain the impression that 
emotions can only be offloaded onto the environment by creatures like 
ourselves, who are sophisticated enough to dream up ways of doing so. 
This, however, is not the case. For those animals with less sophisticated 
minds, natural selection can do the design work instead. Merekats did not 
sit down and work out their system of taking turns to do sentry-duty; the 
system evolved by natural selection, without any conscious reasoning on 
their part. Yet this too is plausibly described as an embedded emotion. 
Those merekats that are not doing sentry duty have partially offloaded the 
computational burden involved in detecting predators onto part of their 
social environment. They have, that is, partially offloaded the emotion of 
fear onto another merekat.
Humans, too, offload some emotions onto the social environment without 
the need for social institutions. The power of crowds to amplify the 
emotions of each individual member is a case in point. Social 
psychologists have long remarked on the distinctive nature of emotional
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behaviour in groups, from the contagious nature of panic to the lynch-mob 
mentality in which otherwise peaceful people can sometimes be caught 
up. These too are plausibly described as cases of embedded emotion, 
when the feedback loops between brain, body and social environment 
mean that the whole is greater than the mere sum of its parts.
Purely cerebral emotions
Adopting a situated approach to emotion does not imply that all emotions 
are embodied and embedded. Quite the contrary, in fact. The whole point 
of the situated approach is not that the input-output boundary is located at 
some point other than the brain-body boundary; it is that the boundary is 
moveable. It is not enough to give examples, then, of how emotions can 
be embodied and embedded; we must also find plausible examples of 
purely cerebral emotions. Otherwise, the mind would not be leaky, it 
would be permanently overflowing.
This is not a problem. There are plenty of examples of emotions where 
the behaviour-generating system of interest is the bare biological brain. If 
there were not, the internalist view of emotion would probably not have 
been so initially tempting. The startle reaction that makes a lone squirrel 
interrupt its foraging behaviour when it perceives a sudden noise may be 
an example of such a purely neural emotion. It need not be, however. If 
the squirrel’s extra-cerebral body chemistry has been sufficiently altered 
by previous startle reactions to warrant being regarded as a repository of 
emotional memory, then this would be a case of an embodied emotional 
process. Everything depends on the details of the particular situation. 
The virtue of the situated approach is that it calls our attention to such 
details.
Situated emotions and artificial intelligence
If the situated approach to emotion is to count as part of cognitive science, 
it must lead us to design better artificial emotion systems. I believe it can.
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In particular it suggests that those working in affective computing do not 
need to build interruption mechanisms entirely inside the machine. When 
constructing emotional robots, designers can be sensitive to the possibility 
of exploiting features of the external environment to offload some of the 
computational burden.
However, the main lesson for affective computing to learn from the 
situated approach to emotion may be precisely the opposite. If computers 
seem so unemotional today, this is because they have, in a sense, already 
offloaded all their emotions onto their human environment. Computers do 
not need interruption mechanisms at the moment, because humans take 
care of all their survival and reproductive requirements. If more 
interruption mechanisms were installed in desktop computers, so that they 
shouldered more of the computational burden of caring for themselves, 
humans would find that their own burden became lighter. Computers 
would become easier to use.
Things began to move in this direction with the invention of screen-savers, 
which can thus be seen as the first internal emotions in desktop 
computers. As the example of the screen-saver shows, giving computers 
emotions can benefit their human users -  in this case by allowing monitors 
to live longer and thus allowing human owners to save money by replacing 
them less often. Building in other kinds of interruption mechanism may 
make computers even more user-friendly. For example, a computer that 
was designed to interrupt activity momentarily when it detected that its 
user was becoming too tired might help to avoid faulty data being stored in 
its memory. Computers that become bored when they are not receiving 
input of a sufficiently novel kind (as in the ACRES program described in 
section 3.2) might help their users to avoid wasting time. And so on.
These points become even more relevant when the computers in question 
are designed for entertainment purposes rather than more utilitarian ones. 
The simulated agents in gaming software will be more realistic, and 
therefore more entertaining, when they have more sophisticated emotional
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capacities. This suggests that developments in affective computing over 
the next few decades may be driven more by the demands of computer 
gaming than by the demands of industry or commerce.
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Chapter Five:
Dynamical cognitive science and emotion
What is passionate in us rises and fails, leaps or creeps, and slowly 
paces. Now it becomes urgent, now hesitant, now stirred more 
feebly, now more strongly.
Johann Gottfried Herder
In the past decade, there have been a number of calls for cognitive 
scientists to adopt a more ‘dynamical’ approach to the study of the mind. 
In this chapter, I ask what such calls actually mean. In the second section,
I examine how the dynamical approach can help to refine the interruption 
theory of emotion.
5.1. Dynamical cognitive science
The machines designed by cognitive scientists in the period 1950-1980 
were almost all discrete-state machines. In such machines, the transitions 
between one state and another are like sudden jumps or clicks. There are 
no intermediate positions between one state and another.
Many of the first generation of cognitive scientists assumed, not only that 
this was the best way to design artificial minds, but that discrete-state 
machines would also be the best way to model natural minds. This 
assumption, however, is logically independent of both CTM and the 
design-based approach. The assumption of discreteness should not, 
therefore, be seen as an essential part of cognitive science per se, but 
simply as a characteristic feature of classical cognitive science. Its 
widespread acceptance among the first generation of cognitive scientists 
was a historical accident, not a logical necessity. This only became clear,
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however, when various sections of the cognitive science community began 
to propose other ways of building artificial minds.
The first cognitive scientists to do this were the connectionists. Rather 
than using a few heterogeneous components, each of which makes a 
specific isolable contribution to overall performance, connectionist models 
(often called nerual networks) employ a large number of homogeneous 
components. Whereas discrete-state machines usually process 
information serially, connectionist models are massively parallel (hence 
the term PDP, or ‘Parallel Distributed Processing’, that is often applied to 
such models).
The connectionists, however, were not always explicit about their 
commitments to continuous mathematics. Very often, they simply got on 
with the business of designing neural networks, and left the theoretical 
issues to philosophers. It was not until the emergence, in the 1990s, of 
proposals for a distinctively dynamical approach to cognitive science that 
the issue of continuity was really foregrounded.
Dynamical systems are not all continuous. There are discrete dynamical 
systems as well. But most proponents of the dynamical approach to 
cognitive science have tended to concentrate on continuous systems. It is 
therefore plausible to argue that the main contribution of the dynamical 
approach has been the challenge that it poses to the classical assumption 
of discreteness.
The dynamical hypothesis of cognition.
Dynamical cognitive science has been defined by its adherence to the 
‘dynamical hypothesis of cognition’, which simply states that ‘cognitive 
agents are dynamical systems’ (van Gelder, 1998: 615). The term 
‘dynamical system’ may be understood in various ways, but proponents of 
dynamical cognition usually construe it in very broad terms, as designating
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any system in which a variable, x, changes continuously over time. The 
‘system’ in question may be (Smith, 1998:4-5):
(i) a real-world system, such as the planets in motion or -  in dynamical 
cognition -  a cognitive agent, or
(ii) a mathematical system, which, in dynamical systems theory, may 
be (a) a set of dynamical equations, which perhaps aims to capture 
the behaviour of some real-world system, or (b) an abstract 
mathematical structure, such as a set of trajectories in a phase 
space which is characterised by a set of dynamical equations.
This multiple use of the term ‘system’ by the proponents of dynamical 
cognition is potentially harmful, as it might lead to ontological questions 
about the nature of things being confused with epistemological and 
methodological questions about the mathematical tools we use to describe 
and analyse things. To prevent such confusion, Tim van Gelder argues 
that we should distinguish two components of the dynamical hypothesis of 
cognition. On the one hand, ‘the nature hypothesis is a claim about the 
nature of cognitive agents themselves: it specifies what they are (i.e. 
dynamical systems)’ (van Gelder, 1998: 619, emphasis in original). The 
knowledge hypothesis, on the other hand, is a claim about cognitive 
science: namely, that we can and should understand cognition by using 
the resources of dynamical systems theory such as dynamical equations 
and geometrical modelling. Before going on to give some examples of 
research in dynamical cognition, I will briefly discuss the nature hypothesis 
and the knowledge hypothesis in turn.
The nature hypothesis
The nature hypothesis states that cognitive agents are dynamical systems 
(where ‘system’ is used in sense (i) described above). This purports to be 
an empirical claim about a set of real-world systems. However, things are 
not that simple. In particular, two points need to be made clear.
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Firstly, it is rather misleading to claim that the statement ‘cognitive agents 
are dynamical systems’ amounts to a hypothesis about cognition, since 
this seems to imply that it makes some specific claim about cognitive 
agents. It sounds as if the property of being a dynamical system is being 
used to pick out cognitive agents from other kinds of physical entity. Yet 
this is not the case. Any physical system, from a single neuron to a 
galaxy, may be described as a dynamical system.1 The concept of a 
dynamical system is no more specific than the rough idea of a computer 
as a system that transforms input into output. In fact, the two ideas are 
equivalent. To pick out those dynamical systems that are cognitive agents 
we need some further constraint, just as we did when we were trying to 
specify the notion of computation involved in CTM. We could, in fact, use 
the very same constraint that we used then -  the notion of representation. 
We could, in other words, define cognitive agents as dynamical systems 
that represent other other dynamical systems.
On this account, dynamical cognitive science is thus no less 
‘computational’ than other forms of cognitive science. Computers are just 
dynamical systems that represent other dynamical systems. When 
proponents of the dynamical approach, then claim that the view of the 
mind as a dynamical system ‘is an entirely different image from the brain 
as a computer with stored contents or subroutines to be called up by a 
program’ (Kelso, 1995: 1), they must clearly have in mind some much 
more specific notion of computation than the one I proposed in chapter 
one. They probably have in mind the classical view that defines 
computation as a process that terminates after a finite number of basic 
operations specified by an algorithm (in technical terms, an ‘effective’ 
process). This indeed, is Church’s thesis, which stipulates that a process 
could only be called 'computable' if it is effective in this sense. Church's 
thesis has acquired such standing in computational theory that it
1 To be more precise, any physical system can be construed as instantiating infinitely 
many dynamical systems. I come to this point shortly.
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sometimes seems to be regarded as an empirical discovery, instead of the 
stipulative definition that it really is. Sterile disputes about whether or not 
the dynamical approach counts as ‘computational’ or not could be avoided 
if it were kept in mind that the term can have two meanings. According to 
Church’s thesis, computers are just finite-state machines.2 According to 
the broader definition I proposed in the first chapter, finite-state machines 
are just one kind of computer; you can have continuous computers too.
The second point that I want to make about the nature hypothesis is this: 
to say that a real-world system, such as a convecting fluid, is a dynamical 
system is actually to make a claim about instantiation, not about simple 
identity. A convecting fluid is not itself a set of variables, but rather a 
material entity whose behaviour can be described by a set of variables. 
Likewise, cognitive agents are not sets of variables, but they may behave 
in ways that are describable in such terms. Thus the nature hypothesis 
should be understood as claiming that cognitive agents instantiate 
dynamical systems (van Gelder, 1998: 619).
Furthermore, since any real-world system instantiates numerous 
dynamical systems, the nature hypothesis should not be construed as 
claiming that each cognitive agent is some particular dynamical system. 
Rather, it should be construed as claiming that each cognitive agent ‘is’ as 
many dynamical systems as are needed to describe all the different kinds 
of cognitive performance exhibited by the agent (van Gelder, 1998: 619).
The fact that claims about the dynamical nature of cognition are really just 
claims about the various dynamical systems that cognitive agents 
instantiate threatens to undermine van Gelder's distinction between the 
nature hypothesis and the knowledge hypothesis. Claims about 
instantiation are reducible to claims about the theoretical tools that are
2 A finite state machine is a discrete state machine that consists of a finite number of 
discrete states, together with their state transition rules.
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most appropriate to use in studying a given object. The nature hypothesis 
thus reduces to the knowledge hypothesis.
The knowledge hypothesis
The knowledge hypothesis of dynamical cognition is much easier to state 
clearly than the nature hypothesis. It is simply the claim that cognitive 
agents are better understood by appealing to the resources of dynamical 
systems theory. Dynamical systems theory is a branch of pure 
mathematics concerned with the properties of dynamical systems (where 
‘system’ is used in sense (ii) described above). Typically, dynamical 
systems theory uses a set of linked differential equations to specify the 
evolution in time of some variable, x. In such systems, time is continuous. 
But there are other dynamical systems, specified in terms of difference 
equations, in which time is discrete. So continuous dynamical systems are 
really just a subset of the class of all dynamical systems. However, for the 
reasons given above, this chapter deals only with continuous dynamical 
systems. To re-cap: a theory of minds as discrete dynamical systems is 
already available in the classical approach. The novelty of the dynamical 
approach consists, therefore, in providing an alternative theory of minds as 
continuous dynamical systems.
Still it remains to be seen how much of an ‘alternative’ this theory really 
amounts to. Some of the proponents of the dynamical approach write as if 
cognitive scientists are faced with a stark choice between it and the 
classical approach (e.g. van Gelder, 1998). What they mean, I suppose, 
is that cognitive scientists much choose between discrete and continuous 
models of cognition; the dynamical approach is not necessarily committed 
to rejecting the other assumptions of the classical approach (domain- 
generality and internalism). Yet the choice between discrete and 
continuous models is far from being a black-or-white one.
For a start, the distinction between discrete and continuous systems is a 
mathematical one, and it is not clear how to apply it to real-world systems.
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When a discrete model is criticised on the grounds that the real-world 
system is better represented by a continuous model, this can usually be 
reduced to one of the following two claims:
(i) The scale chosen by the discrete model is not sufficiently fine­
grained: the dimension in question is usually (but not always) a 
temporal one.
(ii) The discrete model needlessly imputes too much internal structure 
to the real-world system.
However, since both of these criticisms can often be met by refining the 
discrete-state model, the real point at stake does not seem to be one 
continuity as such. I will now explain this point in more detail.
The grain problem.
Sometimes, I claim, the criticisms levelled against discrete models are 
reducible to the claim that the scale chosen by the discrete model is not 
sufficiently fine-grained. An example from the history of biology may serve 
to make this point clear.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, there was a rather silly feud 
between two ways of thinking about heredity. The Mendelians took a 
discrete approach; they argued that phenotypic characters were 
controlled by genes that were either present or absent (more precisely, 
only one particular form of a gene -  one allele -  could be present at any 
given chromosomal locus). The biometricians thought this was clearly at 
odds with the fact that some phenotypic characters can vary continuously; 
people are not, for example, just tall or short. Ronald Fisher showed that 
the disagreement could be solved if one assumed that such continuous 
phenotypic characters are polygenic -  that is, controlled by more than one 
gene. If height is influenced by many genes of small effect, then it is clear 
how it can be approximately continuous.
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The term ‘approximately’ is crucial. Whenever a discrete model differs 
from a continuous one, it can be made to approximate it more closely 
simply by giving it more discrete states. In other words, discrete models 
can always be made more realistic by choosing a more fine-grained scale 
of analysis. So when a discrete model is contrasted unfavourably with a 
continuous model, the charge often amounts to no more than the claim 
that the discrete model is not sufficiently fine-grained. And this criticism 
will only be valid if we can show that the scale chosen was not sufficiently 
fine-grained to meet the explanatory purpose for which the model was 
constructed. After all, the whole point of a model is not to be as fine­
grained as the thing it is supposed to represent. It would be silly to 
criticise a map for not being as detailed as the terrain itself.
This point is borne out when one looks at the actual machines built by 
those who take a dynamical approach. These machines are usually just 
versions of connectionist networks. But connectionist networks are rarely 
built out of analogue components. They are usually simulated on discrete- 
state machines; the theoretically continuous activation level of each node 
in the network is, in practice, approximated by means of a fine-grained 
discrete series.
If connectionist networks can be implemented, to a good enough degree 
of approximation, on discrete-state machines, the reverse is also true. 
This, at least, seems to be what Fodor and Pylyshyn claim in their 
influential paper on connectionism and cognitive architecture (Fodor and 
Pylyshyn, 1988). They argue that a neural network architecture can 
implement the digital processes that they take to lie at the core of human 
cognition. If we combine these two points, we can imagine a machine that 
is digital at one level instantiating a system that, at a higher level of 
analysis, is continuous, and that this continuous system then instantiates a 
discrete-state machine at an even higher level. Thus the grain-problem 
does not just refer to the number of units on a particular scale; it also
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refers to the level of nature we are analysing (though perhaps this 
amounts to the same thing).
The dimension of discrete models which proponents of dynamical 
cognition most often focus on in their pleas for a finer grain of analysis is 
the temporal one. In other words, criticisms of discrete models often 
amount to no more than the charge that they have not been sufficiently 
sensitive to the details of timing. This may be a serious defect with some 
discrete models, but if so, it is not because they are discrete. It is just 
because they are not sufficiently aware that, for many cognitive processes, 
every millisecond counts. This problem can always be remedied by 
choosing smaller units for the temporal scale.
Parsimony
Whenever the criticisms levelled at discrete models cannot be plausibly 
construed as pleas for a finer-grain of analysis, they are usually reducible 
to the claim that the discrete models needlessly impute too much internal 
structure to the real-world system. To understand the connection between 
the idea of continuity and the idea of complexity, we need to make a brief 
digression into chaos theory.
Chaos theory is simply another name for the branch of dynamical systems 
theory that studies the properties of dynamical systems governed by 
nonlinear equations (Stewart, 1989: viii). An equation is linear if the sum 
of two solutions is itself a solution. The solution for a two-stone 
disturbance of a liquid surface, for example, is just the sum of the solutions 
for two one-stone disturbances, centred at appropriate points (Stewart, 
1989: 72). Most classical equations, including those of classical 
dynamics, are linear. This is not true of the equations in chaos theory.
In chaotic systems, trajectories from nearby initial conditions can lead to 
outcomes that are not correlated. In other words, these systems exhibit 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, a phenomenon that is
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sometimes known as ‘the Butterfly Effect’.3 Some popularisations convey 
the impression that this is the most original ‘take-home message’ of chaos 
theory (Stewart, 1989), but this is misleading to say the least. It is no 
news that small changes can have huge effects; Darwin once remarked 
that his voyage on the Beagle, which determined his whole career, had at 
one point depended on such trifles as the shape of his nose.4 The simple 
idea that small changes can cause large, unpredictable effects has been 
around for much longer than chaotic dynamics (Smith, 1998:1).
Chaos theory gives to a new twist to this old idea by showing that the very 
complex patterns formed by the trajectories in a chaotic phase-space can 
be produced by relatively simple equations.5 A very complex series, which 
may even appear to be completely random to the untrained eye, can be 
produced by a deterministic formula.
The take-home lesson here is that when we observe some very complex 
behaviour, we should not assume that the system producing it necessarily 
has a complex internal structure. Now, it is probably fair to say that many 
of the first cognitive scientists tended to make exactly this assumption. 
Guided by the strategy of functional decomposition (see section 1.1), they 
tended to assume that all complex behaviour could only be generated by a
3 The name comes from a story which is often used in the literature to illustrate the 
phenomenon of sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Here is Peter Smith’s version 
of the story: ‘A small blue butterfly, let’s suppose, sits on a cherry tree in a remote 
province of China. As is the way of butterflies, while it sits it occasionally opens and 
closes its wings. It could have opened its wings twice just now; but in fact it moved them 
only once. And -  because the weather system exhibits sensitive dependence -  the 
miniscule difference in the resulting eddies of air around the butterfly eventually makes 
the difference between whether, two months later, a hurricane sweeps across southern 
England or harmlessly dies out over the Atlantic. Or so the story goes.’ (Smith, 1998: 1)
4 Robert Fitzroy, the captain of the Beagle, was a firm believer in physiognomy, according 
to which a person’s character could be discovered by attending to the shape of their facial 
features. Darwin’s nose seemed to Fitzroy to betray a lack of resolution, and thus almost 
cost Darwin his place on the ship (Bateson and Martin, 1999:123-24).
5 There seems to be some sleight of hand here. Unless we can specify some uniform 
measure of ‘complexity’ that applies equally to mathematical equations and to the 
patterns formed in a multi-dimensional phase-space, then it makes no sense to marvel at 
how wonderfully ‘complex’ instances of the latter can be produced by such ‘simple’ 
instances of the former.
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set of heterogeneous components, like those in, say, a television or an 
electronic computing machine circa 1960. One of the surprising things 
about connectionist models was that they put this assumption in doubt. 
Some kinds of task, such as pattern recognition, could be achieved by 
very simple networks consisting of a few dozen homogenous components 
(simple nodes).
Hype
If I am right, and most (perhaps all) criticisms levelled at discrete models 
can be reduced either to a plea for a finer grain of analysis or a call for 
greater parsimony, then the problem with such models is not their 
discreteness. Such criticisms could be met without making the model 
continuous. In neither case is the point at stake one of continuity as such.
Nor is it strictly necessary to appeal to the resources of dynamical systems 
theory to make these points. The point about choosing the appropriate 
grain of analysis can be made quite well without them. And, as the 
example of connectionism shows, it is not necessary to invoke the arcane 
terminology of chaos theory to make the point that complex behaviour can 
sometimes be generated by relatively simple systems. The connectionists 
did not often describe their models in terms of chaotic attractors, but they 
succeeded in challenging the assumption of internal complexity that 
seemed to underlie many classical models.
One is left with the impression that the real value of dynamical systems 
theory for cognitive science is rhetorical. The arcane mathematical 
terminology is being used not for any intrinsic value, but merely to make 
people think that there is something important being said here. Now, 
sometimes there is something important. Sometimes the discrete models 
do need to be finer-grained and more parsimonious. But these points 
would, I think, be made more persuasively if they were couched in more 
simple terms.
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Kelso and other dynamicists are well aware of these suspicions, and try to 
distance themselves from the hype and the vague analogies that have 
characterised some of the recent writings on chaos by insisting on precise 
links between theory and data:
I am not going to comment on the rhetoric surrounding the buzzword 
chaos and how it provides a more holistic view of human life, except 
to say, chaos of what? What are the relevant variables that are 
supposed to exhibit chaotic dynamics? What are the control 
parameters? And how do we find them in complex living systems 
where many variables can be measured, but not all are 
relevant?...What are the attractors? What does the bifurcation 
diagram look like? Are these concepts and mathematical tools even 
relevant? How does one establish them, even in a single 
case?...There has to be some connection between mathematical 
formulae and the phenomena we are trying to 
understand....Establishing a connection between theory and 
experiment is one of the canons of science that the ‘chaos, chaos 
everywhere’ crowd seems to ignore.
(Kelso, 1995: 43-44)
Kelso rightly draws importance to the importance of empirical research, 
and his book includes some of the best examples of such work. One such 
example is the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) model of limb coordination. 
Kelso and colleagues studied coordination within and between limbs, and 
found that a whole range of different coordination patterns could be 
modelled with the same dynamical equation. The only variable required 
for this equation was the relative phase of the limbs in question. Relative 
phase refers to the relation between two oscillating components. Imagine 
that you are tapping the table in front of you with the forefinger of each 
hand. If the fingers hit the table simultaneously each beat, the relative 
phase is said to be ‘inphase’, while if the fingers hit the table alternately, 
the relative phase is ‘antiphase’.
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Kelso also found that a whole variety of limb coordination patterns, from 
the case of finger-wagging just described, to trotting and galloping in 
quadrapeds, could be modelled by a dynamical equation based on the 
derivative of the relative phase. This simple model predicted a wide of 
range of observed phenomena, including the small range of stable 
coordination patterns and the nonequilibrium phase transisitions that 
occurred when the system moved from one stable pattern to another 
(Kelso, 1995: 46-57, 74-87).
The limited applicability of the dynamical approach
The empirical work described by Kelso, such as the HKB model, goes 
some way towards pre-empting the charge of ‘hype’ But finger wagging 
and limb coordination are not exactly paradigms of ‘mental’ processes. 
Ture, movement is vital to all natural cognitive agents, but classical 
cognitive science did not completely disregard motor control. On the other 
hand, classical cognitive science also provided models for more 
paradigmatic mental processes like reasoning and problem-solving, but 
dynamical models for such things are practically non-existent. Even if we 
grant that there are natural advantages to modelling motor-control in 
continuous terms, it seems hard to believe that we could say the same 
about other mental processes.
Evolutionary cognitive science can suggest a very good reason for this. 
Natural minds evolved to guide adaptive behaviour; and it would almost 
never be useful to have cognitive or emotional systems do large numbers 
of iterations through dynamical states into order to achieve such 
behaviour.6 Rhythmic locomotion seems to be the only case where 
coupled oscillators have a distinct advantage over discrete-state 
machines. No wonder, then, that dynamical models of ‘cognition’ tend to 
concentrate on things like limb-coordination.
6 1 owe this point to Geoffrey Miller (personal communication).
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Even if we include connectionist networks in the class of continuous 
systems, the dynamical approach does not go much further. The only 
area in which connectionist networks seem to have a distinct advantage 
over classical discrete-state machines seems to be in the area of pattern 
recognition. Insofar as continuous models can be taken as a separate 
class from discrete models, then, their value may be restricted to ‘low 
level’ processes such as perception and motor-control.
Is the dynamical approach design-based?
Proponents of the dynamical approach point out that connectionism is not 
the same thing as dynamics (van Gelder, 1998: 661). But this only 
weakens their claim to make a distinct contribution to cognitive science. 
The distinctive thing about cognitive science, I argued in chapter one, is its 
design-based methodology. If the dynamical approach cannot claim 
connectionist networks as paradigms of the continuous models they 
prefer, then it the dynamical approach is reduced to mere theory without 
any concrete proposals to show in the way of working machines. If the 
dynamical approach is to prove itself as a species of cognitive science, it 
must provide clear evidence of how it leads to new insights in artificial 
intelligence. So far, it has failed to do so. The various ‘dynamical 
machines’ all turn out to be old-fashioned connectionist networks, with 
perhaps the twist that several such networks are linked up in novel ways 
(see, for example, the robot described in Tani, 1999: 157).
Besides, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that connectionist 
networks are distinctively dynamical machines, it is still not clear whether 
this will permit the dynamical approach to call itself design-based. The 
point of the design-based methodology is not simply that we build working 
machines, but that we understand how the machines work. With 
traditional digital machines, this is no problem. One can apply the strategy 
of functional decomposition quite easily to such machines. But 
connectionist networks are no so amenable to this explanatory strategy. 
There is no obvious way of assigning different functional systems such as
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‘memory’ or ‘executive’ to a particular bit of the network. Rather, these 
functional systems tend to be ‘distributed’ across the whole network in a 
way that defies clear explanation. Connectionist networks thus seem to 
be much less ‘transparent’ in their workings than digital machines. This 
may be why people turn to mathematical equations to understand them; 
there is simply no other way. But describing a machine in terms of the 
mathematical function it computes is rather different to breaking it down 
into distinct subsystems. To the extent that the design-based approach of 
cognitive science requires functional decomposition, connectionism does 
not count as part of cognitive science.
5.2. Dynamical approaches to emotion
In section 3.2, I proposed, on the basis of various evolutionary 
hypotheses, a definition of emotions as interruption mechanisms. In 
section 4.2, I argued that we could take this theory further by drawing on 
the insights of situated cognitive science. Can we take it further still by 
drawing on the insights of the dynamical approach?
These insights, I have argued, reduce to two points. To recap, if the 
dynamical approach offers anything distinctive, it is a reminder that we 
should be careful not get the grain of our analysis right, and not to assume 
that complex internal structure is necessary to generate complex 
behaviour. Let us see how we can use these insights to refine the 
interruption theory of emotion.
Are there enough states in the model?
The classical models of emotion described in chapter two, such as the 
OCC model, represent emotions in discrete terms. In response to a given 
input, a description of an emotion is either generated or it is not. There 
are no intermediate states between the full presence of an emotion and its 
complete absence.
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In humans and other animals, however, emotions are not such black-and- 
white affairs. They have quantitative characteristics as well as qualitative 
ones. At any one moment, an emotion may be present in varying degrees 
of intensity, and this intensity may wax or wane with varying rapidity. 
These quantitative aspects of emotion can be modelled in a discrete-state 
machine by adding more states. Rather than just assigning one bit to 
emotion (is it on or off?), we can assign several, representing degrees of 
emotional intensity. Or we can use a more obviously analogue system, 
such as a connectionist network.
Juan Velasquez of MIT has developed a connectionist model of emotion 
called ‘Cathexis’ (Velasquez, 1996). The network consists of three layers 
of nodes. In the input layer, the nodes represent the four kinds of 
emotional elicitor listed by Caroll Izard in her theory of emotion: neural, 
sensorimotor, motivational and cognitive (Izard, 1993). In the middle 
layer, each node represents an emotion such as joy or distress. In the 
output layer, each node represents a behaviour, such as smiling. The 
nodes in the middle layer are connected to each other as well as to the 
nodes in the other layers, so, for example, joy can inhibit distress and 
activate hope. Each emotion-node has a continuously variable level of 
activation, which represents the intensity of that emotion at a given point in 
time. Unlike the classical models, then, in which only one emotion may be 
present at a given time, all emotions are constantly activated in Cathexis, 
though at varying levels of intensity. The intensity of each emotion 
changes at regular intervals in accordance with an equation whose terms 
include the inputs from other nodes modified by inhibitory and excitatory 
gains, and a function that controls the temporal decay of the emotion. The 
new intensity is thus a function of its decayed previous value, the effects of 
its elicitors, and the influences of other emotions.
Cathexis manifests the quantitative features of emotion that the classical 
models leave out. Emotions are not simply present or absent, but are 
continuously present in varying degrees of intensity. Furthermore, the 
intensity of each emotion changes at differing rates. The equation that
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specifies how the intensity changes from one moment to the next is 
nonlinear, so chaotic dynamics may be observed. For example, since the 
equation includes parameters that specify a minimum activation threshold 
and a maximum saturation value, the possible intensity values for each 
emotion may be graphed as a sigmoidal curve in which the middle region 
is highly sensitive to initial conditions. The steepness of the sigmoid can 
be altered by changing the values of these parameters, which allows for 
different temperaments to be modelled. A steep sigmoid, for example, 
would reflect an emotionally labile temperament, while a gentler slope 
would represent a more phlegmatic character. Finally, the multiple 
interactions among the nodes allows for feedback loops with various 
nonlinear properties such as time-dependence (i.e. the effect of an elicitor 
on the intensity of an emotion depends on the time when the elicitor 
comes into play).
The interruption theory could learn from this model. I have already 
mentioned the possibility that the top-down effects of cognition on emotion 
might be modelled by allowing the top layer in the hierarchy (the cognitive 
layer) to have some control over the activation threshold of the lower 
layers (the interruption mechanisms). This is already to introduce the idea 
of variable intensity into our model. Cathexis suggests that we might 
extend this idea to interactions between the lower layers themselves. If 
the activation threshold of the lower layers was not influenced just by the 
top layer, but also by other lower layers, then feedback effects among the 
various layers could emerge. Increasing tiredness could, for example, 
lower the activation threshold for anger; this would model the tendency for 
tired people to lose their temper more easily than others.
Whether or not the addition of these quantitative features should be seen 
as inherently non-classical is dubious, however. They could be built into 
the interruption model without using a connectionist architecture, simply by 
using discrete-state machines with many more states to approximate the 
continuously variable intensity of emotions. Even if we did build some of 
the layers along connectionist lines, we would not need to build all the
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layers along such lines; we could use a hybrid architecture. And even if 
the machine were entirely composed of connectionist networks, it would 
still have features that could be described in discrete terms. Cathexis, for 
example, though touted as a thoroughly dynamical model of emotion, has 
some discrete aspects. Thus, while the intensity of each emotion appears 
to vary continuously, this is only because the discrete series of intensity 
values has many members. Furthermore, the fact that each emotion node 
only excites other nodes when its intensity surpasses a given threshold 
bestows a digital character on excitation.
Mood
Building variable activation thresholds into the interruption theory may 
provide us with a good way of understanding what moods are. The 
features that are usually used to distinguish between emotions and moods 
are all phenomenological rather than mechanistic. Moods are usually said 
to build up and die away more slowly than emotions, to last longer than 
emotions, and to constrain attention less forcefully than emotions . If this 
is all there is to the emotion-mood distinction, we need not regard moods 
as separate mechanisms from emotions but merely as a set of dimensions 
along which various features of the emotion mechanisms can vary. An 
irritable mood, for example, could be modelled by simultaneously altering 
various parameters of the anger mechanism: for example, we might
lowering the activation threshold, decreasing onset time, and increasing 
offset time. Let us call this the ‘parameter theory of mood’.
This way of understanding mood would actually correspond quite well with 
the explication of mood offered by Vincent Nowlis. Nowlis suggested that 
moods were second-order dispositions (Nowlis, 1963). In other words, 
while emotions are dispositions to act in particular ways, moods are 
dispositions to have certain emotions. The parameter theory of mood 
provides a concrete way of understanding this rather abstract definition. It 
gives a precise mechanical account of how the dispositions are realised in 
design terms. It also accords well with the common view of moods as
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‘emotional states’. That is, if emotional episodes are by definition 
relatively short-lived, this is because such episodes are to be identified, in 
our model, with the relatively short period during which a lower-layer takes 
control of behaviour. Whenever, the top layer is in control, the system is 
not ‘in the grip o f an emotion. However, the system is always in some 
particular emotional state or other, in the sense that we can always give 
an answer to the question: ‘which emotional mechanism has the lowest 
activation threshold at the moment?’ The system is always in one mood 
or another, even when none of the interruption mechanisms are in control 
of behaviour. For example, if the anger mechanism has the lowest 
activation threshold, then we say that the system is in an ‘irritable mood’.
Feedback
By allowing for feedback effects between the activation thresholds of the 
interruption mechanisms, we could also model the oscillations of mood 
that are commonly observed in normal people and which are more 
pronounced in those suffering from various mood disorders. There might 
even be a role for coupled oscillators here, which would increase the 
relevance of a dynamical approach to the mind by showing another role 
for oscillators in the mental economy other than rhythmic locomotion. 
Perhaps unipolar mood disorders could be modelled as point attractors in 
the phase space of emotional states, and bipolar disorders as limit cycles. 
The dynamics of mood disorders are not well understood, and such a 
model could prompt us to look for relevant data by suggesting possible 
control parameters.
Does the interruption model impute too much internal structure to 
emotional mechanisms?
In the previous section, I argued that many criticisms of discrete models 
can be reduced to the claim that the discrete model imputes too much 
internal structure to the real-world system. In cognitive science, this
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amounts to the charge that discrete models sometimes present a rather 
baroque view of the mind which flouts the principle of parsimony.
It is hard to tell whether or not the interruption theory could be accused of 
attributing too much internal structure to the interruption mechanisms, 
since I have not offered any detailed account of how these mechanisms 
are supposed to work. Pending such accounts, we must suspend our 
judgement on this question. However, when constructing design 
hypotheses for these mechanisms, we should bear in mind the general 
principle that complex behaviour can sometimes be generated by 
relatively simple mechanisms.
These rather bald statements do not go very far towards demonstrating 
the usefulness of adopting a dynamical approach to emotion. It remains to 
be seen, therefore, whether or not the dynamical approach can contribute 
as much to interruption theory as the other non-classical approaches 
outlined in this thesis.
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Chapter Six:
Non-classical cognitive science and emotion
In former times a Raja sent for all the blind men in his capital and 
placed an elephant in their midst One man felt the head of the 
elephant, another an ear, another a tusk, another the tuft of its tail. 
Asked to describe the elephant, one said that the elephant was a 
large pot, others that it was a winnowing fan, a ploughshare, or a 
besom. Thus each described the elephant as the part which he first 
touched, and the Raja was consumed with merriment.
Buddhist parable1
In this final chapter I argue that the three non-classical approaches 
discussed in the previous chapters may be combined to produce a single 
integrated non-classical approach. In the second section, I illustrate this 
approach by reference to the interruption theory of emotion.
6.1. Integrated non-classical cognitive science
In chapter two, I described how, in the period between 1950 and 1980, 
cognitive scientists tended (i) to assume that the mind was a domain- 
general mechanism, (ii) to identify its boundary with a physical feature of 
the agent (either the boundary of the brain, or the boundary of the body), 
and (iii) to work with discrete models. In chapters three to five, I showed 
how, after 1980, these assumptions came to be challenged by various 
‘deviant’ schools of thought within the cognitive science community. 
Evolutionary psychologists argued that the mind was composed of many 
domain-specific mechanisms. Proponents of the so-called ‘situated’
1 The parable of the elephant is attributed to the Buddha by the Udana, one of the 
scriptures of the Theravada or Hinayana school. This version of the story is taken from 
Buddhism: An Introduction and Guide, by Christmas Humphreys (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1951), p. 11.
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approach argued that the mind had flexible boundaries. And there were 
calls to model the mind in continuous terms by those enamoured of 
dynamical systems theory.
In this section, I try to lay bare the conceptual links between these three 
non-classical approaches. First, however, I want to examine the links 
between the assumptions of the classical approach.
The disunity of classical cognitive science
The three assumptions of domain-generality, internalism and discreteness 
are logically independent. It is perfectly possible to imagine a cognitive 
scientist of a classical bent dropping any one of them and retaining the 
others, or relinquishing any two of them and keeping one. All 
permutations are possible from a strictly logical point of view. Nor do there 
seem to be any strong theoretical reasons of a non-logical kind for linking 
the three together. One is forced to the conclusion, then, that the 
conjunction of these three assumptions in the first decades of cognitive 
science was a mere historical accident.
The word ‘accident’, however, should not be taken to imply that there is no 
good explanation for the fact that the first generation of cognitive scientists 
subscribed to these three assumptions. It is just that the explanation 
should appeal to historical reasons rather than theoretical or logical ones. 
For example, Andrew Wells has suggested one possible historical 
explanation for the widespread acceptance of assumption (ii): internalism. 
He claims that Turing originally conceived of the finite state control and the 
infinite tape memory in his ‘universal machine’ as equivalent to the agent 
and the environment, respectively. According to Wells, it was only the 
increasing tendency of computer scientists to hardwire the control to a 
finite memory and package the resulting system into a single box that led 
Turing's original distinction to be increasingly blurred. The result was that 
cognitive scientists interpreted control and memory as internal 
components within the cognitive agent rather than as two qualitatively
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different sources of variance -  the organism and the environment (Wells, 
1998: 275). In other words, it was a contingent fact about the design of 
computing machinery that led cognitive scientists to adopt a strong 
commitment to internalism.
This point might be extended more generally to other aspects of classical 
cognitive science. The basic idea of CTM is so general that it gives no 
real guidance about how artificial minds should be designed, or by what 
criteria they should be evaluated. Yet, as a matter of fact, many classical 
cognitive scientists probably identified the term ‘computer’ far too closely 
with the actual machines of their day, which were built for very particular 
purposes (and certainly not always to provide models of the human mind, 
although they were later construed as such). The demands of 
mathematical rigour from those who wanted machines to ease the burden 
of doing sums meant that these machines had to be consistent, reliable, 
non-random, accurate, and predictable.2 These aims are best met by 
discrete-state machines. Whether or not this explanation is the correct 
one remains to be seen, but this would clearly make an interesting project 
in the history of science.
The unity of classical cognitive science is a historical curiosity, then, that 
has no interesting theoretical explanation. One might be tempted to infer 
from this that, just as the three classical assumptions are not conceptually 
linked, so also their contraries are quite independent of one another. This, 
however, would not be a valid inference. It might be true, but one cannot 
assume it on purely logical grounds. In fact, I think it is false. I think that 
there are good grounds for thinking of the three non-classical approaches 
as forming a single conceptual bundle. There are good grounds, in other 
words, for combining the evolutionary, situated and dynamical approaches 
into a single ‘non-classical’ approach that is far more theoretically coherent 
than the classical approach ever was.
2 This point was brought home to me by Geoffrey Miller (personal communication).
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The unity of non-classical cognitive science
This is not to say that the non-classical approaches are equal partners. 
On the contrary, I think that the conceptual unity of the integrated non- 
classical approach I am proposing comes from taking the evolutionary 
approach to be primary. In other words, if you start with an evolutionary 
approach, you will probably also want to adopt a situated approach, and 
perhaps a dynamical approach too. But if you start with a situated 
approach you are much freer to retain the classical assumptions of 
domain-generality and discreteness, and if you start with a dynamical 
approach, you are not thereby given any guidance on the questions of 
domain-generality and internalism.
Here is how the evolutionary approach leads us to the other non-classical 
approaches. First, it leads us to think in situated terms, because natural 
selection will always favour those cognitive agents that can offload as 
much of their computational burden onto the environment as possible. 
Natural selection is an economiser, and computation is expensive. 
George Williams made a similar point in 1966 when he argued that, other 
things being equal, natural selection will always favour obligate 
adaptations over facultative ones (Williams, 1966). Obligate adaptations 
develop willy-nilly, while facultative ones develop one way in one set of 
circumstances and another way in other circumstances. Obligate 
adaptations are computationally cheap; the advantages of polymorphism 
have to be considerable before natural selection will give up the cheap 
alternative.
This point is reinforced by computer simulations of evolution. When 
artificial perceptual discrimination systems are allowed to evolve by 
techniques of artificial life, the end result is often a highly situated system 
that offloads as much computation onto the world as possible. In other 
words, such systems exploit very specific details of their local 
environment, not general features of all possible environments. For 
example, a system for picking out squares might simply evolve a straight­
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edge detector if the only shapes in its artificial environment were squares 
and circles. Only if it also regularly encountered other straight-edged 
shapes such as triangles would it need to build in extra knowledge.
Evolution and dynamics
The evolutionary approach also leads cognitive scientists to pay attention 
to the grain of our scales (are there enough states in the model?), to the 
details of timing, and to chaotic behaviour -  all the things which, I argued, 
are the distinctive traits of the dynamical approach. The details of timing 
are particularly important to evolved cognitive agents who, unlike the 
systems that tend to result from traditional human design methods, must 
deal with a multiplicity of concerns in real time. Evolutionary psychologists 
are also interested, of course, in longer time-scales than those that apply 
to the second-by-second control of behaviour. Ontogeny and phylogeny 
are also inherently temporal processes, so there may be a distinctive 
advantage in adopting the dynamical approach when trying to understand 
them.
Ontogeny and phylogeny have traditionally been described in terms that 
are, at least implicitly, digital. During the past ten years, however, 
dynamical accounts of these processes have grown in popularity (Depew 
and Weber, 1995). There are now interesting, though still rather 
speculative, accounts of both ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes that 
attribute to them complex nonlinear phenomena such as bifurcation.
Many traits, for example, are classed as innate or acquired, or analysed 
into innate and acquired components. This binary opposition, however, is 
too crude for most explanatory purposes. Here, a dynamical approach 
can help to make it clear that innateness is a question of degree. The 
resources of dynamical systems theory can also be applied directly to the 
question of how innate a given trait is by providing a mathematically 
precise model of Waddington’s epigenetic landscape (Waddington, 1940). 
The various factors influencing the shape of the landscape can each be
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represented as a different dimension in an n-dimensional state space, and 
the trajectories through this state space will then represent the possible 
paths taken by individual development or the evolution of a species. Nor 
is there any need, in such a model, to partition these factors on the basis 
of whether they are ‘genetic’ or ‘environmental’. Such a distinction serves 
no useful purpose (other than assisting animal and plant breeders), and 
the dynamical model makes this clear by treating all factors as equivalent 
sources of variance.
If one adopts the evolutionary approach to begin with, then, there are good 
reasons why one should also take a situated and a dynamical approach. 
The evolutionary approach, therefore, can be the basis of an integrated 
non-classical approach that differs from the classical approach in taking a 
view of minds as:
(i) Massively domain-specific
(ii) Leaky
(iii) Inherently temporal, and involving continuous as well as discrete 
systems
The integrated non-classical approach also differs from the classical 
approach in that these three tenets are much more closely linked by 
theoretical reasons than the assumptions of domain-generality, internalism 
and discreteness. The integrated non-classical approach is, in other 
words, truly integrated in a way that the classical approach is not.
From possibility to actuality
Another difference between the integrated non-classical approach and the 
classical approach is that, at moment of writing, the former only exists as a 
theoretical possibility. For several decades, almost all cognitive scientists 
subscribed to all three assumptions that define the classical approach. 
Many still do, though the number is gradually diminishing. However, there 
are very few cognitive scientists who reject all three classical assumptions.
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Many cognitive scientists today reject one, and some reject two, but hardly 
any challenge the classical approach on all three fronts. There are few, if 
any, proponents of the integrated non-classical approach I propose.
If anything, the proponents of one classical approach often seem to be 
more concerned to compete with proponents of the others rather than with 
building links between them. Exchanges between proponents of the 
various non-classical approaches to cognition can sometimes take on a 
very shrill tone, as if these approaches were mutually exclusive.
This is less true of relations between the situated and the dynamical 
approaches, where there have been some attempts to tie them together. 
Andy Clark, for example, has argued that the resources of dynamical 
systems theory are strongly preferable for understanding embodied, 
embedded agents. In particular, he claims that dynamical systems theory 
provides 'an explanatory framework that (1) is well suited to modelling both 
organismic and environmental parameters and (2) models them both in a 
uniform vocabulary and framework, thus facilitating an understanding of 
the complex interactions between the two' (Clark, 1997: 113). A 
framework that invokes digital components lacks these advantages.
However, this is far from being the common view among cognitive 
scientists working with a situated approach or those working under the 
banner of dynamical systems theory. Most of the time, each of these two 
schools of thought operate without much reference to the other. The 
same is true of evolutionary psychology with respect to both the situated 
and dynamical approaches. One looks in vain at the bibliographies of the 
various books and papers published by leading evolutionary psychologists 
for any mention of any works by the leading proponents of situated 
cognition (such as Andy Clark, Francisco Varela, George Lakoff and 
Rodney Brooks), nor of the earlier sources on which these writers draw
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(such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and J. J. Gibson).3 Likewise, most 
evolutionary psychologists seem to be unaware of the burgeoning work in 
dynamical cognition. It seems that evolutionary psychologists have, at 
least up to now, adopted a very narrow conception of cognitive science, 
one which is exclusively classical in all respects except its commitment to 
the evolved nature of mind. When reading Cosmides and Tooby, or 
Steven Pinker, one gets the impression that cognitive science is still 
entirely dominated by the disembodied, digital approach that characterised 
the discipline in its early days.
This is particularly unfortunate for, as I have just argued, the evolutionary 
approach can provide the foundation for an integrated non-classical 
approach. Evolutionary cognitive scientists are not logically obliged to 
adopt a situated and a dynamical approach, but there are good theoretical 
reasons why they should do so. By failing to realise this, evolutionary 
psychologists have so far missed the opportunity to lead a revolution in 
cognitive science.
The explanation for this may for have more to do with social and rhetorical 
reasons than with any failure of imagination on the part of evolutionary 
psychologists. The main priority for evolutionary psychology in its early 
days, in the late 1980s, was to establish itself as a credible research 
program in its own right. At that time, evolutionary theory was perceived 
as rather tangential to the business of discovering mental structure by 
most cognitive scientists. In challenging this assumption, as well as 
arguing for the domain-specificity of many mental processes, evolutionary 
psychologists had enough on their hands. Tying the evolutionary 
approach too closely to the situated and dynamical approaches, which 
were also perceived as ‘young Turks’ by the older generation of cognitive 
scientists, would have made it even harder to establish credibility (and 
thus to get jobs and funding). At a time when departments of cognitive
3 Geoffrey Miller is somewhat of an exception. He is the only evolutionary psychologist to 
make abundant references to J. J. Gibson and ecological psychology.
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science were run by those of a classical bent, retaining the classical 
assumptions of internalism and discreteness was probably necessary for 
evolutionary psychology for purely tactical reasons.4
Things are somewhat different now, though. The evolutionary approach is 
certainly not accepted by all -  indeed, there are still sections of the 
cognitive science community that are vehemently opposed to it -  but it has 
at least established itself as a major player. It has already acquired many 
of the status symbols of a thriving research program: scholarly journals 
that are peer-reviewed, learned societies, textbooks, academic positions, 
undergraduate courses, and annual conferences. Evolutionary 
psychology has also achieved something that other schools of thought in 
cognitive science never have, not even the classical approach: 
widespread popular appeal. This last feature, however, may actually 
have hindered the process of gaining academic acceptance (perhaps 
because classical cognitive scientists are jealous).
Now that evolutionary cognitive science is no longer an embryonic 
discipline but a rapidly maturing research program, the time would seem 
ripe for it to question its adherence to the classical assumptions of 
internalism and discreteness. If evolutionary psychologists have enough 
nerve and imagination, they could transform the integrated non-classical 
approach I have proposed here from a mere theoretical possibility into a 
historical reality.
Pluralism and compatibility
How would such an integrated non-classical cognitive science relate to its 
classical forbear? Confrontation would not necessarily be the order of the 
day. As I have argued in the previous chapters, the cognitive scientist is 
not necessarily forced to make a stark choice when faced with the issues 
of domain-generality and discreteness (internalism is a different matter, as
4 This point was suggested to me by Geoffrey Miller (personal communication).
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I will argue shortly). It is quite possible to build hybrid models that 
combine domain-general mechanisms with domain-specific ones (as 
Fodor did in The Modularity of Mind), or that combine discrete-state 
machines with analogue systems (e.g. Tani, 1999: 152). Thus, instead of 
talking about a 'paradigm shift' or a 'scientific revolution', then, the 
relationship between the integrated non-classical approach and the 
classical one might therefore be described more appropriately as one of 
assimilation, akin to the way that the theory of general relativity is 
sometimes described as absorbing Newton's theory of gravity as a special 
case applying only to a limited domain. This way of talking might help to 
avoid perpetuating the spurious confrontations that have dogged cognitive 
science in recent years. Andy Clark has argued persuasively for an 
eclectic approach to the mind in which we need to combine a variety of 
explanatory styles, including both the componential explanations typical of 
the classical approach and the dynamical explanations of more recent 
years. He suggests that progress in cognitive science will consist of 
'adding new tools' to the explanatory tool-kit, rather than abandoning those 
we already have. After all, if the mind were so simple that a single 
approach could unlock all its secrets, we would be so simple that we 
couldn't understand the theory!5
Still, if calls for pluralism are not to descend into sloppy thinking, we must 
be precise about the nature of the compatibility between the classical 
approach and the various non-classical approaches. Compatibility comes 
in various kinds.6 In particular, the claim that two approaches, A and B, 
are ‘compatible’ could be construed in at least three different ways:
(i) A and B provide different kinds of explanation
(ii) A and B are mutually inter-translatable
(iii) A and B explain different phenomena
5 Adapted from a phrase quoted by Andy Clark (Clark, 1997: 175). Clark states that he 
was unable to trace the originator of this remark.
6 I owe this point to Michael Wheeler (personal communication).
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I have argued that the evolutionary approach is compatible with the 
classical approach in sense (i), that the situated approach is compatible 
with the classical approach in sense (ii), and that the dynamical approach 
is compatible with the classical approach in sense (iii). I will now spell 
these compatibility claims out in more detail.
The classical approach and the evolutionary approach provide different 
kinds of explanation. Specifically, the former is fundamentally concerned 
with providing design explanations (how minds work), while the latter is 
concerned with functional-historical explanations (why minds work the way 
they do). Now, there may be ways of deriving constraints on the former 
kind of explanation from the latter; this is precisely what Cosmides and 
Toobey suggest when they propose that cognitive models should always 
be evaluated according to the evolvability criterion (see section 3.1). 
However, this possibility has not yet been conclusively demonstrated, as I 
showed by reference to the debate about domain-specificity. However, 
even if this were eventually to be proven to be the case, it would not call 
into question the general point that providing synchronic hypotheses about 
mental structure and providing diachronic hypotheses about the origins of 
such structures are different kinds of explanatory project. The links 
between them, if any, are empirical, not conceptual; we can only derive 
constraints about mental design from functional explanations by enriching 
the latter with a whole set of empirical assumptions about the adaptive 
problems posed by particular environments for particular lineages of 
organism.
The classical approach and the situated approach are mutually inter- 
translatable. As I argued in chapter four, whenever the proponent of the 
situated approach locates the input-output boundary of a particular 
computational system at some point outside the organism, the classical 
cognitive scientist can always re-describe this system in traditional 
internalist terms. Proponents of the situated approach can argue against 
this internalist move on the grounds that it is dogmatic and is of dubious
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explanatory value, but they cannot rule it out on purely logical grounds. 
The leaky mind hypothesis, when stated baldly, is the contradictory of the 
internalist view, but when it comes to applying these two approaches to 
real-world systems, there are no purely logical grounds for preferring one 
over the other. This logical compatibility, however, is not that exciting.
Finally, the classical approach and the dynamical approach are compatible 
in sense (iii): they explain different phenomena (and sometimes different 
aspects of the same phenomenon, which amounts to the same thing). I 
argued in chapter five that, insofar as continuous models can be taken as 
a separate class, they are better suited than discrete models to explaining 
‘low-level’ processes such as pattern-matching and limb-coordination. 
Discrete models, on the other hand, are better suited to modelling ‘high- 
level’ processes such as forward planning. Hence the cognitive scientist is 
not forced to choose between an exclusively discrete approach and an 
exclusively continuous one. She can construct hybrid models that use 
both digital and analogue components. The same point applies to the 
debate about domain-generality. It is possible to conceive of minds that 
employ both domain-general mechanisms and domain-specific ones. 
This, indeed, was the main thrust of Fodor’s proposal in The Modularity o f 
Mind (Fodor, 1983).
Calls for a kind of super-integrated cognitive science, combining the 
insights of the integrated non-classical approach and the classical one, 
must be careful to distinguish between these different kinds of 
compatibility. Otherwise, they risk leading us to blur the questions raised 
by the non-classical approaches, and thus to obscure their importance. It 
is hard to argue with calls for broad-mindedness and pluralism, but if such 
calls are to amount to anything more than the politically-correct view that 
‘everyone must have prizes’, they must tempt us into thinking that there 
are no real disagreements. Methodological pluralism is not an end in 
itself; it is simply a way of clearing aside the false oppositions so that we 
may concentrate on the genuine ones. The ultimate aim of cognitive 
science, after all, should not be to provide a cosy umbrella under which
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those of any persuasion can take shelter, but to answer the questions 
about how minds work and why they work the way they do.
6.2. An integrated non-classical approach to emotion
In section 3.2, I put forward a theory of emotion based on a proposal by 
Herbert Simon. According to this theory, emotions are defined in 
functional terms as interruption mechanisms. An interruption mechanism 
is one that can interrupt ongoing activity and temporarily take control of 
behaviour in the service of survival or reproductive goals. In section 4.2, I 
developed the interruption theory by showing how some of the 
computational burden it required could be offloaded from the brain onto 
the body and the environment. In section 5.2, I asked whether further 
refinements to the theory could be made by paying attention to the 
continuous features of emotion as well as the discrete ones.
The interruption theory can serve as an example of the integrated non- 
classical approach that I proposed in the previous section. It has all the 
hallmarks that define such an approach: domain-specificity, leakage, and 
continuity. Furthermore, the evolutionary approach is primary. The view 
of emotions as interruption mechanisms is based on the functional 
accounts of emotion provided by evolutionary psychology. Thus I started 
with evolutionary considerations, and used the situated and dynamical 
approaches serve to round out the theory.
The interruption theory, as I have sketched it out in this thesis, needs 
much more conceptual refinement. However, the bare bones are at least 
clear. The theory is already capable of generating specific hypotheses 
about the design of emotional systems. Such hypotheses could be tested 
by implementing these designs in artificial agents. Indeed, without this 
vital step, the interruption theory would remain of limited use to cognitive 
science.
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Classical versus non-classical approaches to emotion
The interruption theory is clearly non-classical in flavour, but this does not 
mean that it is incompatible with classical models of emotion. In the 
previous section, I outlined various ways in which theories can be 
compatible: providing different kinds of explanation, being mutually-
intertranslatable, and explaining different things. Is the interruption theory 
compatible with classical appraisal theory in any (or all) of these different 
ways?
(i) Kinds of explanation
The interruption theory provides a very different kind of explanation to that 
provided by the classical account of emotion. Appraisal theory and the 
propositional attitude theory both explain how emotions can be 
representational. The interruption theory takes this as given, and draws 
on evolutionary considerations to explain what emotions are 
representations of. Emotions, it claims, are representations of changes 
that are relevant to the achievement of some biological (i.e. survival- 
related or reproduction-related) goal. To be more precise, it is the function 
of emotions to represent such changes to the organism so that behaviour 
can be modified accordingly.
This general account needs to be fleshed out for each individual emotion. 
For each emotion, we need to say which biological goal the emotion is 
designed to serve. This provides a criterion for individuating emotional 
mechanisms: one goal, one mechanism. For example, fear is the
emotion designed to serve the goal of avoiding potential physical injury 
(trauma), whether as a result of being attacked by another organism, or as 
a result of some process in the nonliving environment such as an 
avalanche. The function of fear is thus to represent this danger to the 
organism so that ongoing activity can be interrupted, when necessary, to 
avoid the danger.
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The interruption theory complements the classical approach because the 
functional account it provides offers a new way of distinguishing between 
cognition and emotion. The classical approach had a rather conservative 
aim; to show how emotions could be seen as thoroughly representational, 
and thus count as true mental phenomena according to CTM. Appraisal 
theory and the propositional attitude theory achieved this aim by 
construing emotions as judgements. But this success was purchased at 
the price of destroying the only widely accepted account of how emotions 
differed from thoughts. Prior to appraisal theory and the propositional 
attitude theory, most psychologists had accepted Hume’s view that 
passion was to be distinguished from reason by reference to the concept 
of representation; reason was representational, while passion was not. 
The classical approach rejects this way of making the distinction between 
cognition and emotion, but offers no other way to make it. The interruption 
theory does. If emotions are interruption mechanisms, then, if cognition is 
a distinct kind of process, it must be the kind of process that cannot 
interrupt any other.
(ii) Inter-translatability
When the interruption theory is supplemented with considerations drawn 
from the situated approach, emotions can be seen as processes occurring 
in a system whose boundaries are not co-terminous with any single 
feature of the organism. On this view, although it is sometimes useful to 
view emotions as entirely neural processes, at other times it is useful to 
see them as processes that leak out of the brain into the rest of the body 
and even into the external world. Humans, in particular, have found ways 
of offloading the computational burden involved in deciding when to 
interrupt ongoing activity onto parts of their environment. Other animals 
succeed in doing this too, though to a lesser extent.
From a strictly logical point of view, there is nothing to prevent the classical 
cognitive scientist from re-describing the examples of embodied and 
embedded emotions in terms of a purely neural process that has complex
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feedback loops with bodily and environmental processes. The input- 
output boundary can always be moved back to the borders of the brain. 
Yet this type of compatibility claim is purely scholastic. There is more of 
an argument to be had here when one compares the two approaches with 
regard to explanatory fruitfulness rather than mere logical consistency. 
The design-based methodology of cognitive science means that the 
proper way to assess a research program is not via post-hoc logical 
assimilation to a given theory, but via practical research. In other words, 
the mere fact that two approaches are mutually intertranslatable should 
not lead us to overlook the possibility that one approach might lead 
consistently to much better working models.
(iii) Explanatory domains
If dynamical considerations can enrich the interruption theory by leading to 
a greater attention to the temporal features of emotion, this does not 
necessarily lead to any incompatibility with the classical approach. The 
classical models of emotion may not have been sufficiently sensitive to the 
details of timing, but nor did they deny the importance of such details. 
They simply ignored them. In this case, the interruption theory can be 
seen as supplementing the classical approach to emotion by providing 
explanations of different kinds of emotional phenomena. There is no real 
conflict here.
Domain-generality
The fact that the interruption theory is compatible with the classical 
approach to emotion in all these ways should not tempt us into thinking 
that there are no areas of disagreement at all. There does seem to be at 
least one major point of disagreement -  the issue of domain-generality. In 
the classical models, such as the OCC model, all emotional stimuli are 
processed by a single emotion-generating mechanism. In the interruption 
theory, however, each emotion is implemented by a distinct mechanism 
that attends only to the kind of input that is relevant to that emotion.
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However, it would be false to infer from this that the interruption theory is 
incompatible with the classical approach on this point. Although the actual 
models of emotion developed by appraisal theorists have all been domain- 
general, this need not have been the case. The domain-generality of 
appraisal-type models is a historical accident, not a theoretical necessity. 
There is nothing inherently domain-general about appraisal theory. The 
basic idea that emotions are judgements arrived at by attending to 
particular features of external (and possibly internal) stimuli is compatible 
with both a domain-general and a domain-specific theory of emotional 
mechanisms. Thus it is not quite correct to say that the interruption theory 
is opposed to the classical approach on this point. It is more accurate to 
say that the interruption theory is opposed to most of the models designed 
by appraisal theorists so far. Besides, taking a domain-specific view of 
emotion does not imply that one is also committed to a domain-specific 
view of cognition. It is possible to conceive of a hybrid model of the mind 
in which emotional processes are domain-specific while cognitive 
processes are domain-general.
An integrated theory of emotion
The interruption theory can be seen then, not just as an integrated non- 
classical approach to emotion, but as an integrated approach simpliciter. 
To call it ‘non-classical’ implies a wholesale rejection of the ideas of 
domain-generality, internalism and discreteness, taken as a single 
package. The interruption theory, however, is much more sophisticated 
than this. As I have just argued, it is compatible (in various different ways) 
with many aspects of the classical approach to emotion, and many 
aspects of the classical approach to cognition. To describe the 
interruption theory as ‘non-classical’ would be to obscure this compatibility.
This is all well and good. But since understanding emotions, at least from 
a cognitive perspective, entails building emotional machines, the litmus 
test of the interruption theory will not rest on such compatibility claims but
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on whether or not it leads us to better machine models of emotion. If it 
does, then this would not only vindicate the interruption theory itself, but 
would also support my proposal for an integrated approach to cognitive 
science in general.
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